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· • Oneida County 
Honor Stephan S . Dunn, ' r_- J ge 
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H , 
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LAW OFFICE OF PURDUE, BRANDON, FIELDER, COLLINS & MOTT; LISA NEILSON 
AND DOES 1 - 10 
Defendants/Respondents. 
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Honorable Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge 
Oneida County Case CV-2011-66 
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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 
SUPERVISORY MANDAMUS 
AUTHORITY ON SIGNIFICANT 
QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION 
ORDER OF DISQUALIFICATION 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO 
ORDER DENYING RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX - 7 
Oneida County Case CV-2011-66 
Supreme Court #39878-2012 
02/08/2012 401 III 
09/06/2011 285 II 
04/09/2012 454 III 
08/18/2011 150 I 
11108/2011 357 II 
08/29/2011 263 II 
06/10/2011 37 I 
04/09/2012 461 III 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
WAIVER OF CLERK'S RECORD FEE 
ORDER VACATING HEARING 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS SUPPORTED BY: (1) THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF HOLLI TELFORD, 
(2) THE AFFIDAVIT OF L.A. GREER, 
(3) THE AFFIDAVIT OF ELHAM 
NEILSEN, ( 4) THE AFFIDAVIT OF KIM 
VOGT, (5) THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
S. DURFEE, (6) VERIFIED RESPONSE 
TO COURT ORDER DATED AUGUST 
18, 2011 CROSS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS, MOTION TO QUASH AND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS, MOTION TO QUASH AND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-ADMITRA 
MILLS 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEF AULT AND DEF AULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
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Supreme Court #39878-2012 
05/03/2012 473 III 
08/24/2011 261 II 
09/01/2011 264 II 
08/18/2011 153 I 
08/18/2011 162 I 
06/27/2011 43 I 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-ARTIE 
ROSS 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l) CODY 
KELLY 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-PAUL 
KELLEY JR. 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-SANDRA 
COPELAND 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-SMITH 
COUNTY TRUSTEE 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-THE ESTATE 
OF PAUL KELLEY SR. 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX - 9 
Oneida County Case CV-2011-66 
Supreme Court #39878-2012 
06/27/2011 111 I 
06/27/2011 74 I 
06/27/2011 63 I 
06/27/2011 52 I 
06/27/2011 96 I 
06/27/2011 85 I 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST 
FOR 54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED 
OCTOBER 18, 2011 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
VERIFIED PLAINTIFF'S REPLY RESPONSE 
TO THE DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S I.R.C.P. RULE 
l l(a)(2)(B) MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED IN 
FAVOR OF GARY BARBER, TAB 
BEALL, LAW OFFICES OF PURDUE, 
BRANDON, FELDER, COLLINS & 
MOTT, A_ND SMITH COUNTY 
VERIFIED RESPONSES TO COURT ORDER 
DATED AUGUST 18, 2011 AND 
OPPOSING COUNSEL'S OBJECTION 
TO CONTIN1JANCE OF THIS CASE 
FILED ON AUGUST 16, 2011 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX - 10 
Oneida County Case CV-2011-66 
Supreme Court #39878-2012 
11114/2011 359 II 
06/06/2011 22 I 
11/21/2011 392 III 
08/23/2011 192 II 
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' 
HOLLI TELFORD 
AKA HOLLI LUNDAHL 
10621 S. Old Hwy 191 
Malad, Idaho 83252 3 ~ J~l 1 l 
__ Q.~~~_J''f. 
. Lfi-31P' ·.,. 0 h~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DLSTBl.CT~ . .:.;~~-~~-~- ~ 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA COPELAND, et al. 
Defendants 
Case No. CV 2011 -- 00066 
VERIFIED 
RESPONSES TO COURT ORDER DATED 
AUGUST 18, 2011 AND OPPOSING 
COUNSEL'S OBJECTION TO CONTINUANCE 
OF THIS CASE FILED ON AUGUST 16, 2011 
A VERIFICATION IS ATTACHED TO THIS 
RESPONSE TO CONVERT THIS RESPONSE 
INTO A SWORN STATEMENT 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Holli Lundahl to Respond to the Defendant's Objection 
to Plaintiffs Motion To Continue the instant proceedings as ordered by this Court on August 
18,2011. 
I. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. On August 9, 2011, the Sheriff of Oneida County, Idaho and 5 deputy 
officers conducted an illegal search and seizure of plaintiffs abode under a "general search 
warrant" proscribed under the Fourth Amendment. See Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 
404 (10th Cir. 1985) (The particularity requirement under the Fourth Amendment ensures 
that the search is confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific 
crime set forth in the warrant and for which there is probable cause.). 'These requirements 
prevent "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971). See also USA v. 
Albert Foster Jr., 100 F.3d 846 (1 Qth Cir. 1996) (It is beyond dispute, that the officers in this 
case viewed the warrant issued by the state judge as a general warrant and executed the 
warrant in accord with those views. Because the officers here flagrantly disregarded the 
terms of the warrant in seizing property "in general", "the particularity requirement was 
undermined and [the otherwise] valid warrant was transformed into a "general warrant" 
proscribed by the Fourth Amendment and thereby required suppression of all evidence 
seized under that warrant" citing Medlin II, 842 F.2d at 1199 (10th Cir. 1989). The evil that 
this circuit addressed in Medlin II was the use of an otherwise valid warrant to conduct a 
general search. With this particular evil in mind, the court held that blanket suppression 
was mandated when a warrant was executed to perform in reality a general 
search of the target's property. Our Supreme Court has observed: "It is familiar 
history that indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general 
warrants' were the immed- iate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment." Payton v. New York, 445 US 573, 583 (1980). This Amendment exists in 
recognition of "[t]he tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain 
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions," Marron v. United 
States, 275 U.S. 196 (1927). The particularity requirement guarantees "[a]s to what is to 
be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Id. 
Stanford v. State of Texas, 379 US 476 (1965) ("The indiscriminate sweep of language 
in a warrant is constitutionally intolerable.") A warrant that includes the dangerous 
phrase, "any and all data, including but not limited to" a list of items, turns a computer 
or other search warrant into an unconstitutional "general warrant." United States v. Fleet 
Management Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443-44 (E.D. Pa. 2007); see also Otero, 563 F.3d at 
1132 (warrant authorizing seizure of "any and all information and/or data" fails the 
particularity requirement.). United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 584 (D. Vt. 1998) 
(concluding that warrant to seize "[a)ll computers" was not sufficiently particular where 
description "did not indicate the specific crimes for which the equipment was sought, nor were 
the searching instructions embedded into the probable cause affidavit incorporated by 
reference into the warrant.") 
2. After plaintiff identified the facial defects in the general search warrant 
subsequent to the officers reading the whole of the warrant to plaintiff while standing on the 
outside of the locked screen storm door to plaintiff's home, and accordingly denying entry into 
her home based on those defects which effected the validity of the warrant, the officers 
kicked in plaintiffs screen storm door and forciably entered plaintiff's home. 
3. The officers handcuffed plaintiff to a chair in plaintiff's home office while the 
officers executed a general search of plaintiffs and other third persons properties, home, 
outbuildings, barn and vehicles ; searches that were unattended by any resident member 
because plaintiff had been handcuffed to a chair and barracaded into a corner of her home 
office during the search. The officers broke or cut off locks to cabinet doors, security 
drawers and to outbuildings in order to seize items securely locked in these structures and for 
which officers were given no consent either by plaintiff or other third persons to search and 
seize these items which were locked away from plain view. See 'People v. Gonzalez, 51 
Cal.3d 1179, 1260, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 776 (1990), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 835, 112 S. Ct. 117, 116 L Ed. 20 85 (1991) (" Without clear consent, the government 
does not have the right to 'fish' through private and privileged files to investigate possible 
crimes".). 
4. Part of the items also seized were all of plaintiffs case files including 
mailed pleadings and responsive pleadings; original evidentiary documents in support of 
proving plaintiffs cases at jury trial; electronic data from non-party witnesses constituting 
self authenticated evidence; electronically recorded phone messages from opposing parties 
establishing contact with the jurisdiction; electronic and documentary data memorializing 
work product, witness communications, investigatory matters for the cases and litigation 
strategies, etc. The entirety of the files pertaining to this case were seized by the sheriff's 
office; thereby raising serious questions as to whether opposing counsel was involved with 
the illegal seizure of plaintiffs protected and privileged materials in order to obstruct 
prosecution of the within case. 
5. Plaintiff complained about and vocally objected to the illegal searches and 
seizures of hers and other third person's properties to which plaintiff held powers of 
attorney. Plaintiff also demanded an electronic copy of all files on hers and others 
computers so that plaintiff would not be prejudiced by the seizure of these items and be forced 
to default on her pending civil and criminal traffic cases. See In re Search of 5444 
Westheimer Road, 2006 WL 1881370, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 6, 2006) (the Government is 
required to provide the property owner with an electronic copy of seized computer files; 
If the Government fails to do so then the defendant has an obligation to file a demand for 
return of the property because the Government's actions will be deemed unreasonable). See 
Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1993) (seized property will be returned if 
the government's continued possession is unreasonable.). 
6. Because plaintiff complained about these unlawful takings of her properties 
and the properties of third persons to which plaintiff held lawful possession, plaintiff was 
arrested for obstructing a police officer in the performance of his search duties and 
incarcerated in Bannock county jail. 
7. When Holli returned to her home three days later after being released on 
OR, her home and outbuildings were left unsecured and it appeared that in addition to the 
items seized under the general search warrant, the property had been stripped of removable 
non -- fixed items. Whether all items were taken by the sheriffs office or a subsequent theft 
took place, is anybody's guess. The point is, the sheriff had no lawful right to search 
plaintiffs premises, much less arrest plaintiff for objecting to the illegal taking of hers and 
others properties lawfully in plaintiffs possession ; so if a theft took place afterwards, it was 
a predicament caused by the Sheriffs illegal actions at the outset. 
8. Plaintiff immediately filed a handwritten motion to continue the within case. 
Plaintiff was unable to secure a sworn affidavit in support of the motion (an issue raised in 
opposing counsel's paragraph 2 of his Objection to plaintiffs motion for continuance), 
because the sheriffs office seized all of plaintiffs identification cards, bank cards and credit 
cards at the time of the search, and plaintiff needed an identification card for presentation to a 
notary to obtain a sworn affidavit. The only notary that could have executed a sworn 
statement for plaintiff based on that notary's personal knowledge of the identify of plaintiff, 
was this court's clerk Dianne Skidmore. When Ms. Skidmore was approached to notarize a 
declaration for plaintiff, Ms. Skidmore informed plaintiff that she was instructed by an 
unidentified authority after the search, not to execute anymore notaries for plaintiff. Plaintiff 
was thus forced to obtain new identification in order to execute a sworn notary before a 
person having no familiarity with plaintiff. 
9. On August 13, 2011, plaintiff returned to her property with a borrowed 
desktop computer which she hooked up to her internet cable. When Holli attempted to use 
the internet, . she received security warnings from various browsers. See exhibit "1" attached 
for computer messages admitting that Holli's internet access had been blocked. In spite of 
these warnings, Holli proceeded with accessing the internet and a virus was immediately 
sent to the attached computer causing this borrowed computer to crash. Holli has since 
been using wifi connections .at McDonalds to access the internet 
10. In paragraph 1 of page 2 of opposing counsel's Objection To Continuance, 
counsel cites the wrong rule which authorized opposing counsel's motions to dismiss. 
Because plaintiffs copies of opposing counsel's motions to dismiss were seized during the 
illegal search, plaintiff obtained additional copies from the court's file to confirm that the 
whole of all declarations and the memorandum filed by opposing counsel assert authority to 
dismiss plaintiff's complaint under l.R.C.P. Rule 12, not rule 56. Plaintiff therefore contends 
that rule 7 (b)(3) (B) or (E) controls the time limitations for rule 12(b) motions to dismiss. Rule 
7(b)(3). Time limits for filing and serving motions, affidavits and briefs, provides in part: 
(B) When a motion is supported by affidavit(s), the affidavit(s) shall be served 
with the motion, and any opposing affidavit(s) shall be filed with the court and 
served so that it is received by the parties no later than seven (7) days before 
the hearing. 
(E) Any brief submitted in support of a motion shall be filed with the court and 
served so that it is received by the parties at least fourteen (14) days prior to the 
hearing. Any responsive brief shall be filed with the court and served so that it 
is received by the parties at least seven (7) days prior to the hearing. Any reply 
brief shall be filed with the court, and served so that it is received by 
the parties, at least two (2) days prior to the hearing. 
Opposing Counsel asserts that because his motions to dismiss are subject to being 
converted to summary judgment motions given he filed affidavits with his motions to reach 
Rule 12(b )(6) matters in plaintiffs complaint on their merits, that this procedural manuever 
changed the timeline in which plaintiff was to respond to the defendant's motions or be 
deemed defaulted. Plaintiff disagrees. Rule 7 refers to the filing of affidavits in support of 
motions and requires that responsive briefs and opposing affidavits be filed 7 days before the 
scheduled hearing date. Plaintiff contends Rule 7 controlled the time limitations for filing 
responsive breifs, not rule 56. 
In researching case law to interpret this issue, the only case plaintiff could find 
was In the adoption of John Doe v. Idaho Dept. of Health And Welfare, Docket no. 37936 
(Idaho Supreme Court, 2011 ). The Idaho Supreme Court found that the Department had 
filed a motion to dismiss under l.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) along with an affidavit by its attorney stating 
that the Department would not consent to the Does adopting A.H. Does filed a timely 
opposition . The hearing was held 14 days later, and the magistrate court indicated that it 
was treating the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment under LR.C.P. 56(c) 
because it was considering the Department's affidavit. The Civil Rules provide that if matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, a motion under l.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) shall be treated as one for summary judgment. l.R.C.P. 12(b). Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 
144 ldaho 829, 831, 172 P.3d 1104, 1106 (2007). Because the district court considered the 
Department's affidavit in its decision, the Court properly treated the matter as an order 
granting summary judgment. Here, the Supreme Court affirmed that it was within the courts 
discretion to consider or exclude affidavits, and that if the affdavits were considered, then 
the judgment would be converted to a Rule 56 judgment. In the case at bar, opposing 
counsel is purporting to revoke the court's discretionary powers to consider or exclude the 
affdavits; a necessary predicate to converting the proceeding into a summary judgment 
proceeding. Therefore, Rule 7 controls the time limitations on these proceedings. 
This conclusion would be supported by the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in 
Parkside Schools v. Bronco Elite Arts, 177 P .3d 390 (Idaho Supreme Ct. 2008) . Here 
Parkside filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice under Rule 41 (a)(1) which provides for 
filing a "Notice of Dismissal", not a motion. The Court found that l.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) controls 
the procedure to be employed with the filing of "any motion", excepting motions for summary 
judgment and given the district court ignored the provisions under rule 7(b)(3), the high court 
overturned the dismissal corder and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
Given the foregoing, Plaintiffs responses for the August 19, 2011 hearing were 
not due until August 11, 2011, not August 5, 2011 as alleged by opposing counsel. 
Nevertheless this issue is moot because counsel amended the hearing date to August 26, 
2011. 
Following the foregoing rules, plaintiff's response brief and remainder opposing 
affidavits would not have been due until August 19, 2011 - under the 7 day rule - for a 
hearing scheduled for August 26, 2011. 
Nevertheless, plaintiff does not have access to a paid law library like counsel 
does. Moreover, the only public law library in the state is located in Boise Idaho, more than 7 
hours drive from plaintiff's house located in a rural community on the east side of Idaho. 
Consequently plaintiff's resources are limited to what plaintiff can locate online and it takes 
considerably more time to locate those resources online, if any can be found. At the time 
the Oneida County Sheriff's office illegally searched and seized plaintiff's abode and 
properties in a seeming attempt to obstruct plaintiff's access to the courts by stealing plaintiff's 
case files, among other illegal actions, plaintiff had invested more than two weeks of online 
research in an opposing brief for this case. In fact, at the time the sheriffs came knocking on 
plaintiff's door, plaintiffs was in the process of editing her response brief for this case and had 
intended on filing the response brief by the end of the day on August 9, 2011. When the 
officers made clear their intent to seize all of plaintiff's case files and computers etc., plaintiff 
pleaded with the officers to tender her an electronic copy of all files on her computer so that 
plaintiff could complete her response brief in this and other cases plaintiff is presently 
litigating. The officers refused and hauled plaintiff off to jail for obstructing an officer in the 
performance of a search and seizure duty. The officers then seized everything from plaintiff's 
location by breaching the security devices plaintiff had in place. 
According to the foregoing, plaintiff's responsive documentation would not 
have been subject to be stricken because it was untimely at any time before the seizure of 
plaintiff's documentation on August 9, 2011. 
11. Because no legal reason existed for the seizure of plaintiffs privileged 
materials as it applied to this proceeding, it would be very interesting indeed if the defendants 
reply papers seek any collateral advantage from the illegal search and seizure of plaintiff's 
properties on August 9, 2011. 
12. In paragraph 2 of opposing Counsel's objection to the Plaintiff's motion for 
continuance, counsel complaints that Plaintiff has not provided sworn statements regarding 
the events which resulted in plaintiffs motion for continuance. Plaintiff has now obtained 
new identification and is able acquire a notary to take plaintiffs oath regarding this matter and 
said notary's jurat is affixed to the verification summing up this response which is attested as 
true and correct under penalty of perjury. 
13. On August 13, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify Magistrate Evans 
from sitting on the Obstruction of Jutice prosecution re the illegal search and seizure 
performed on plaintiff's property commencing August 9, 2011. On August 18, 2011, the trial 
court administrator disqualified Magistrate Evans and assigned Magistrate Laggis to plaintiff's 
criminal case. See exhibit "2" attached for reassignment order. 
14. On August 22, 2011, plaintiff herein filed an ex parte mandamus petition in 
the criminal case, petitioning in part for the immediate return of all properties illegally seized 
from plaintiff's residence from August 9, 2011 through August 12, 2011. That Mandamus 
petition is attached hereto as exhibit "3". Plaintiff has placed her mandamus petition before 
the assigned court on an emergency and expedited basis. As soon as Magistrate Laggis 
grants the petition, plaintiff will have access to her illegally seized properties taken in this 
case ... assuming the bailees prefer to avoid a criminal contempt charge. If Magistrate 
Laggis denies plaintiff's mandamus petition, then the denial order is a final order subject to 
immediate appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court; an election that plaintiff will exercise. As 
soon as plaintiff obtains custody of her stolen documentary and electronic files, plaintiff will 
be able to prosecute this case in spite of the pending obstruction case given plaintiff has also 
sought a protective order against further search and seizures. The defendants should not be 
permitted to take advantage of the illegal search and seizure given it is reasonably suspicious 
that these defendants may have colluded with the Sheriff's office and sitting prosecutor to 
steal plaintiffs records regarding this case for the purpose of obstructing same. 
15. If any prejudice exists in this case, it exists to plaintiff, not any defendant. 
For example, as averred in her filed affidavit in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion To 
Dismiss, Holli attested that she had borrowed funds to expedite the purchase of the 
properties at issue in this case. Holli obtained a letter of credit from her bank confirning 
Holli's loan credits to be applied towards the sales transactions at issue. That letter of credit 
is found at exhibit "2" attached to Holli's affidavit. Exhibit "4" attached to Holli's affidavit is the 
electronic confirmation by the lawfirm of Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and Sampson LLP ( the 
lawfirm admittedly constructing the deed to be transferred to plaintiff upon signature by Lois 
Mosley) verifying that Charlene Fugler from their law office will be emailing plaintiff a copy of 
another demand document on plaintiffs letter of credit and then will mail the original of this 
demand document to plaintiff for personal presentation to plaintiffs bank. This lawfirm has 
already taken one draw on plaintiff's letter of credit for payment of the home which picture is 
attached as exhibit "8" to Holli's affidavit. This home has been permanently affixed to the 
property. Attached to this response as exhibit "4" is yet another original copy of a letter from 
plaintiffs bank verifying that $4,214.77 was credited from plaintiffs loan proceeds from 
America First Bank and as admitted in the letter of credit, as an initial draw on the entire 
transaction, and wire transferred to the Law Offices of Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and 
Sampson LLP in March of 2011. Attached to the letter is the wire transfer transcript identfying 
Holli's Idaho address as the applicant for the letter of credit. The Law Offices of Linebarger, 
Goggan, Blair and Sampson LLP accepted partial funds for this transaction as Smith County's 
contracted agent. Draws on Letter of Credits permits the applicant to enforce the transaction 
subject of the draw. See Synergy Center v. Lone Star Franchising, 63 S.W.3d 561 (Tex.App.-
Austin, 2001) (letter of credit is a contract promising payment and can be specifically 
enforced or avoided on grounds of breach.) Blickenstaff v. Clegg, Docket n. 29901 (ID, 2004) 
(letter of credit is equivalent to a gaurantee of payment.) Loscha Falls LLC v. State, 207 P.3d 
963 (Idaho, 2009) (letter of credit was instrument gauranteeing payment of costs). SRS 
Products v. LG Engineering, 994 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.App., 1999) (The beneficiary of the letter 
of credit is the seller and the account party is the purchaser. The seller is guaranteed payment 
on the transaction through a letter of credit proferred by the pruchaser.). The prejudice exists 
to plaintiff because the interest rate for real estate transactions has increased 2% since the 
sale was confirmed to plaintiff. Plaintiff cannot lock the interest rate on her loan until title is 
completely conveyed to plaintiff and the property may be used as collateral security for the 
letter of credit 
16. In addition, opposing counsel does not deny that plaintiff made significant 
improvements to the property after plaintiff was promised and believed she had color of title. 
But opposing counsel essentially calls plaintiff a fool for improving property before she had the 
deed in hand. The Idaho Supreme Court in Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142; 158 P.3d 305; 
2007 Ida. LEXIS 82 (Idaho 2007) affirmed its ruling in Smith v. Long, 76 Idaho 265, 277, 281 
P.2d 483, 491-92 (1955) , that occupiers who make improvements to real property in good 
faith while believing they had color of title would be entitled to compensation for those 
improvements. Texas law requires a similar result. The monies expended on those 
improvements again came from draws on plaintiffs letter of credit buttressed by the loan in 
favor of plaintiff. Again Plaintiff is prejudiced by ever increasing interest rates because this 
matter has not been judicially settled in an expedited manner in plaintiffs favor. 
17. The defendants on the the hand have suffered no prejudice by the within 
transaction because they seek to steal plaintiffs properties and have that theft judicially 
sanctioned by this court. 
18. With respect to opposing counsel's irregularity claim re plaintiffs statement 
that Oneida County Sheriff has the power to shut down plaintiffs internet account, exhibit "1" 
attached speaks for itself. Plaintiff can also email pictures of exhibit "1" which she took 
directly from the computer before a virus crashed the borrowed computer. Plaintiff is not a 
computer nerd and does not know how officials did what they did, she only knows it 
happened. 
19. With respect to counsel's assertion that plaintiff can go elsewhere to use the 
internet, plaintiff has already admitted that she uses the internet service provided at 
McDonalds. Gmail access however has been locked. 
20. As to magistrate Evans being disallowed from sitting on any case naming 
plaintiff, that matter is a sealed matter before the judicial misconduct commission. 
21. Furthermore, opposing counsel complains that they should not have to 
expend additional time and resources in this civil case becaus~ of plaintiff needing to address 
her criminal case. The cases are indeed separate and plaintiff has expeditiously demanded 
that her properties relating to this case that were illegally seized on August 9, 2011 be 
immediately returned. This requires no additional expenditure from the defendants. 
22. Finally, plaintiff contends that the motions to dismiss submitted by the 
defendants may not be ruled on as a matter of law; indeed they are very fact intensive with 
respect to the fraud committed by the defendants and introduced into the forum to procure 
plaintiff to part with substantial amounts of money based on the defendant's false promises; 
actions remedial under Idaho's Consumer Protection act and Idaho's racketeering act. 
23. The defendant's contention that this court should just give this case to the 
defendant's because the court has ruled that plaintiff must personally serve the defendants 
with the process herein rather than employ the service procedures specifially set forth under 
the Idaho Consumer Protection act as it applies to non-resident offenders, lacks merit. First 
the defendants have made a general appearance by pleading that plaintiff cannot state a 
cause of action against the defendants on any of her claims as a matter of law. Given the 
defendants have sought affirmative relief from this court by way of asking this court to rule that 
plaintiffs claims are frivolous as a matter of law, this court has already acquired personal 
jurisdiction over these defendants, and whether service was proper or not, is not a moot 
issue as to these defendants. Moreover as set forth supra, plaintiff did not fail to timely 
respond to these defendants motions; plaintiff was clearly obstructed from timely responding. 
The only question is, did these defendants have any part in that obstruction? 
THIS PART IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff requests that this court continue these 
proceedings until plaintiff's properties are ordered returned to plaintiff by the newly assigned 
magistrate Laggis. At that time, plaintiff will prepare her response and request oral 
argument. 
VERIFICATION UNDER OATH 
I, Holli Telford, being first duly sworn upon oath, state under penalty of pejury that 
each of the foregoing statements of fact and conclusions of law are true and correct, and 
that the documents attache.d here~o are true and corrr~ies of the original doc~ments. 
Further your afflant saith naught, ~, · 
' { I 
~? 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this p.,_") day of August, 2011. 
SP.NOY Fl\CER 
Nok' 1 °ublic 
State 01 Idaho ( Notary Public 
I. J. ?- /0-l/\y Cornmi;sion f:xpi1es_....__,__--""'~2--
1 
rz .. 
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DUSTIN W. SMITH 
Oneida County Prosecuting Attorney 
30 North 100 West 
Malad City, Idaho 83252 
Telephone: (208) 766-2201 
Facsimile: (208) 766-2202 
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Tiffi 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANu FOR TIIE COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
IN TIIE MATTER OF THE 
APPLICATION FOR A 
SEARCH W ARRA.~T. 
MAGISTRATE DMSION 
****** 
CASE NO. 
-----
) 
) 
) 
) 
). 
) 
SEARCH W ARR~T 
COPY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, TO AA1Y SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHAL OR 
POLICEMAN IN THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA, STATE OF IDAHO: 
PROOF, by Affidavit having been this day made before me by Sheriff J.P. Semrad of the 
Oneida County Sheriff's Department, that there is probable cause to believe that certain property 
and/or evidence consisting of information, data, communications, correspondence, electronic 
images or data, digital images or data, te:x."t messages, e-mails, electronic or other messages or 
communications or information or data, computers, laptop computers, computer hardware, 
computer software, computer drives, hard drives, storage devices, disks, CD-ROMS, thumb 
drives, jump drives, or similar instruments used or associated with electronic or digital 
information or data, routers, modems, and network equipment used to connect computers to the 
i(' u I 
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r 
internet, items or instrumentalities evidencing v.'ho used, owned, or controlled any of the 
aforementioned items together with anything evidencing who created, edited, or deleted such 
items such as logs, registry entries, saved usemames and passwords, documents, browsing 
history, user profiles, records of use of routers, modems, computers and network equipment used 
to connect to the internet, records or information pertaining to internet protocol addresses, 
records of internet activity including firewall logs, caches, browser history and cookies, together 
with any similar record or information in whateYer form and by v.ilatever means ~ 
together with any items, instrumentalities, memory, or drives associated with the same, toget:hcr 
with any item, instrumentality, document, writing, drawing, painting, printing, file, or 
representation or reproduction thereof, and any mechanism or item used to print or type or create 
or alter or be used in conjunction with creating, generating, altering, forging, reproducing, 
publishing or conveying any written or electroajc items or instruments, v.hlch may exist in, on, 
1--· upon, or within a residence or home, white siding _and blue roof, and outbuildings, sheds, 
garages, and storage areas appurtenant thereto, located at 10621 South Old Highway 191, Malad 
City, Oneida County, Idaho, the property of Holli Telford, Holli Lundahl, R.M. Telford, Ruth 
Marlene Telford, James Keddington, and/or Marie Marchant, together with any 
instrumentalities, and/or any indicia, evidence, item, information, material or instrumentality 
which indicates use, possession, ownership, dominion, control, connection with, or distribution 
of any of the above mentioned property or items, and the Court having specifically hereby 
warrant is easily concealed and/or destroyed in a very short period of time. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED, at any time of the day and/or night to make 
\ 
immediate search of the above-described item for the items or evidence descnlied above, and if 
you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Oneida County 
Courthouse in the City of Malad, Oneida County, Idaho. 
RETURN of this Warrant is to be made to the above-entitled Court within ten (10) days 
from the date hereof. 
GIVEN UNDER.MY HAND and DATED this 2_ l!f;, o~, 2011. 
~~ 
Magistrate Division 
15 
2 
- 2-01-
Warrant for the serach of Timothy McVeigh's 1977 Mercury Marquis file:///C:/Users/elham/Desktop/mcveighwarrant.html 
Search Warrant for the Vehicle of Ti1nothy Mc Veigh 
The file includes a list of items found in the vehicle 
(May 5, 1995) 
States District Court 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 
!APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
In the matter of the search of AUTOMOBILE LOCATED AT 1977 MERCURY 
:MARQUIS AUTOMOBILE LOCATED AT 1009 N.W 4TH STREET 
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 
I, Henry C Gibbons, being duly sworn depose and say I am a Special Agent. 
Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, and have reason to believe that on the premises 
known as, AUTOMOBILE: Yellow 1977 Mercury Marquis, currently located at 
1009 N W. 4th Street, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in the Western District of 
Oklahoma, there is now contained certain property, namely yellow 1977 Mercury 
'
Marquis, and for which a comprehensive forensic examination of its contents 
could reveal items. including but not limited to, hair, fibers, oil, fuel, soil, grass, 
chemicals and fingerprints which has been used as the means of committing a 
criminal offense and which is property that constitutes evidence of the 
commission of a criminal offense specifically a violation of Title 18, United 
States Code, Sectlon 844(£).The facts to support a finding of Probable Cause 
areas follows: See attached Affidavit of Special Agent Henry C. Gibbons, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, which is incorporated by reference herein.Continued on 
· the attached sheet and made a part hereof 
HENRY C. GBBONS 
Special Agent 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
I
. Sworn to before me and subscribed in my presence on this 5th day of May, 1995, 
at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 
DAVID L. RUSSEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
AFFIDAVIT 
I, HENRY C. GIBBONS, being duly sworn, Hereby state that I am an agent v.rith 
the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, having been so employed for 26 years and as 
such am vested with the authority to investigate violations of federal laws, 
inciuding Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(£) This affidavit is submitted 
in support of a search warrant for a 1977 yellow Mercury Marquis in the 
pcssession of the Federal Bureau ofinvestigation(FBI). FUrther, Affiant states: 
1
1 The follomng information was received by the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation 
lduring the period Apri' 19, 1995 to May 4, 1995. 
! 2, On April 19, 1995, a powerful exploslve device detonated in front of the 
. - :zos~ 
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jAlfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OY-Jahoma, at 
1approximately 9:00 a.m. Among the many people killed by the bombing are 
employees of the numerous federal agencies which had offices in the building. 
3. Investigation by Federal agents at the scene of the explosion has determined 
that the explosive was contained in a 1993 Ford truck O\vned by Ryder Rental 
Company. a. A partial vehicle identification number (VIN) was found at the scene 
of the explosion and determined to be from a part of the truck that contained the 
explosive device. 57 /5/45 B. The Vin which was completely redonstructed was 
traced back to a truck owned by Ryder Rentals of Miami, Florida. c. Ryder 
Rentals informed the FBI that the truck was assigned to a rental company known 
as Elliot's Body Shop in Junction City Kansas. 
4. The rental agent at Elliot's Body Shop in Junction City_ was intervied by the 
FBI_ on April 19, 1995, and advised that two persons had rented the truck on 
April 17, 1995. The individual who signed the rental agreement provided the 
following informatlon: a. the person who signed the rental agreement identified 
himself as Bob Kling, SSAN 962-42-9694, South Dakota driver's license number 
YF942A6, and provided a home address of 428 Maple Drive, Omaha, Nebraska, 
telephone 913-238-2425. The person listed the destination as 428 Maple Drive, 
Redfield, South Dakota. b. Subsequent investigation conducted by the F3I 
determined all that information to be false. 
5. An employee of Elliot's Body Shop in Junction City, Kansas, identified 
Timothy McVeigh from a photographic array as the person who rented a Ryder 
1
truck on April 17, 1995, and signed the rental agreement. 
6. An employee of the Dreamland Motel in Junction City, Kansas, identified 
Timothy McVeigh as a guest at the motel from April 14, 1995, through April 18, 
1995. This employee, when sho"WD. a photo lineup identified Timothy McVeigh's 
picture as the individual who registered at the motel under the name of Tim 
Mc Veigh, listed his automobile as a Mercury bearing an Arizona license plate, 
and provided a Michigan address, onNorthVan Dyke in Decker Michigan. 7. On 
April 17, 1995, Trmothy James McVeigh was arrested in Noble County, 
I Oklahoma, on traffic and weapons offenses and was thereafter incarcerated on 
I those charges in Perry, Oklahoma. Mc Veigh's arrest occurred approximately 
1
60-70 miles north o Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, approximately 1 hour and 2o 
minutes after the April 19, 1995, explosion that damaged the Alfred P. Murrah 
!Federal Building. At the time of his arrest, McVeigh was driving a 1977 yellow 
I 
Mercury Marquis. 
8. On Ap-il 21, 1995, a criminal complaint was filed charging Timothy James 
I
McVeigh with a violation of 18 U.S.C. 844 f) based on his involvement of the 
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building. Later that day, McVeigh was taken into 
I 
federal custody. 
1
9. On April 27, 1995, a prelinlinary hearing was held on this charge, evidence 
1was presented and the federal magistrate judge found that there was probable 
I ~ause to believe that an offense had been committed and that Mc Veigh committed 
I it 
[ 10. Based on intervie\:VS and other evidence developed by the FBI, there is reason 
I 
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[to believe McVeigh did not act alone in committing this offense: a. The employee 
1
1 at Elliot's Body Shop in Junction City, Kansas, where the truck subsequently used 
as the bomb vehicle was rented, has advised that the vehicle was picked up by 
two persons; b. Two witnesses at the scene of the Alfred P Murrah building on 
April 19, 1955, observed a person believed to be Timothy James McVeigh with 
another person departing the area of the Murrah Building shortly before the 
bombing. One of these witnesses observed the person they believed to be 
Timothy James Mc Veigh leave the area in a yellow or cream-colored Mercury; 
11. Supervisory Special Agent(SSA) James T. Thurman, Chief, Explosives Unit 
Washngton, D C , Bomb Data Center, FBI Laboratory, advised that: a the bomb 
which detonated in front of the Murrah Federal Building on April 13, 19949, 
contained a high explosive main charge initiated by as yet unknown methods; b. 
an explosive device of the magnitude which exploded in Oklahoma Cily on April 
19, 1995, would have been constructed over a period of time utilizing a large 
quantlty of both paraphernalia and materials, which may have included, but not 
been limited to, the following: fertilizer, fuel oil, chemicals, dynamite, military 
explosives, detonators (blasting caps), electrical or non-electrical fusing systems, 
· wires, batteries, timing devices, burning type fuse, mixing and other containers. c. 
The construction of an explosive device similar to the one believed to have 
caused the damage to the Murrah Building would necessarily have involved the 
efforts of more than one person. ' 
12. On. April 21, 1995, United States District Judge David L. Russell authorized 
a search warrant for the 1977 Mercury Marquis based upon an application and 
affidavit of the United States Among the items located during the course of the 
search of the 1977 yellow Mercury Marquis were human hairs of value for 
· comparison purposes of more than one person. 
13. On May 2, 1995, FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Richard S. Hahn 
advised affiant that during the course of the initial search, a test for latent 
. fingerprints utilizing Cyano Acrylate was not conducted. SSA Hahn advised that 
the Cyano Acrylate search procedure can produce latent finger prints of value 
which other tests cannot produce. 
[ 14. A comprehensive forensic processing and examination of the vehicle and its 
contents could reveal hair, fibers, oil, fuel, soil, grass, chemicals and fingerprints 
which could be used to identify the presence of other persons present in the 
vehicle with Timothy James McVeigh and/or the presence of chemicals which 
could be used in the construction of the explosive device, and/or could be used to 
place the vehicle at locations where the explosive device may have been 
constructed, and/or could provide other evidence of the relationship of the vehicle 
and its owner to the explosion in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Moreover, during 
the course of this investigation, evidentiary items, including man-made and 
natural fibers, hairs, cloth, oil, fuel, other compounds, soil and grass have been 
I 
seized from the Dreamland motel room, described paragraph 6 where Mc Veigh 
stayed, and from a location at Geary State Fishing Lake, approximately six miles 
I south of Junciton City, Kansas, where witnesses described seeing a Ryder truck 
parked next to a pickup truck in an unpaved area on April 18, 1995. The pickup 
-2.iD -
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·truck was described as a 1980-1987 Chevrolet or GMC truck, dark blue or brown 
in color, Vvith possibly a white camper shell back. Terry Nichols, who has 
admitted that he is an associate of Mc Veigh, and who has stated that he loaned his 
pickup truck to Mc Veigh on April 18, 199 5, in Junction City, Kansas, owns a 
1984 GMC blue pick-up truck with a white camper top. An additional, 
comprehensive processing and examination of the yellow 1977 Mercury Marquis 
is needed in order to obtain representative samples and quantities capable of 
I analysis for purposes of comparison with the items described above. 
15. Based upon the aforesaid, your affiant believes that probable cause exists to 
believe that the yellow 1977 Mercury Marquis, which is currently in FBI custody, 
is property which has been used as a means of committing a violation of Section 
I 844(f) of Title 18, United States Code. Affiant also believes that probable cause 
exists to believe that the yellow 1977 Mercury Marquis currently in FBI custody 
consists of and contains items, both visible and latent, which are evidence of a 
criminal offense, namely Section 844(f) of Title 18, United States Code, or which 
can be compared to items seized and identified which are such evidence. 
16. Based on the aforesaid and Rule 41 (b ), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
affiant wishes to seize said vehicle as evidence and to examine and process said 
vehicle and its contents Affiant believes there is a probable cause for law 
enforcement officials.to conduct laboratory examinations on this vehicle and its 
contents for trace evidence materials to associate the vehicle with the bombing of 
the Alfred P.Murrah Federal Building, the mixing of explosives and to link said 
•vehicle to any other coconspirators. Further your a:ffiant sayeth not. 
Henry C. GIBBONS 
Special Agent 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 1977 MERCURY +MARQUIS 
1. Explosive materials and residue including but not limited to the following: 
Military explosives, C4, ammonium nitrate, dynamite, water gels, emulsions, 
detonating cord, explosive boosters, free flowing powders, including but not 
limited to black powder, pyrodex and smokeless powder and explosive detonators 
including but not limited to electric and non-electric. 
1
2. Fuzing systems including but not limited to clocks, timers, radio transmltters, 
1 servo motors and components, wires, electncal andlor mechanical switches, time 
fuse, chemical delays, andlor any other source of power. 
3. Non-explosive construction materials including but not limited to tape, v.riring, 
adhesives, fasteners, containers, nails, staples, or any other matenal necessary to 
I assemble IED devices. 
4. Non-explosive fragmentation material including nails, screws, wire and other 
metal fragment which could be used to enhance the damage effect of the 
- 21i - 2f) 
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I l . 1exp os1on. 
5. IED construction tools which would include but are not limited to scewdrivers, 
cnrnpers,wire strippers, knives, pliers, hammers, fingernail clippers, files, electnal 
tools such as saws, dulls and presses. 
6. Documentation which would include but not limited to schematics, bluepnnts, 
receipts for purchase of items, uhow to+ magazines, books and pamphlets which 
described construction, design and assembly techniques, directions, maps and 
blueprints of target sites and potential target sites, communications, memos and 
photographs which would include descriptive infonnation such as telephone 
numbers, addresses, affiliations and contact points of individuals involved in a 
conspiracy to manufacture, transport and/or detonate the explosive device used at 
the Alfred P. Mc:rrah building on April 19, 1995. 
7. Any assembled explosive and/or detonation device. 
8. Photographs, maps, hotel receipts, rental receipts, notes, ledgers, phone 
numbers, address books, commerical transportation receipts, and firearms, 
ammunition, digital pager(s), cellular phones, chemical formulas, and/or recipes 
for explosives. For which items there is probable cause stated in the Affidavit in 
support of the Application for the Search of the 1977 Mercury Marquis, and 
which items are evidence and instrumentalities of a violation of 18 U.S.C. + 371 
and 844(f). 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
: INVESTIGATION 
page 1/1 
date April 21, 1995 
1977 yellow Mercury Marquis VIN 2260A613847 
Description ofltems: 
1 black ball cap from front passenger seat 
2 one sheet of paper from front passenger seat 
3 one enveloped containing contents unopened from front passenger seat 
4 one clipboard form front passenger seat 
5 one Wrigley gum ·wrapper from between from passenger seat 
6 one pair brown gloves from under passenger seat 
1
7 debris from under rear seat( includes .55) 
. 8 dry swabbing from door handles and steering wheels 
19 dry swabbing from drivers side sun visor 
10 white rag from trunk 
11 carpeting from trunk 
112 dry swabbing from trunk (illegible) 
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AUG-18-2011 l0:12AM FROM-Bannock 6th Dist.Cr! 20M36-7012 MSO P.001/002 F-SB7 
IN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTIRC'!' 
OF THc STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOLLI LUNDAHL, 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CR-2011-719 
) 
) 
) 
Filed AT f12lJ!i. O'clock--ftM 
Defendant. ) ORDER OF ASSIG1'tr:MENT 
TIIE Honorable Dave Evans having disqualfied himself; 
TT TS HEREBY ORD£RED that rhe above matter be and hereby is assigned to the 
Honorable Paul Laggis for all further proceedings. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this August l 8, 2011 
Suzanne H. Johnson 
Trial CounAdministrator 
Sixth Judicial District 
DALE HATCH, Bannock County Clerk of the Court 
BY, Deputy Clerk 
AUG-IMVll l0:12Ah! FROM-Bannock Sth Dist Crt 20M3HOl2 T-360 P.002/00Z F-687 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THERE BY CERTJFY that on the August 1 &, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoi11g document on the following person(s): 
Honorable Dave Evans 
Oneida County Magistrate Coun 
I 0 Court Street 
Malad City, Idaho 83252 
QU.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
0Hand Delivery (Courthouse Mail) 
(glFax 
Honorable Paul Laggis 
Power County Magistrate Court 
543 Bannock Avenue 
American Falls, Idaho 83211 
QU.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
0Hand Delivery (Courthouse Mail) 
[2JFax 
0U.S.Mail 
0Hand Delivery (Courthouse Mail) 
0Fax 
Ou.s. Mail 
01-land Delivery (Courthouse Mail) 
OF ax 
Deputy Clerk 
-ZI~' 
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Holli Telford Lundahl 
10621 S. Old Hwy 191 
Malad Idaho 83252 
208-4 73-5800 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ONEIDA COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
Defendant 
Case No. CR 2011-719 
VERIFIED EX PARTE APPLICATION 
FOR 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS. 
FOR ORDERS: 
(1) RETURNING ILLEGALLY SEIZED PROPERTY 
(2) FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
(3) FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT 
(4) FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE 
(5) FOR PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF HOLLI 
(6) FOR REMOVAL OF PROSECUTOR DUSTIN 
SMITH, AND; 
(7) OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF 
COMES NOW Holli Telford Lundahl and PETITIONS this Court EX PARTE for a 
Writ of Mandamus directing Oneida County Officials to: (1) Immediately return all of the 
defendant's and other third person's properties illegally seized on August 9, 2011; (2) For a 
protective order against the illegal use of, interference with, or collateral gain by any illegal 
actions taken against Holli and other third persons commencing August 9, 2011 and therafter; 
(3) For an Order of Criminal Contempt Order and an Order of imprisonment against anyone 
who violates the protective order; (4) For an Order of Spoliation of Evidence and 
Presumption in favor of Holli; (5) For an order removing prosecutor Dustin Smith from 
participation as counsel in any action concerning Holli; and (6) For any other equitable relief. 
UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 
1. On August 9, 2011, Oneidc:: county Magistrate David Evans, challenged 
ii - I/ 
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from sitting on any action naming Holli as a party, issued a search warrant prepared by 
prosecutor Dustin Smith on subject matter wherein Prosecutor Dustin Smith was a 
defendant in a civil suit the defendant HOLLI brought against Oneida County Revenue 
officials, DOE sheriff officials and Dustin Smith on April 15, 2011 as State of Idaho, Sixth 
Judicial District, Oneida County, case no. 2011- 44 . The "General Search Warrant" is 
attached hereto as exhibit "1". 
2. Prosecutor Dustin Smith had a pecuniary conflict in interest in acting as 
counsel or as a prosecutor in any matter concerning the defendant Holli and third parties 
Marie Marchant, James Keddington and Ruth Marlene Telford. In spite of this knowing 
conflict of interest, Prosecutor Dustin Smith corrupted his office by colluding with Sheriff Jeff 
Semrad to abuse the criminal process against Holli by creating an illegal "general search 
warrant" which purported to authorize a "fishing expedition" of Holli's and other third 
person's properties in search of any incriminating evidence that would support an extortive 
criminal prosecution against Holli. 
3. The "General Search Warrant" on its face suffers from wholesale defects 
under the fourth amendment, to wit (1) It does not list the person who is reportedly the 
target of the search and allegedly engaging in criminal acitivity; (2) It does list any crime 
giving a magistrate criminal jurisdiction to issue any search warrant; (3) It does not 
incorporate the probable cause affidavit of Sheriff Jeff Semrad within the body of the search 
warrant to test issues of probable cause and the veracity and credibility of Jeff Semrad's 
attestments; (4) It does not draw a nexus between any crime and items to be seized; the 
latter which are required to be related to the crime alleged in the warrant; (5) It does not list 
items to be seized with any level of particularity; (6) the warrant instructs officers to seize 
anything and every at the property that is documentary or electronic in nature without giving a 
legal justification for the seizure; (7) The warrant was obtained by a conflicted prosecutor; 
and (8) The warrant was signed by a Magistrate whom was barred from sitting on any case 
naming Holli as a party. 
4. On the early morning hours of August 9, 2011, Sheriff Jeff Semrad and 
5 Oneida County officers, appeared at the defendant Holli's front door and knocked on the 
door. Holli opened the wooden part of the door but left the screen storm door shut These 
officers asked Holli to come outside of her home to speak to these officers. Holli said no. 
The officers said they were there to serve a search warrant on Holli's house and outbuildings. 
Holli instructed the officers to read the search warrant to her from outside the house. One of 
the officers did so. After the officer finished, Holli inquired into who petitioned for the warrant 
and who signed the warrant. The doe officer announced that prosecutor Dustin Smith 
petitioned for the warrant and that Magistrate David Evans signed the warrant. Holli informed 
Sheriff Semrad that the warrant was void on several grounds and stated the grounds set forth 
in paragraph 3 supra. Holli then instructed Sheriff Semrad to go back to the court and get a 
valid warrant if he wanted to search Holli's home and furthermore, to attach Semrad's 
probable cause affidavit to the new properly executed search warrant. 
5. Sheriff Semrad kicked in Holli's screen storm door and he and the other 5 
officers forcibly entered into Holli's home. Sheriff Semrad forcifully pushed Holli up against 
the wall and then ordered deputy Williams to handcuff Holli to a chair situated in Holli's office 
inside the home; while the other officers commenced going through Holli's entire home, 
outbuildings and cars without any member resident to observe their search activities. 
6. Holli observed that the officers were piling banker size boxes of litigation 
files on top of the feeder tray to her copy machine knowing that such conduct would break the 
machine. Holli complained several times. The officers ignored Holli complaints not to 
damage her office equipment. 
7. Holli also complained that the officers were seizing documents WITHOUT 
HOLLI'S CONSENT that were protected under various work product, privacy, and witness 
communication privileges and which were not in any way related to the suit Holli had pending 
against Oneida County. Ignoring Holli, the officers seized nearly all of the "litigation" 
paperwork Holli had in her home, leaving only "a part of the litigation paperwork" involving 
Hollis lawsuit against ELI LILLY dating back to 1991. Holli complained that the officers had 
no right to seize Holli's case files with the purpose of obstructing Holli's fair access to the 
courts and Holli's right to present best evidence to a jury. In response the officers told Holli 
to shut up or they would take Holli to Jail 
8. Holli held power of attorney for a number of low income taxpayers. Holli 
handled the taxpayers claims through payment of refunds or structured tax payments 
contracted under settlements agreements with the IRS. As part of Holli's client's files, Holli 
held custody of the taxpayer's bank accounts, credit information, and social security 
information; records which were required for IRS tax examinations. Holli handled all 
administrative appeals with the IRS on behalf of her client taxpayers for which Holli held 
power of attorney. Sheriff Semrad seized all of Holli's taxpayer files asserting that Holli had 
no right to posess these records. Holli complained that Sheriff Semrad had no authority to 
.31 
seize her clients files or to interfere with Holli's powers of attorney with her taxpayer clients. 
Sheriff Semrad informed Holli that if Holli gave him the taxpayers phone numbers so that 
Sheriff Semrad could contact the taxpayers and verify Holli's status as their power of attorney, 
Sheriff Semrad would not take Holli's taxpayer client files. This turned out to be a blatent lie. 
Holli did give the phone numbers of her taxpayer clients to a female lieutenant and demand 
that this lieutenant contact Holli's taxpayer clients in front of Holli to verify Holli's status as their 
representative and attorney in fact Th~ liuetenant did call several clients in front of Holli and 
Holli heard the clients refuse to give consent to the officers to seize their files from Holli's 
house. In spite of Holli's demands that these records not be searched or seized, and the 
clients demands that the officers were not to search or seize their private files pr records, 
Sheriff Semrad illegally ordered that all of these files be searched and seized. 
9. The officers also siezed all of Holli's computers, software programs, 
scanners, internet adaptors, computer external hard drive devices, jump drives, computer 
telephone recievers, and any other devices that Holli could use to communicate with others. 
Holli complained about these seizures because Holli's work product for her past and pending 
civil and criminal cases was on these computers and were memorialzed electronically as 
opposed to paper records and Holli feared that the officers would corrupt her electronic files 
and make them irretrevable. Holli asked the officers to transfer copies of her electronic 
records to a computer jump drive so that Holli could have her records preserved on another 
computer in the event the officers destroyed her electronic files after they seized her hardware 
storing these records. The officers refused and at that point they arrested Holli for obstructing 
the officers performance of their official duties. They transferred Holli to Bannock County jail. 
10. The officers remained at Holli's property unattended by any resident 
member for possible days given Holli was in jail and does not know when the officers 
completed their illegal search and seizures. 
11. While Holli remained in jail, individual Taxpayers contacted by the female 
lieutenant during the first day of the search, were re-contacted by Sheriff Semrad in a failed 
effort to obtain these taxpaxer's consents to retain these taxpayers private tax files that 
Sheriff Semrad had seized on August 9, 2011 without their consent. In response to Semrad's 
post seizure contact, at least two taxpayers wrote Semrad expressly denying consent and 
demanding Semrad return their private files to Holli. See these two communication attached 
as exhibit "4" hereto. 
12. Holli got out of jail on August 12, 2011. Holli and others appeared at Holli's 
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property which was left unsecured. The property list authored by Oneida County officials was 
taped to Holli's door. Holli entered the building with others and surveyed the condition of her 
properties. Her residence was almost entirely cleaned out of all paper files including case 
files and client files, and the only remaining office equipment was the broken copy machine, 
outdated computer monitors Holli purchased from Oneida County school district, and hollis 
netgear router. Holli locked up the property and went to her friends house in Utah. 
13. The next day Holli reappeared at her property with a desktop computer she 
obained from her friend. Holli hooked up the desktop computer and attempted to access her 
internet account. Holli received a message from her ISP provider indicating that her 
"navigation had been blocked", that there was security certificate problems which allowed 
interception of any data Holli obtained on her computer, and when Holli went through her 
Firefox brouser, this browser warned Holli that someone was trying to impersonate Holli's 
access information to her website. See exhibit "3" attached hereto for these security 
warnings displayed on desktop computer Holli had borrowed. 
14. Holli accessed her internet provider anyway. Suddenly the computer went 
in to download mode. The computer downloaded a virus which crashed the computer. Holli 
has now been remanded to her friends house to use her friends other computer equipment 
and ISP services. 
15. Because of Holli's incarceration in jail, Holli defaulted in her appearance in 
two civil cases. Holli contacted the sheriffs office and demanded electronic copies of her files 
so that Holli could submit belated process in the defaulted proceedings. The sheriffs office 
refused to submit Holli electronic copies of her case files kept on Holli's computer. The 
Sheriff also refused to return the illegally seized tax files and in fact threatened the taxpayers 
that he, Sheriff Semrad, intended on obstructing the taxpayers claims. 
Based on the foregoing, the defendant now seeks relief from the illegal conduct of 
Onieda county officials on an expedited, emergency and ex parte basis. 
ARGUMENT 
I. l.R.Cr.P. Rule 41 Provides For The Return of Seized Property 
If The Property Was Seized In Violation of The Fourth 
Amendment Or The Defendant Will Suffer Harm If The 
Property Is Not Returned 
A defendant may file a demand to return his property if he believes that the 
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seizure of his property violated the Fourth Amendment. If the Fourth Amendment was 
violated, the seized property must be returned. See In re Grand Jury Investigation 
Concerning Solid State Devices, Inc., 130 F.3d 853, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1997). Also Rule 41 
permits owners to move for a return of their property when the seizure was lawful, but 
the movant is "aggrieved by the government's continued possession of the seized 
property." Id. At 856. Under Idaho Law, the return for seized property is controlled under 
l.R.Cr.P Rule 41.1. Reclaiming property: 
At any time after the commencement of a criminal action, any interested 
party or person may apply to the trial court for an order permitting a 
reclamation by such party or person of exhibits offered or admitted in 
evidence, documents or property displayed or considered in connection 
with the action, or any property in the possession of any department, 
agency or official who is holding such property in connection with the 
trial of a criminal action. 
Also see Rule 41 (e) Return of property under search: 
A person aggrieved by a search and seizure may move the district court 
for the return of the property on the ground that the person is entitled to 
lawful possession of the property and that it was illegally seized. The 
motion or application for the return of the property shall be made in a 
criminal action if one is pending, but if no action is pending, a civil 
proceeding may be filed in the county where the property is seized or 
located. The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary 
to the decision on the application. If the motion or application is granted 
the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence 
at any hearing or trial. If a motion or application for return of property is 
made or comes on for hearing after a complaint, indictment or infor-
mation is filed, it shall be treated as a motion to suppress under Rule 12. 
Moreover, if the government's possession of seized property is unreasonable, the 
government must return the property immediately. See Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 
322, 325 (9th Cir. 1993) (seized property will be returned if the government's continued 
possession is unreasonable. This test requires the court to weigh the government's 
interest in continued possession of the property with the owner's interest in the property's 
return. United States v. Promises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297, 1304 (3d Cir. 
1978). If the government has a need for the property in an investigation or prosecution, its 
retention of the property generally is reasonable. But, if the government's legitimate 
interests (emphasis added) can be satisfied even if the property is returned, continued 
retention of the property would be unreasonable. See also Standard Drywall, Inc. v. United 
States, 668 F.2d 156, 157 n2. (2d CiL 1982)("seizure of privileged documents demonstrates 
harm as a matter of law in light of statutory protections against disclosure."); Moreover, 
where the government seizes electronic records, the government's failure to provided a copy 
of the seized electronic records is deemed unreasonable. See In re Search of 5444 
Westheimer Road, 2006 WL 1881370, at *2 (S.D. Tex. JuL 6, 2006) (the Government is 
required to provide the property owner with an electronic copy of seized computer files; If 
the Government fails to do so then the defendant has an obligation to file a demand for 
return of the property because the Government's actions will be deemed unreasonable); 
See In re Grand Jury (Impounded), 138 F.3a 978, 982 (3rd Cir. 1998)("Judicial enforcement of 
the work product privilege is required to foreclose the government from further use' of the 
seized files.") Id At 982. 
As stated supra, the defendant was served with a "general search" warrant 
(exhibit "1" attached) at her place of abode on August 9, 2011. The search warranted was 
constructed and authored by Oneida County Prosecutor Dustin Smith; the latter whom was a 
defendant in the civil rights and abuse of process lawsuit plaintiff filed against Oneida county 
officials 4 months earlier on April 15, 2011. The search warrant served on the defendant did 
not list the premise to be searched on the caption page of the warrant ; did not allege any 
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crimes defendant herein was alleged to have committed; did not draw a nexus with between 
any particular items to be seized any "listed" crime; did not specifically particularize what 
documentary or electronic evidence the officers were required to seize to comply with the 
terms of the "search warrant"; purported to authorize a wholesale seizure of any and all 
documentary and electronic items kept within the 4 corners of defendant's abode, house, 
outbuildings, barn and vehicles, and; omitted the probable cause affidavit of Sheriff Jeff 
Semrad thus making it possible for Sheriff Semrad to alter his affidavit before defendant has 
had an opportunity to assess same for competent probable cause. Attached hereto as exhibit 
"2", is the online search warrant issued on a car owned by Timothy McVey respecting the 
Oklahoma bombing. As required, this search warrant had all the contents included to make it 
a competent search warrant. 
Moreover, all of the properties taken by the government officers were subject 
to work product priviledges, witness communication privileges, privacy act privileges, and 
most Important of all, could not establish any criminal offense against the defendant. 
Based on the foregoing, the defendant is entitled to a mandamus order directing 
Oneida County executive officials to immediately return to defendant Holli Lundahl all of her 
properties seized on August 9, 2011 and, to a protective order which provides that if the 
defendant or her clients suffer any prejudice or harm from the unlawful seizure of their 
properties, Sheriff Semrad, Prosecutor Dustin Smith or anyone acting through or under them, 
will be found in criminal contempt and immediately imprisoned in jail for knowingly acting on 
the illegally seized evidence without authority at law. 
II. The Government Executed An Illegal Search And Seizure 
On Defendant's Properties As Part Of A "Fishing Expedition" 
To Search For Any Incriminating Evidence Against The 
Defendant And Possibly To Plant Evidence -- All For The Purpose 
Of Obstructing The Defendant's Civil Lawsuit Filed Against 
Oneida County Officials, Other Pending Lawsuits And To Punish 
Defendant For Prosecuting Civil Rights Claims 
A. Blanket Supression Of Evidence Seized During A 
Search Is Authorized When The Officers Execute A 
General Search Warrant As A Pretext To Conduct 
A Hfishing Expedition" Through The Targets 
Private Properties 
In State of Idaho v. Belden, Case no. 35284 (Idaho.App. 2009) : the Idaho 
appellate court held that the burden to prove a search warrant is invalid is upon the defendant. 
State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 275, 678 P.2d 60, 67 (Ct.App.1984). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment, 
except that "oath or affirmation" is termed "affidavit." 
A search is executed in "flagrant disregard" of its terms when the officers so 
grossly exceed the scope of the warrant during execution that the authorized search appears 
to be merely a pretext for a "fishing expedition" through the target's private property. Same in 
United States v. Liu, 239 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Foster, 100 F.3d 846, 851 
(10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1105-06 (1st Cir. 1989). See also 
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United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007) (To be entitled to the 
extreme remedy of blanket suppression, the defendant must establish that the seizure of 
reported materials proves that the agents executed the warrant in "flagrant disregard" of its 
terms. With respect to seizing electronic material, the seizure of storage media commingled 
with other information not ·subject to the warrant can lead to a blanket seizure of all property. ) 
Same in United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1269 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Matias, 
836 F.2d 744, 747-48 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing cases). When applying for a search warrant, 
Probable cause to search requires a nexus between criminal activity and the item to be 
seized, and a nexus between the item to be seized and the place to be searched. U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV; State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686, 85 P.3d 656, 662 (2004). See also 
United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 939, 963 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The Fourth Amendment requires 
that a warrant particularly describe both the place to be searched and the person or things to 
be seized. If a warrant is not particular, it can be challenged as too broad." ); Voss v. 
Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir. 1985) (The particularity requirement ensures that 
the search is confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime 
set forth in the warrant and for which there is probable cause.); 'These requirements prevent 
"general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443, 467, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971); 
The 1 Oth Circuit has decisioned what will be the ultimate outcome when a general 
search warrant is conducted on a USA citizen's home or abode, to wit: blanket supression of 
all evidence seized and the inability to proceed on criminal charges arriving from the tainted 
search. See USA v. Albert Foster Jr., 100 F .3d 846 (1 Oth Cir. 1996). Here, Foster brought a 
motion to suppress all property seized during the search, including the items listed in the 
warrant. Following a suppression hearing, the Honorable Frank H. Seay found that the 
officers had exhibited flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant by conducting a 
"wholesale seizure of Foster's property amounting to a ''fishing expedition for the 
discovery of incriminating evidence." Accordingly, pursuant to the 1 Qth Circuit's decision 
in United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Medlin II"), the district court 
ordered the blanket suppression of all evidence seized from Foster's residence, including 
those items specifically covered by the search warrant. The United States appealed the 
district court's order of blanket suppression. The 1 Qth Circuit exercised jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirmed. Held: We review de novo the ultimate determination of 
the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Callwood, 66 
31 
F.3d 1110, 1112 (10th Cir. 1995). It was undisputed that items were taken from Foster's 
residence which did not fall within the terms of the warrant. The search of Foster's residence 
lasted from 3:25 p.m. until approximately 11 :00 p.m. Although the warrant specifically 
identified the items to be seized, four weapons and marijuana, when the DEA agents left the 
residence they took thirty-five items "including various firearms, ammunition, videotapes, 
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and other miscellaneous items." Dist. Ct. Order at 4. There 
was a wholesale seizure of Foster's property amounting to a fishing expedition for the 
discovery of incriminating evidence of "any crime." It is beyond dispute, that the officers in 
this case both viewed the warrant issued by the state judge as a general warrant and 
executed the warrant in accord with those views. Because the officers here flagrantly 
disregarded the terms of the warrant in seizing property in general, "the particularity 
requirement was undermined and [the otherwise] valid warrant was transformed into a 
"general warranf' proscribed by the Fourth Amendment and thereby requiring suppression 
of all evidence seized under that warrant." Medlin II, 842 F.2d at 1199. The evil that this 
circuit addressed in Medlin II was the use of an otherwise valid warrant to conduct a general 
search. With this particular evil in mind, the court held that blanket suppression was 
mandated when a warrant was executed in flagrant disregard for its terms. This Circuit has 
spoken to the issue and has determined that blanket suppression is mandated when the 
executing officers flagrantly disregard the particular terms of the warrant. We are bound to 
apply that rule of law. See In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that three-
judge panel cannot disregard or overrule circuit precedent), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 53 (1994). 
Young, 877 F.2d at 1105-06 ("the lawful part of the warrant seems to have been a kind of 
pretext for the unlawful part of the warrant"). 
Our Supreme Court has observed: "It is familiar history that indiscriminate 
searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general warrants' were the immed-
iate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment." Payton v. New 
York, 445 US 573, 583 (1980). This Amendment exists in recognition of "[t)he tendency of 
those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful 
seizures and enforced confessions," Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 196 (1927). The 
particularity requirement guarantees "fa]s to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the 
discretion of the officer executing the warrant" Id. Stanford v. State of Texas, 379 US 
476 (1965) ('The indiscriminate sweep of language in a warrant is constitutionally 
intolerable.") 
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A review of the search warrant at exhibit "1" attached, shows nothing "particular" 
on the face of the "general warrant". First, the warrant doesn't describe the property to be 
searched in it's caption as does the search warrant issued against Tim McVey's car in exhibit 
"2" attached. Ttle search warrant claims to be supported by the affidavit of Sheriff Jeff 
Semrad, but this probable cause affidavit is not incorporated into the search warrant itself so 
that the target of the warrant can determine if the warrant was based on false or omitted 
information by Sheriff Semrad in his affidavit. The warrant then commences to set forth 
Sheriff Semrad's belief that certain property and evidence exists at the defendant's house. 
The properties described.by Sheriff Semrad is a "laundry list of general properties and items" 
found in any normal home where a home business is conducted or where the home is 
arranged on a networking basis that allows numerous users to access the internet, computers 
and other networking devices designated to that address. The warrant does identify the 
location to be searched in the body of the warrant; but does not identify any crime supporting 
probable cause for the search, nor does it draw a nexus between any crime and the "laundry 
list" of items to be seized. In addition, the warrant does not particularize the items to be 
seized as instruments or evidence of any alleged crime - but simply directs the officers to take 
everything listed in the warrant. Finally, the warrant was obtained by prosecutor Dustin 
Smith in collusion with Jeff Semrad, 4 months after the defendant filed suit against 
- Prosecutor Dustin Smith charging this prosecutor with conspiracy to violate plaintiffs 
constitutional rights to equal protection under the revenue codes, fifth amendment takings 
and spoliation of evidence schemes. A considered analysis of the warrant shows that it was 
a "general warrant" issued for the sole purpose of conducting a ''fishing expedition" through 
the defendant's and other third persons private properties located at the search site in hopes 
of discovering incriminating evidence against Holli and witnesses acting in favor of Holli in 
pending civil litigation. 
As set forth supra, the defendant immediately complained about the defects in the 
void warrant after the 2;..{ page warrant was read to the defendant from behind the defendant's 
closed screen door. When the defendant denied the officers entry into her home because 
the void warrant was executed by a financially conflicted and vindictive prosecutor and bore 
facial defects that sounded a death knell to the invalid warrant, Sheriff Semrad broke through 
the defendants screen door and directed his 5 attending officers to handcuff the defendant to 
a chair while the officers rummaged through the defendants entire house and curtilege 
unattended, looking for any incriminating evidence against Holli and witnesses in Holli's civil 
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litigations (and possibly planting evidence). The officers would not allow Holli to videotape 
their search of her premises thus suggesting the officers had a great deal to hide. When the 
sheriff and his deputies began seizing the Holli's client's tax return files, all of the Holli's 
pending civil case files, and Holli's and others computer equipment and electronic data 
devices and files - to force Holli and others into default in their pending civil cases, Sheriff 
Semrad directed deputy "rusty" to arrest and incarcerate Holli at Bannock County jail for / 
obstruction of an officer in the performance of his duty. Rusty did arrest the defendant Holli 
and remove Holli to the Bannock County jail while the remaining 5 sheriff officials continued to 
rummage through Holli's and non-target's properties and commit wholesale seizures of 
everything in site without another resident member present to visually monitor the officer's 
actions. Moreover, the officers purported to tape a property list to plaintiffs front door, but 
the property list omits a number of client files, original Documentary records for pending civil 
cases, and electronic equipment and sofurvare. 
Because the search warrant served upon Holli was a "general search warrant" in 
violation of the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment and because the warrant 
was used to conduct a fishing expedition at Holli's place of abode in hopes of finding 
incriminating evidence against Holli and Holli's witnesses, the entire search was tainted and 
illegal and mandates: (1) a "blanket supression order" from this court, (2) an order directing 
immediate return of all of Hollis and other third persons properties seized from the abode, 
and, (3) a protective order directing that no official use, communicate or interfere with any 
matter seized during the illegal search - else that official shall be convicted of criminal 
contempt and ordered incarcerated. 
B. Sheriff Semrad Deliberately Failed To Incorporate 
His Probable Cause Affidavit Into The Search 
Warrant Because He Knew It Was Supported By 
False Statements And Omissions That Would Have 
Defeated Probable Cause 
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the United States Supreme Court 
held that a defendant is entitled to a Franks evidentiary hearing to challenge probable cause 
for a search warrant. If the defendant establishes that the search warrant contained material 
omissions or misrepresentations, the criminal natter must be enjoined. Franks does not 
permit a court to "correct" the affidavit after the warrant has issued or been executed. (See 
United States v. Davis, 714 F.2d 896, 900 (9th Cir.1983)). See United States v. Barton, 995 
F.2d 931, 934-36 (9th Cir. 1992). United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 785, amended 769 
F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1985) (demonstration that affiant probably knew that previous arrest 
mentioned in affidavit had not resulted in conviction was sufficient showing that probable 
cause affidavit was false.). The Ninth Circuit has held that proven "misstatements or 
o_missions of government officials which are incorporated into an affidavit for a search warrant 
establish that probable cause was lacking and strip the affiant of immunity in subsequent civil 
rights litigation. United States v. Deleon, 979 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1992). United States 
v. Condo, 782 F .2d 1502, 1506 (9th Cir.1986) ( ... in determining whether probable cause to 
search exists, a court must consider not only false matter in the affidavit but also material 
omissions which taint probable cause.). 
Here, Sheriff Semrad withheld his affidavit both from the search warrant itself 
and from filing with the magistrate's clerk after the search was executed. It is this defendant's 
belief that the affidavit was withheld so that Sheriff Semrad could alter the affidavit to include 
"fabricated probable cause allegations" post seizure. Holli specifically appeared before the 
court's clerk as soon as she was released from jail on the underlying charge and was told that 
Sheriff Semrad had not filed his probable cause affidavit with the Magistrate's clerk as 
required under the criminal rules. Therefore, Holli requests that this court order Sheriff 
Semrad to produce a copy of his probable cause affidavit to Holli forthwith so that it may be 
impeached and Holli may use the affidavit as a basis to dismissing the underlying criminal 
charges. 
C. The .uGeneral Search And Seizure" Was 
Executed To Default The Defendant's Appearance 
In Pending Civil Litigation By Seizing All Computers, 
Data And Work Product Files, Software, Wireless 
Adaptors, Phone .Devices, Internet Devices, And 
Printing Devices Used To Construct, Communicate 
And Deliver Legal Process 
In USA v. Carey, 172 F3d 1268 (101h Cir. 1999), the 10th circuit directly addressed 
the issue of an illegal search and seizure of a computer. Here, the defendant was charged 
with drug crimes. Officers started doing searches on the defendant's computer for key words 
for drugs and found none. Officers then conducted search on Jpeg files and found child 
pornography. Following MARRON V. US, 275 US 192 (1946) the 101h circuit held that the 
limitations on search warrant were exceeded because warrant limited the search to drug 
crimes. 
In Bridges, 344 F.3d at 1016 (91h Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Kow, 58 
F.3d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1995), the gih Circuit reaffirmed that a warrant was unconstitutional 
because the wording was unquestionably broad in describing the items the agents could 
seize which was almost all of [the suspect's] property, papers and home office equipment." 
Id., at 1017. Specifically the "Bridges Warrant" stated that officers were authorized to seize 
among other items, "records and documents, or electronically stored information ... 
documents, contracts or correspondence ... computer hardware ... computer software ... 
all records, documents, and photographs establishing the person ... in control of the 
property seized and owning or leasing [the premises to be searched]". The Ninth Circuit 
noted, "The list is a comprehensive laundry list of sundry goods and inventory that one'would 
readily expect to discover in any small or medium-sized home business in the United States." 
In US v. Comprehensive drug testing, 579 F3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009), the 9th circuit 
following the 10th circuit in Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1997) held: the 
description of the things to be seized should be limited to the probable cause scope of the 
crime alleged in the warrant to forbid agents from seizing equipment needed in most 
households settings today. The .computer is "evidence" only to the extent that some of the 
data it stores is evidence. See United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2008) 
("Computers, like briefcases and cassette tapes, can be repositories for documents and 
records."). When probable cause to search relates in whole or in part to information stored 
on a computer, the warrant should identify that information with particularity, focusing on 
the content of the relevant files rather than on the storage devices which may happen to 
contain them. See United States v. Vilar, 2007 WL 1075041, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) 
("underlying information must be identified with particularity and its seizure independently 
supported by probable cause"); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that a warrant to seize evidence stored on a computer should specify "which 
type of files are sought"); In cases where the computer is merely a storage device for 
evidence, failure to focus on the relevant files will lead to a Fourth Amendment violation. For 
example, in United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005), which involved an 
investigation into harassing phone calls, the court held that a warrant authorizing seizure of 
all storage media as well as the computer itself and "not limited to particular files" 
violated the Fourth Amendment. 
A similarly dangerous phrase, "any and all data, including but not limited to" 
a list of items, has been held to turn a computer search warrant into an unconstitutional 
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"general warrant." United States v. Fleet Management Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443-44 
(E.D. Pa. 2007); see also Otero, 563 F.3d at 1132 (warrant authorizing seizure of "any and all 
information and/or data" fails the particularity requirement). See, e.g., United States v. Kow, 
58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995) (invalidating warrant for failure to name crime or limit 
seizure to computer files sharing nexus with crime.); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 
574, 584 (D. Vt. 1998) (concluding that warrant to seize "[a]ll computers" was not sufficiently 
particular where description "did not indicate the specific crimes for which the equipment was 
sought, nor were the supporting affidavits or the limits contained in the searching instructions 
incorporated by reference.") 
Accordingly, the majority of courts who have considered the question of seizing 
computers have held these types of seizures to be unreasonable, especially when the 
government refuses to remediate loss of use of the computer. See Ramsden v. United 
States, 2 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1993) (seized property will be returned if the government's 
continued possession is unreasonable. This test requires the court to weigh the 
government's interest in continued possession of the property with the owner's interest in 
the property's return.). Also see United States v. Promises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 
F.2d 1297, 1304 (3d Cir. 1978) (If the government's legitimate interests in seized property 
can be satisfied if the property is returned, continued retention of the property is 
unreasonable.) Moreover, where the government seizes electronic records, the 
government's failure to provide a copy of the seized electronic records is deemed 
unreasonable. See In re Search of 5444 Westheimer Road, 2006 WL 1881370, at *2 
(S.D. Tex. Jul. 6, 2006) (the Government is required to provide the property owner with an 
electronic copy of seized computer files; If the Government fails to do so then the defendant 
has an obligation to file a demand for return of the property because the Government's actions 
will be deemed unreasonable). 
In the case at bar, the government took all of defendants computers, Data, Work 
Product and case files, Software, Wireless Adaptors, Phone Devices, Internet Devices, 
And Working Printing Devices; All Used To Construct, Memorialize, Communicate And 
Deliver Legal Process and client files. The Officers also locked up Holli's IP Address and 
internet program so that Holli nor any other user at the abode could use the internet, email or 
phone systems that required internet access. See exhibit "3" attached for computer 
messages received when a borrowed computer was brought to property and hooked in (after 
the search and seizure was executed and Holli was released on OR on the underlying 
charges); these messages show a denial of access to emails accounts irrespective of the 
browser used. Holli's email accounts had been locked down by the seizing officers. 
Furthermore, Holli's internet service worked for a couple of hours to permit Holli to access 
websites albiet not email, and then a virus was sent through the borrowed computer 
corrupting that computer from functioning. This defendant does not know much about 
computers save they are a great substitute for typewriters and to do "free" research; so 
defendant is unaware of how the sheriff officials corrupted defendant's access to her internet 
service or any computer device hooked up to defendant's internet service. In addition, the 
officers did leave behind a copy machine, but during the initial search which Holli witnessed 
before she was arrested and taken to bannock county jail, officers stacked heavy banker size 
boxes onto the feeder tray of the machine breaking the feeder tray; in spite of Holli's repeated 
complaints to the officers not to place boxes on top of the copy machine at all - much less the 
feeder tray. The Officers owe Holli a new copy machine plus several locks which the 
officers cut off to Holli's outbuildings in order to search these buildings. In addition, if the 
officers dont return all of Holli's equipment in the conditions seized, Holli will be seeking theft 
damages against the Sheriff's office. 
Finally, Holli repeatedly told the officers that she was editing her memorandum 
response "on the Sandra Copeland, et al. case" before the Idaho Sixth Judicial District, 
Oneida County and assigned case no. 2011- 66 and that this ''work product" file was only 
contained on the laptop computer that had the document up on the computer screen at the 
time officers Rusty and Williams seized Holli's computers. Holli repeatedly begged these 
officers to email this extensively researched pleading to Holli's email address so that Holli 
could complete the legal document from another offsite computer and thereby not default in 
her response in this civil case given the officers announced they were taking all of Holli's 
computers and supporting devices. This "pleading draft" represented three weeks of internet 
research in order to obtain authorities sufficient to respond to the pleading. The officers 
refused to provide Holli with an electronic copy of this pleading and immediately arrested and 
carted Holli to jail after this final complaint re emailing Holli copies of her "work product files" to 
avoid default. During the argument that ensued, it became immediately apparent that one of 
the true purposes of the search and seizure was to obstruct and interfere with all civil cases 
Holli and others were pursuing; all in violation of the Idaho racketeering laws and 18 USC 
section 1505 re federal cases. This application for mandamus writ directing imemdiate return 
of her computer equipment is one means by which this court can estopped any future 
violations to Holli's access to the courts. 
Ill. Oneida County Sheriff Officials Did Not Have Authority To 
Convert Their "General Search" Into A "Warrantless Search" 
In State v. Lafferty, Docket No. 28669 (Idaho.App. 2003), the Idaho Appellate 
court addressed the issue of a warrantless search under Idaho law, acknowleging from the 
outset that a warrantless entry or search of a residence is per se unreasonable and violative 
of the Fourth Amendment. The only way a warrantless search may be rendered reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment is by an individual's consent. State v. Johnson, 11 O Idaho 
516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abevta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 387, 
390 (Ct. App. 1998). In such instances, the State has the burden of demonstrating consent by 
a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kilbv. 130 Idaho 747, 749, 947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct. 
App. 1997). Consent to search may be in the form of words, gestures, or conduct. State v.. 
Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 348, 815 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Ct. App. 1991). As the United States 
Supreme Court stated: 
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of 
settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when 
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's 
home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional 
terms: "The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... 
shall not be violated." 
As set forth supra, unless the State can show that defendant consented to a 
warrantless search of her home and curtilege, the search was unreasonable and a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. Without clear consent, the government does not have the right to 
'fish' through private and privileged files to investigate possible crimes. 1 'People v. Gonzalez, 
51 Cal.3d 1179, 1260, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 776 (1990), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 835, 112 S. Ct. 117, 116 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1991). 
1. See State v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. Ct. App. 2009) (officers told the 
defendant that they believed that he may have been the victim of fraudulent credit card 
charges and asked to search his computer for evidence of the fraud, including computer 
viruses; the defendant agreed, and the officers then searched the computer, finding images 
of child pornography; the defendant moved to suppress, arguing that he gave the officers 
consent to search for viruses and evidence of credit card fraud only ; although the trial court 
denied his motion, the appellate court reversed, finding that t,he officers exceeded the scope 
of the defendant's consent) 
Here, it was clear that Holli did not give consent to any officer to search her 
property and the properties of others for which Holli was the acting power of attorney. As 
stated supra, the officers kicked in Holli's front screen door when Holli denied the officers 
entrance into her residence as a result of the facially defective warrant. In addition, Holli 
repeatedly told the officers that all documents pertaining to her suit against Oneida County 
and that were in Holli's possession, were a matter of public record and had been filed with 
the various clerks of the various forums that Holli was statutorily required to access ; hence 
there was nothing that Holli had on her computers that the sheriff and prosecutor Dustin Smith 
did not have easy access to via various public forums. The officers nevertheless broke down 
Holli's screen door for a forciable entry into the building. 
During the illegal search, Holli argued that the officers were not entitled to access 
privileged and private materials, and the record shows that Holli sought to, by words, prevent 
the officers from seizing 3rd person client tax files for which Holli was the acting power of 
attorney. Holli gave th-e officers the phone numbers of the third persons for whom she was 
acting power of attorney, so that Sheriff Semrad would contact these persons in front of Holli 
to verify Holli's status as their power of attorney and to obtain a denial of consent to seize 
these third persons private properties in Holli's possession. Two phone calls were made in 
front of Holli to Ferron Stokes and the other to Elham Neilson. Holli heard these third persons 
directly instruct the sheriffs officers not to seize any file, paperwork or documentation bearing 
these parties names from Holli's premises - as Holli had legal control over these files under a 
power of attorney. These persons followed up their oral denials with written denials refusing 
to consent to search and seizure of any of their private properties. See exhibit "4" attached for 
thiese written denials executed while Holli was in jail on the obstruction charge. In spite of 
these demands by third persons denying consent to the sheriff officers to access their private 
properties and in spite of Hollis very vocal denial of consent, these sheriff officers seized 
each and every 3rd person's tax , bank and accounting records on the premise and for which 
Holli was admittedly the acting power of attorney. In addition, the sheriff officers seized all of 
Holli's "hard copy case files" which included Hollis work product, original evidence, and 
witness communications in preparation for trial on the causes of action presented by those 
cases; the latter items were protected priviledged materials under the work product and 
witness communication doctrines. Holli's lack of consent to any search is evidentiarily 
shown by Holli's arrest for obstructing an officer in the performance of his duty. An affirmative 
defense to the obstruction charge for which Holli was cited as ·shown in exhibit "5" attached, is 
the right to protect property from an illegal taking. 
In conclusion therefore, the officers had neither Holli's consent as acting power of 
attorney nor the consent of third persons, to seize materials and items from Holli's residence 
under a warrantless search theory. 
IV. Enforcement Officers Cannot Use A Search Warrant To 
Obtain Privileged Documents Or Communications ; On 
The Contrary The Attorney General Of The United States 
Has Determined That Such Privileged Documents Or 
Communications Will Be Subject To Subpeona Power Only 
Agents should make sure that the search will not violate the Attorney General's 
regulations relating to obtaining confidential information from third parties. At Congress's 
direction, the Attorney General has issued guidelines for officers who want to obtain 
privileged documentary materials from third parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11(a); 28 
C.F.R. §59.4(b). Under these rules, law enforcement officers should not use a search 
warrant to obtain documentary materials believed to be in the private possession of a third 
party where the material sought or likely to be reviewed during the execution of the 
warrant contains confidential or privileged information. 28 C.F.R. §59.4(b). The United 
States Attorneys' Manual., §9-13.420 (1997) sets forth the guidelines for serving location 
having privileged materials. Search warrants for "documentary materials" held under a 
privilege are governed by 28 C.F.R. 59.4, USAM 9-19.221 et seq. and 42 U.S.C. Section 
2000aa-11 (a){3). In addition, Attorneys' Manual § 9-19.240 provides that where material 
sought in a search warrant are in possession of a person holding them as part of their work 
product in relation to some form of public communication, seizure of these items shall be 
controlled by Title I of the Privacy Act of 1980 ("PPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa, et seq. See 
Criminal Resource Manual 661 for the text of 42 U.S.C.§ 2000aa et seq. The PPA prohibits 
the use of search warrants to obtain any work product materials or other documentary 
materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the 
public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other form of public communication, except 
under the following limited circumstances: (1) when there is probable cause to believe that the 
person possessing the materials has committed a criminal act to which the materials relate, 
in which case, a search warrant may not be sought unless the alleged offense involves 
classified materials or child pornography; or (2) when there is reason to believe that the 
immediate seizure of such materials is necessary to prevent the death of, or serious 
bodily injury to, a human being. 
The United States Attorneys' Manual provides that the Department of Justice policy 
mandates the use of a subpoena or other less intrusive means to obtain privileged evidence 
from first or third parties. See 28 C.F.R. §59.4(a)(1); United States Attorneys' Manual, §9-
19.210. In line with this federal policy, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a seminole 
decision in O'Connor vs. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400 which mandated that no privileged 
legal documents or communications shall ever be subject to the search and seizure procedure 
but could only be obtained by subpeona. In O'Connor, the police had searched numerous 
legal files to find evidence in support of a crime against an attorneys client. The issue,' as the 
Minnesota Supreme Court saw it, was "the reasonableness of searching an attorney's office 
for documents and files of a particular client. if police are permitted to search through an 
attorney's files for documents listed in an otherwise valid warrant, said the court, work 
product privilege will be rendered a nullity. Cast in the language of search and seizure law, 
this is an argument directed to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. A 
warrant directing law enforcement officers to seize privileged files will oblige the officers, in 
order to obtain that document, to scan dozens, perhaps hundreds, of other documents. The 
officers, having scanned those other documents, can hardly be expected to expunge their 
contents from memory. Privilege as to those documents would be destroyed, and having been 
destroyed, could not be restored. The O'Connor court thus mandated the strongest possible 
remedy: In the future, all law enforcement efforts to obtain legal documentary evidence must 
proceed by subpoena, never by warrant. 
Such is the case at bar. The persons executing the search were opposing parties 
in civil rights litigation filed by the Holli 4 months earlier. If these defendant's sought privileged 
work product and witness communications from Holli, they should have indentified exactly 
what privileged items they sought from Holli in the form of a subpeona; not abused their 
offices by obtaining an illegal warrant to seize every item and communication located on 
Holli's property, related or not, to the Oneida County lawsuit. 
l.RC.P. Rules 26(b)(3) and (b)(5)(A) applies various privileges to all materials 
"prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial" whether prepared by a party or its 
representative and precludes disclosure of impressions or communications in developing a 
case for trial. See Rule 26(b)(3): "the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or ... party concerning 
the litigation, including communications ... whether written or oral." 
The US Supreme Court held in Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510 that the work-product 
doctrine protects orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims and cannot be violated 
except under very exceptional circumstances. "Work product protection exists to promote the 
adversarial system by providing "a privileged area that enables attorneys (or parties) to 
prepare cases without interference." In re Grand Jury Impounded, 138 F.3d 978, 981 (3'd 
Cir. 1998). See also Sporck, 759 F.2d at 316 ("preserving the privacy of preparation that is 
central to the adversarial role is the central justification for the work product doctrine.). 
United Coal Cos. v. Powell Constr. Cos., 839 F.2d 958, 966 (10th Cir. 1988) (Material 
prepared for litigation is protected by work product doctrine.); SR International Business 
Insurance Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Props, 2002 WL 1334821 *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Work 
product doctrine protects counsel's legal strategies and thought processes.); Peralta v. 
Cendant Corp., 190 F .R.D. 38, 42 (D. Conn. 1999) (authorities cannot question witnesses 
regarding a party's legal strategies as such actions violate the work product doctrine); 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 US 383, 398-401 (1981) (Access to work product not 
permitted unless seeking party unable to obtain equivalent material elsewhere and seeking 
party meets exceptional circumstances to violate the doctrine.); in re Grand Jury, 599 F.2d at 
1233 (the desire to obtain evidence to impeach a witnesses testimony does not avoid the 
work product protection.); Delco Wire & Cable v. Weinberger, 109 F.R.D.680, 691-92 (E.D.Pa 
1986) (advise given to a witness in preparation for testimony is protected under work product 
doctrine.) 
As is evidently apparent here, the Oneida County officials sought to explore Holli's 
litigation strategies, witness communications, and other protected matter by seizing items and 
electronic equipment from Holli's residence which disclosed this information. Illegal seizure of 
this protected material allowed the opposing parties to prepare offensive papers to defeat 
Holli's litigation. All materials seized from Holli's property on August 9, 2011 must be 
suppressed and the opposing parties must be permanently enjoined from presenting any 
argument, claim or defense based on the tainted search and seizure. 
V. Tax Files Seized Under A General Search Warrant Must Be 
Suppressed And Cannot Be The Subject Of Another Search 
Or Prosecution Under "The Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree" Doctrine 
In United States v. Hoang Anh Thi Duong, 156 F. Supp. 2d 564, 572 (D. Va. 2001 ), 
Defendant Hoang Anh Thi Duong and her two daughters were charged with conspiracy and 
filing false federal corporate tax returns 18 U.S.C. 371and26 U.S.C. 7206(1). Hoang Anh Thi 
Duong at 566. The three women ran a restaurant in Arlington, Virginia. Id In 1995, the FBI 
was investigating Hoang Anh Thi Duong's son for an unrelated crime of robbery and 
confiscated trash from the defendants' residence. Id The inventory of the trash listed bank 
statements and restaurant records that were unrelated to the FBI investigation supporting the 
search warrant. The Court commented on the "expansive breadth of the FBI search" in June 
1995 and listed the following as seized during that search: The agents seized, inter a/la, (i) 
documents relating to Cafe Dalat, including a file folder containing ledgers of Cafe Dalat sales 
from February 1994 through May 1995, and Phuoc-Lai bank account statements, insurance 
bills, and 1991-1995 deposit records; (ii) defendants' personal records, including school 
records, bank and other financial records, warranties, and receipts; (iii) personal tax returns 
of defendants Tu Anh Phan and Danh Anh Phan and of their sister, Anh Minh Phan; (iv) home 
videotapes; (v) records relating to rental property owned by Anh Minh Phan and defendant Tu 
Phan; and (vi) family life insurance records. [Id At 568.] The Court remarked that very few of 
the documents seized related to the targeted robbery conspiracy. Id 
At the suppression hearing, the FBI Agent in charge of the robbery investigation 
was asked whether any documents that proved to be evidence of the robbery conspiracy were 
seized in the search and the FBI agent identified only one note that Hoang Anh Thi Duong's 
son wrote to a co-conspirator instructing him where to store the guns that they planned to 
steal. Id The FBI Agent testified further that although he determined that the records were 
unrelated to the criminal investigation, he contacted the IRS because he observed that the 
documents related to a number of assets that he opined "didn't match up" with the tax 
records. Id. At 569. The FBI Agent referred the case to the IRS, and an IRS Special 
agent received and reviewed the documents that she obtained from the FBI. Id. 
Subsequently in 1997, the IRS Special Agent obtained authorization for a search 
warrant for tax-related offenses based on an affidavit that specifically relied upon the 
evidence taken during the trash confiscation and the 1995 search by the FBI. Id. At 
570-571. 
The Court found that the scope of the search far exceeded the purpose of the 
warrant. Id. The defendants argued that the 1997 search conducted from the IRS Agent's 
warrant was tainted because the IRS Agent's affidavit was b~sed on items seized during the 
illegal 1995 search. Id. At 573-574. See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484; 
~" 
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83 S. Ct. 407; 9 L Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine). The Court 
observed that the fruits of the 1995 search gave rise to the investigation by the IRS, and 
consequently, to the 1997 warrant and search by the IRS. Id At 575. 
In addressing various exceptions to suppressing an illegal search and seizure, 
the Court explained that it must first identify the portions of the IRS Agent's affidavit 
that were tainted by the illegal 1995 search and exclude them from consideration. Id at 576. 
Next the Court considered the "independent source" exception and examined the IRS' 
affidavit and warrant to determine if any part of these documents were not related to the illegal 
search conducted in 1995. The court found the documents to be wholly derivative of the 
results of the 1995 search and therefore the Independent source exception did not save the 
IRS. Murray v US, 487 U.S. 533; 108 S.Ct. 2529; 101 LEd2d 472 (1988). Alternatively, the 
Court considered whether the government could rely on the "plain view" exception. Horton v. 
California, 496 U.S. 128, 137, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990). Under this doctrine, 
officers may seize an object without a warrant if (1) the object is actually in plain view; (2) 
the officers have a lawful right of access to the object itself; and (3) the object's 
incriminating character is immediately apparent. United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 242 (4th 
Cir. 1999)( citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. Denied, 129 L.Ed.2d 876, 114 
S.Ct. 2761 (1994). [Id At 810. ]. 
In Conclusion: The Court held that the Defendant was entitled to blanket 
suppression of all tax related materials seized in the 1995 search and the whole of all 
materials seized in the 2001 IRS search. The Tax Division, in order to prosecute the 
defendant under a tax related criminal offense, did not obtain this evidence using procedures 
detailed in its own policies or authorized under the Fourth Amendment. First, the 
independent source doctrine will be difficult for the government to establish without purging 
the taint of the original 2001 search which was prompted by the illegal 1995 search. The 
government possessed that evidence by virture of the illegal searches and expressly relied 
upon that illegally obtained evidence for the 2005 tax evasion indictment. Second, the "plain 
view" doctrine should not apply since the records obtained in the search did not have an 
immediately apparent incriminating character. At the time of the 1995 search, the 
government had no probable cause to believe that the Defendant had committed a crime 
under the tax laws. Therefore, the government is not justified in using the evidence obtained 
under the search warrant for a robbery conspiracy in a case where the government intends to 
prosecute the defendant for tax evasion. Having no evidence to continue the prosecution, 
d.,3, 
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the IRS mail fraud prosecution is therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
VI. A Conflict With The' Prosecutor Prohibited The Prosecutor From 
Executing Any Process In Which That Prosecutor Would Gain 
From The Process Executed 
In People v Loomis, 70 AD3d 1199 (2010), a New York state judge Stephen 
Herrick dismissed the 33-count indictment against five pharmacy operators from Florida 
ruling that the defendants' federal civil lawsuit against District Attorney David Soares' office 
created a "conflict of interest" that merits removing Albany County prosecutors from the case. 
"When an impermissible conflict of interest has been established, disqualification , of the 
district attorney's office becomes necessary to prevent the undermining of the public 
confidence in our criminal justice system," Judge Herrick stated. "In the present matter, the 
court has found a conflict of interest sufficient to warrant dismissal of the indictment obtained 
by the conflicted prosecutor. Likewise, the court finds that this demonstrated conflict of 
interest warrants disqualification of the Albany County district attorney's office from further 
prosecution of this matter." The judge dismissed the criminal indictments against the 
principals in the Signature Pharmacy steroid distribution case citing the incompetence of 
Albany County District Attorney David Soares. Soares is the lead prosecutor for a county in 
New York who had taken it upon himself to spend possibly millions of dollars of Albany 
residents taxpayer money to carry on a nationwide steroid witch hunt dubbed "Operation 
Which Doctor". The ruling means that prosecutor David Soares can no longer seek charges 
against Stan and Naomi Loomis, the Signature Pharmacy owners, pharmacist Michael 
Loomis or Signature Pharmacy employees Kirk Calvert and Anthony Palladino; charges must 
be sought if at all by an out of county prosecutor. 
Other courts have similarly held. See also Haraguchi v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 590 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.), rev. granted on court's own motion, 149 P.3d 737 (Cal. 2006) 
(removal of prosecutor given a pecuniary interest in the result of the criminal proceedings.); 
Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1143 (10th Cir. 1995) (Courts have found removal 
especially appropriate when the prosecutor obtained privileged information through his 
or her misconduct.); United States v. Omni Int. Corp., 634 F.Supp. 1414, 1440 (D.C. Md. 
1986) (disqualifying prosecutors from further involvement with case after finding "entrenched 
and flagrant misconduct"); In re Goodman, 210 S.W.3d 805, 814-15 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) 
(granting writ of mandamus and ordering trial court to remove prosecutor, because "requiring 
the parties to proceed through a lengthy litigation process, just so Goodman could later 
obtain reversal on appeal, would be a tremendous waste of the parties' (and the judicial 
system's) financial and temporal resources"). 
Reference to exhibit "1" attached shows that the search warrant was prepared and 
submitted to the Magistrate Judge David Evans by Prosecutor Dustin Smith; the latter a 
defendant in Holli's civil rights and RICO lawsuit against Oneida County. Prosecutor Dustin 
Smith had a pecuniary interest that was benefitted by abuse of Dustin Smith's office, to wit: to 
use the criminal process against Holli and illegally obtain a criminal prosecution that would 
taint the credibility of Holli and Holli's civil litigation. Dustin Smith was prohibited as a matter 
of law from participating in any criminal process against Holli, expecially after he became a 
tort defendant in civil rights and rico litigation brought by Holli 4 months before the "general 
search warrant" was constructed, issued and executed. Moreover Magistrate Evans knew he 
could not sit on any case involving Holli because of a judicial misconduct complaint Holli had 
filed against this Magistrate one year earlier complaining of persistent failures to follow the 
rules of law controlling Magistrate's Evans non-discretionary judicial conduct. 
Because the process was exercised by persons that clearly had a conflict and 
prohibition against executing process against Holli, the process was void from the outset and 
the officers did not have the right to kick in Holli's screen door and execute the void "general 
search warrant" for "fishing purposes"! 
VII. The Officers Did Not Prepare An Accurate Property List 
Of The Things Taken From The Defendant's House 
Rule 41 (f) requires an officer executing a warrant to "prepare and verify an 
inventory of any property seized," and to "return [the warrant]together with a copy of the 
inventory to the magistrate judge designated on the warrant," Fed. R Crim. P. 41 (f)(1 )(8), (D). 
The defendant herein was released from custody on August 12, 2011. Upon her 
return home, she found the property lists taped to her front door. Defendant and other third 
persons conducted an examination of the searched property to note items that were no longer 
on the property to: (1) compare these missing items to the government's property list, (2) 
report the "non-listed" items on the government's property list as stolen from Holli during the 
search and (3) observe if any evidence had been planted on Holli's premises as would be 
noticed by a cursory inspection. Holli also checked her copier that the officers had piled 
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heavy boxes on during the search to see if copier had been broken by the officers searching 
activities, The copier had been broken. Neverthless, there are a number of computer 
devices and software programs that were stolen from Holli's residence and which are not 
listed on the government's property list, as well as other tax files from "unrelated" third 
persons that are not contained on the government's property list. Also the government did not 
list all of Holli's case files or original evidentiary documents seized which Holli intended on 
providing to the court to prove up her civil cases. It is believed that the government will 
destroy these items upon an order by this court to return ALL OF HOLLI'S PROPERTIES 
so that HOLL! cannot prove up her cases with best evidence. Therefore, Holli will also 
seek a spoliation order against the government which requires any finder of fact to presume 
the truth of the matter stated from a copy of any record Holli submits in lieu of an original given 
destruction of any original documentation by Oneida County officials. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant requests the following mandamus 
relief: 
1. An Order finding the August 9, 2011 General Search Warrant served on 
Holli on August 9, 2011, illegal as a matter of law; 
2. An Order commending a blanket supression of all evidence or other 
materials or items seized from Holli's residence and curtilege during the total days the search 
was executed while Holli was incarcerated in jail on a bad faith obstruction charge; 
3. An Order commanding Oneida County Sheriff Jeff Semrad to immediately 
turn over to Holli within 24 hours of granting this Petition : 
(a) His probable cause affidavit used to support the August 9, 2011 
"general search warrant"; 
(b) All items and materials seized from Holli's residence under the 
August 9, 2011 search warrant; 
(c) Monetary compensation for the items broken during the search 
commenced on August 9, 2011, and ; 
(d) Monetary compensation for all electronic items stolen from Holli's 
property and not reported on the property lists created by the sheriffs office. 
4. An Order of Spoliation of Evidence and a Rule that any trier of fact is to 
deem a copy of any record submitted by Holli as an original ·document in light of the bad 
faith search and seizure of plaintiff's property; 
5. An Order of Protection preventing any official process - criminal or 
civil -- from emanating from the materials, documents, items, communications, or properties -
electronic or documentary - OR - oral or written - searched or seized on Holli's property 
under the illegal August 9, 2011 search warrant for however long that search took place while 
Holli was in custody ; 
6. An Order of criminal contempt directed against any person, official or 
private, that uses, interferes with, gains, profits or is advantaged from the illegal actions 
taken against Holli and other third persons commencing August 9, 2011, and furthermore an 
Order stripping any and all privileges from attaching to the illegal actions taken against Holli 
and other third persons commencing August 9, 2011. This means includes invoking "the 
litigation privilege doctrine" in any civil and criminal case pending at the time or brought 
therafter, in order to avoid the commands of this decree; 
7. An Order finding that Holli had every right to protect her properties and the 
properties of third persons under the possession and control of Holli by virtue of Holli's powers 
of attorney form illegal search and seizure by Oneida County officials and that Holli may 
therefore use her right to protect property as an affirmative defense to the obstruction charge, 
AND: 
8. An Order immediately ordering the removal of Prosecutor Dustin Smith 
as the prosecutor of the underlying obstruction charge, as the prosecutor on any charge 
concerning the defendant herein, and as participating as counsel in any litigation involving 
the defendant herein whether that litigation be criminal, 
Dated: August 22, 2011 
Warrant for the serach of Timothy McVeigh's 1977 Mercury Marquis fiie:///C:/Users/eiham/Desktop/mcveighwarrant.htm 
13 tool box from trunk 
14 debris from trunk 
15 vacuuming from right rear carpet 
16 vacuuming from left rear carpet 
17 vacuuming from right front carpet 
18 vacuuming from left front carpet 
19 vacuuming from trunk 
20 vacuuming from front rear and rear sears 
21 three latent lifts 
_IN 'ffffi'UNITE,~~STA'fES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE \\TESTERN 
DISTRICT QF OK::L_AHOMA 
IN RE: SEARCH WARRANTS 
ORDER 
Upon motion of the United States of America and of good cause shmvn, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that the original search warrant returns and affidavits I 
presently under seal by Order of the United States District Court for the Western j 
District of Oklahoma, may be disclosed to the parties for the limited purpose of I 
disco_v.<?9:' !,µ~y;cq.se styled UIJ.ited State9 pfA.merica vs. Timothy James ,J. 
Mcyeiqh~d ]fy:rry ,,t,ynnNic,hdls"'filmy-Um-teP.,:S~~~ct Co:qrtfor tjae. 1'' 'We~~~D~ct of Oklahoma, &e N@. CR- 9~u:@-£'.an<l to their att;meys, 
·and that duplic~te_-09.pies 0f9.aifil·iioc.1fill~rrts ~y-be used by eouns~l and-the-.- -_ -
Court in such further pr-ecee.diugs as there may be in the said case. IT IS SO , 
ORDERED this 1st day of September, 1995. 
Ronald L.Howland 
Mc Veigh Trial Homepage 
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To Whom This May Concern: 
My name is Ferron Stokes: 
Holli Telford aka Holli Lundahl was handling some tax matters for me. She had a file 
with my name affixed to the face of the file which included privileged information 
concerning me. Also she has my-private tax information on her computers seized by 
the sheriff of Oneida County. During the search conducted on Holli's house, a 
luitenant called me at my cell number provided by Holli and asked me if I wouid 
consent to them seizing my labeled file and any other papers bearing my name 
including my tax return papers. I EXPRESLL Y TOLD THE LUITENANT THAT I DID 
NOT CONSENT TO THEM TAKING CUSTODY OF ANY OF MY PRIVATE PAPERS 
AND THAT THEY WERE TO LEAVE MY PRIVATE PAPERS AT HOLLI'S 
RESIDENCE. 
I picked Holli up from jail on August 12, 2011 after Holli had been arrested for 
obstructing the police officers in performance of their duties when Holli complained 
about seizing mine and others personal tax information, etc. We returned to Holli's 
place and surmised what had been taken. All tax files and other personal banking 
information, including my own had been seized from the property. THE OFFICERS 
DID NOT LEAVE MY PRIVATE AND PRIVILEDGED INFORMATION AT HOLLI'S 
HOME LIKE I INSTRUCTED THEM TO DO. HOLLI HAS COMMITTED NO CRIMES 
WITH RESPECT TO ANY MATTER CONCERNING ME AND MY FILES HAVE 
NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT EXERCISED 
ON HOLLI'S PROPERTY ON AUGUST 9, 2011. I INTEND TO SUE IF MY 
PROPERTY IS NOT IMMEDIATELY RETURNED AND/OR IF I SUFFER ANY 
PREJUDICE WHILE MY PERSONAL INFORMATION WAS IN THE ILLEGAL 
CUSTODY OF ONEIDA COUNTY AUTHORITIES. 
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AMERICA FIRST 
HOLLI TELFORD 
10621 S OLD HWY 191 
MALAD CITY, ID 83252 
To the clerk of the court: 
Please find attached the wire transcript of America First Credit Union identifying the wire transfer to the 
law offices of Linebarger Goggan Blair Sampson, LLP ofTyler, Texas in March of 2011 in the amount of 
$4,214.77 as credited from the Loan Proceeds of America First Credit Union Member, Holli Telford. 
If you have any further questions please feel free to call. 
~1~~\2-lrisa~acock 
Lead Teller 
America First Credit Union-North Logan 
(435)792-7520 
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IFTS Message Print - Message Inquiry Display Dialog Box 
User: jkearns Ba.."lk: America First CU Date: 08/05/11 18:01:25 
Message Status: PNRM 
Seq Num: 20110600031100 
Pay Method: FED Output 
Date Recvd: 03/01/2011 
Related Seq Num: 20110600031200 
Message ID: FTI0811 
13:19:57 Value Date: 03/01/2011 
Sender: 324377516 
Amount: $4,214.77 
Debit info 
Account: 205120 
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Addr2: 
Addr3: 
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BRANCH WIRE GL 
ACCOUNTING DEPT 
MANAGEMENT CENTER 
Account: 324377516 
Name: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA 
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Advice: Dept: DEPTl 
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Trancode: DOMESTIC 
Create Template: 
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{4320]0574509010767557* 
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FROM : FAX NO. Aug. 23 2011 07:45PM P 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to opposing 
counsel on 8-23-11 
Brian K. Julian 
Stephen L Adams 
250 S. Fifth St. Ste 700 
Boise Idaho 83707 
fax no. 208-344-5510 
Holli Telford I/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH IBDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
* * * * * * * 
HOLLI TELFORD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) Case No. CV-2011-66 
w ) 
) ORDER VACATING HEARING 
SANDRA COPELAl\T]), AD MITRA MILLS, ) 
JEANETTE HAR_MON, CODY KELLEY, ) 
PAUL KELLEY, JR., THE ESTATE OF ) 
PAUL KELLEY, SR, SMITH COUNTY ) 
TRUSTEE, TAX ASSESSOR GARY ) 
BARBER, SMITH COUNTY, ARTIE ROSS, ) 
ATTOIThTEY TAB BEAELL, LAW OFFICES) 
OF PURDUE, BRAl\T])ON, FELDER, ) 
COLLINS & MOTT; LISA 1'-J'EILSON; AND ) 
DOES 1 - 10 ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
The above-entitled matter was set for hearing Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to 
Quash and Motion For Summary Judgment on the 26th day of August, 2011. The Court has been 
notified that Plaintiff has filed a Petition For Supervisory Mandamus Authority On Significant 
Question of First Impression, as well as an interlocutory appeal of prior rulings, with the Idaho 
Supreme Court. These filings will need to be resolved by the Idaho Supreme Court and require a 
stay on all matters presently pending in this case until those issues and the appeal are responded to. 
The Court also notes that Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Continue the hearing of August 26, 2011, 
\vith supporting documents and argument, which has been objected to by Defendants. However, 
this Motion need not be decided at this time because of the pending appellate matters. 
ORDER VACA TING HEARING - I 
AUG-25-2011 THU 12:30 PM D; dr ict Courl P. 
Therefore, the hearing of August 26, 2011 is vacateclil and will be rescheduled when the Idaho 
Supreme Court has ruled on the matters now pending before them. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 24th day of August, 2011. 
I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
fJ- ·I~ I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25 day of ~ , 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing ORDER vA.ill'NG HEARING to the following 
person(s) in the manner indicated below: I 
Holli Telford 
10621 S. Old Hwy. 191 
Malad, ID 83252 
Stephen L. Adams 
A"l\TDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
ORDER VACATING HEARING - 2 
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IN THE MA TIER OF THE PETITION FOR 
SlJPERVISORY MANDAMUS 
AUTHORITY ON SIGNIFICANT 
QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------------------------------------------------- ) 
HOLLI TELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DISTRICT JUDGE STEPHEN DUNN, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 
SUPERVISORY MANDAMUS 
AUTHORITY ON SIGNIFICANT 
QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION 
Supreme Court Docket No. 39056-2011 
Oneida County Docket No. 2011-66 
Ref. No. 11-387 
A PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY MANDAMUS AUTHORITY ON SIGNIFICANT 
QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION with attachments was filed by Appellant Holli Telford on 
August 9, 2011, requesting a supervisory mandamus writ to resolve a significant question of first 
impression regarding the statutory construction of a "long arm service statute" under Idaho's 
Consumer Protection Act. The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant Holli Telford's PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY 
MANDAMUS AUTHORITY ON SIGNIFICANT QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION be, and 
hereby is, DENIED. 
DA TED this 'J7- day of August, 2011. 
cc: Holli Telford, prose appellant 
Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge Stephen Dunn 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk/ 
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY MANDAMUS AUTHORITY ON 
SIGNIFICANT QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION - Docket No. 39056-2011 
HOLLI TELFORD 
AKA HOLLI LUNDAHL 
10621 S. Old Hwy 191 
Malad, Idaho 83252 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA COPELAND, et al. 
Defendants 
Case No. CV 2011 -- 00066 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
SUPPORTED BY: 
(1) The Affidavit of Holli Telford 
(2) The Affidavit of LA Greer 
(3) The Affidavit of Elham Neilsen 
(4) The Affidavit of Kim Vogt 
(5) The Affidavit of S. Durfee 
(6) Verified Response To Court Order 
Dated August 18, 2011 
CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Holli Telford and timely files her OPPOSITION to the defendant's 
motions to dismiss within 7 days before the scheduled hearing date of September 7, 
2011. 1 
1. The Defendants contend that Rule 56 applies to the motions to dismiss. 
Plaintiff disagrees. Rule 56 does not apply until after the Court has exercised his 
discretion and decided that he is going to consider matters outside of the pleadings. See 
In the adoption of John Doe v. Idaho Dept. of Health And Welfare, Docket no. 37936 
(Idaho Supreme Court, 2011) (The Civil Rules provide that if matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, a motion under l.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) shall be treated as one for summary judgment. l.R.C.P. 12(b). Glaze v. 
Deffenbaugh, 144 Idaho 829, 831, 172 P.3d 1104, 1106 (2007). Here, the Supreme 
Court affirmed that it was within the courts discretion to consider or exclude affidavits, 
and that if the affdavits were considered, then the judgment would be converted to a Rule 
56 judgment. Here, since the Defendant's motions to dismiss were couched under Rule 
12 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the court doesnt exercise his discretion to 
convert the motions until the time of the hearing, then the time schedule set out in Rule 
7(b)(3).(B) or (E) controls. These provisions read as follows: 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a court considers a motion to dismiss in a case that would be tried to a 
jury, all facts are to be liberally construed, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn 
in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms, 119 Idaho at 517, 808 P.2d at 854; 
Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 
1994 ). Therefore all facts are to be contrued in plaintiffs favor here. 
I. THE DEFENDANrs MOTION TO QUASH LACKS MERIT, AND 
FURTHERMORE, THIS DEFENSE WAS WAIVED BECAUSE THE 
DEFENDANTS MADE A GENERAL APPEARANCE 
On July 18, 2011, this court entered a rule that the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act's long arm service statute does not apply to serving a summons and complaint upon a 
non-resident defendant because the word "Summons" was not specifically included in the 
language of the service statute. See l.C. Section 48-613: 
SERVICE OF NOTICE. Service of any notice, demand or subpoena under this act 
shall be made personally within this state, but if such cannot be obtained, 
substituted service therefor may be made in the following manner: 
(i) Personal service thereof without this state; or 
(2) The mailing thereof by registered or certified mail to the last known 
place of business, residence or abode within or without this state or 
such person for whom the same is intended; 
Plaintiff opposed the court's interpretation of this service statute by asserting that the 
(B) When a motion is supported by affidavit(s), the affidavit(s) shall be served 
with the motion, and any opposing affidavit(s) shall be filed with the court and 
served so that it is received by the parties no later than seven (7) days before 
the hearing. 
(E) Any brief submitted in support of a motion shall be filed with the court and 
served so that it is received by the parties at least fourteen (14) days prior to the 
hearing. Any responsive brief shall be filed with the court and served so that it 
is received by the parties at least seven (7) days prior to the hearing. Any 
reply brief shall be filed with the court, and served so that it is received by 
the parties, at least two (2) days prior to the hearing. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the rules are, in part, to allow 
the best chance for each claim to be determined on its merits rather than on some 
procedural technicality. Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323. 326, 715 P2d 993. 996 (1986). 
words "Notice" and "Subpeona" in the statute were synonymous to the word "Summons" 
by all dictionary references and did authorize service of process upon non-resident 
defendants via certified mail. Plaintiff filed a supervisory writ before the Idaho Supreme 
Court seeking an order construeing the service statute which had never been previously 
interpreted. On August 29, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court, without opinion, 
summarily denied plaintiff's supervisory writ on the presumptive conclusion that the issue 
should be raised on appeal after final judgment. Plaintiff therefore adopts and incor-
porates herein her argument made in her supervisory writ petition and continues to assert 
that she properly served the non-resident defendants by certified mail. 
Nevertheless, plaintiff also argues that the defendants waived the defense of 
improper service of process when they sought affirmative relief from this court in their 
motion to dismiss by asking the court to rule that plaintiff had failed to state any actionable 
claim against the defendants for which relief could be granted under Idaho rule 12(b)(6). 
See pgs 13-20 of Barber's, et al's Motions to Dismiss. Instructive on this issue is the 
Rule in Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft. 193 P.3d 866. 146 Idaho 319 (Idaho 09/24/2008). 
Chronicling the procedural history in RHINO METALS: on March 12, 2007, Craft filed 
a special appearance. On March 22, 2007, Craft filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction and noticed the motion for hearing. Before the hearing on the motion, 
Rhino filed an amended complaint to add a count alleging fraud and to demand an 
accounting. In response, Craft filed a motion to strike the amended complaint. The 
district court heard Craft's motion to dismiss on April 26, 2007. At that hearing, Rhino 
argued that by filing the motion to strike, Craft had made a general appearance in the 
action and was therefore subject to personal jurisdiction. The court rejected that argument 
and granted Craft's motion to dismiss. Rhino filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
court denied. Rhino then timely appealed. 
On appeal the RHINO Court considered the issue of whether Craft's Motion to 
Strike constituted a general appearance. The Supreme Court affirmed the following 
conclusions of law. 
1. "If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court, he must 
keep out for all purposes except to make that objection. " Pingree Cattle Loan Co. v. 
Charles J. Webb & Co 36 Idaho 442, 446, 211 P. 556, 557 (1922) (quoting from Lowe v. 
Stringham, 14 Wis. 222, 225 (1861)). A party who specially appeared to challenge the 
-2~"1- 3 
court's in personam jurisdiction made a general appearance by also moving to change 
venue. American Surety Co. of NewYorkv. District Court, 43 Idaho 589, 598, 254 P. 515, 
517 (1927}. A party who specially appeared to challenge the court's in personam 
jurisdiction made a general appearance by also moving to change venue. American 
Surety Co. of NewYorkv. District Court, 43 Idaho 589, 598, 254 P. 515, 517 (1927). Rule 
4(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure supports the rule that the party must keep out for 
all purposes except to object that he is not in court. Here, after Craft filed his motion 
under Rule 12(b)(2) to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction, Rule 4(i) permitted him 
to respond to discovery or to a motion filed by Rhino without such action constituting a 
voluntary appearance. Craft's motion to strike the amended complaint was neither a 
response to discovery nor a response to a motion. Furthermore, the rule provides "If, 
after a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied, the party pleads further and 
defends the action, such further appearance and defense of the action will not constitute 
a voluntary appearance under this rule. 
Here, the defendants have moved to dismiss the case for improper venue -
specifically asking the court to determine whether plaintiff should be able to prosecute her 
breach of contract claims in the forum where the plaintiff sustained damages from 
financial obligations incurred and monies expended as a direct result of the defendants 
failure to complete the sales transaction and turn over a deed to plaintiff. The defendants 
also self servingly and falsely averred that all of the evidence required to prove up 
plaintiffs claims - lied in Texas. To determine if the defendant's claims are credible, 
plaintiff was required to submit evidentiary documents going to the merits of her causes of 
action. On August 1, 2001, plaintiff filed an affidavit wherein plaintiff attached the 
following critical documents going to the merits of damages sustained by plaintiff as a 
direct result of breach of the sales contract between plaintiff and Smith County officials: 
Exhibit "2": A letter of credit /approval 2 from plaintiffs bank representing that 
2. Draws on Letter of Credits permit the applicant to enforce the transaction 
subject of the draw. See Synergy Center v. Lone Star Franchising. 63 S.W.3d 561 
(Tex.App.-Austin, 2001) (letter of credit is a contract promising payment and can be 
specifically enforced or avoided on grounds of breach.) Blickenstaff v. Clegg, Docket n. 
29901 (ID, 2004)(1etter of credit is equivalent to a gaurantee of payment.) Loscha Falls 
LLC v. State, 207 P.3d 963 (Idaho, 2009) (letter of credit was instrument gauranteeing 
payment of costs). SRS Products v. LG Engineering, 994 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.App., 1999) 
(The beneficiary of the letter of credit is the seller and the account party is the purchaser.). 
plaintiff had been approved for a personal loan up to $18,000 as related to a bid proposal 
on property located in Smith County Texas and bearing situs address 14811 FM 2661 
Flint, Texas. 
Exhibit 11: Numerous draws taken from plaintiffs loan account referenced in 
the letter of credit and negotiated to fund the excavation of the subject property for 
installation of a home; directly subsequent to representations made to plaintiff in the 
April 8, 2011 letter by Smith County employee Lois Mosley that the sale of the property to 
plaintiff was conclusive and binding under Texas Tax Code Section 34.23, and that 
plaintiff could occupy, possess and improve the property. (See exhibit "5" attached to 
Telford Affidavit, paragraph 3 for promise.). 
Exhibit "1" attached hereto: Judicial admission that plaintiff wire transfered 
$4,214.77 from her loan account secured under the letter of credit, a sum of money 
pursuant to the draw demand made by the county defendant's "agent" attorneys, the 
Law Offices of Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and Sampson LLC (as admitted in exhibit "4" 
attached to the Telford Affidavit filed 8/1 /11) - to pay for the distressed manufactured 
home transferred to the subject property and permanently affixed thereto. The wire 
transfer transcript (following the bank letter), identifies plaintiffs Idaho address and the 
defendant's agent's receiving bank information. 
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs bank and employees thereof; are all material 
witnesses in this case. These witnesses are residents of the state of Idaho and subject to 
the personal jurisdiction and subpeona power of this court. These witnesses would not be 
subject to the jurisdiction nor the subpeona power of the Texas courts. The defendants are 
are effectively asking this court to judicially prejudice plaintiff by negating these witnesses 
to prove up plaintiffs claims - by these defendant's petition to this Court to force venue 
jurisdiction over plaintiffs action in Texas. This is clearly a petition for affirmative relief. 
Exhibit 8: The picture of the manufactured home affixed to the property. This 
home has a security lien attached to it by an Idaho resident - S. Durfee - for funding the 
rehabilitation and transportation costs on the home now affixed to the "sold" property. 
(See Durfee affidavit attached hereto). This is another "local" obligation to which plaintiff 
incurred as a direct result of being promised delivery of the title to the subject property. 
Granting the defendant's venue petition would "affirmatively" prejudice plaintiff from 
subpeoning this witness at trial as well if Plaintiff were required to try the case in Texas. 
- ])./6- 5 
The affidavit of Elham Nielsen: Elham Nielsen has filed an affidavit claiming 
that she is a third party beneficiary of the property sold to plaintiff because plaintiff 
entered into a contract to resell the property to Elham after Plaintiff completed the agreed 
upon improvements to the property. 
It is therefore clear that the defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue 
and/or inconvenient forum (dismissal was admittedly requested by the defendants 
because the court cannot change venue from a forum state court to a sister state court) 
was a petition seeking affirmative relief from this court. This venue objection was not the 
result of any discovery process initiated by plaintiff nor was it a response to a motion filed 
by plaintiff; therefore the defendant's venue petition constituted a general appearance. 
In addition, it is clear from reading the defendants motions to dismiss, that 
they were not limited to Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5) motions; rather the defendant's motions 
included additional petitions to dismiss each and every merits claim pleaded by plaintiff in 
her verified complaint. Rule 4(i) provides: "If, after a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or 
(5) is denied (emphasis added), the party pleads further and defends the action, such 
further appearance and defense of the action will not constitute a voluntary appearance 
under this rule." The defendants will not be pleading further in the action because they 
merged their rule 12(b)(6) petitions with their rule 12(b)(2),(4) and (5) petitions. Therefore 
the defendants have made a general appearance under rule 4(i) because they did not wait 
for the court to deny a separate motion under rule 12(b)(2), (4) and (5) before pleading 
further. Accordingly, under the Rule set forth in Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 193 P.3d 
866, 146 Idaho 319 (Idaho 2008), the defendants waived all of their personal 
jurisdiction arguments and made a general appearance in the action by law. 
II. VENUE OF THE WITHIN ACTION IS PROPER IN THIS FORUM 
The leading case on the determination of proper venue is Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). Here, the High 
court held that a plaintiff need only show certain factors to establish personal 
jurisdiction and venue in the chosen forum. These factors are: 
(1) the extent of a defendant's purposeful interjection in the forum state; 
b 
(2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum; 
(3) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and 
effective relief; 
(4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; and 
(5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy. 
Followed in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 
94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) ("Where a defendant seeks to defeat jurisdiction, [it] must 
present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would 
render jurisdiction unreasonable." OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096. "Modern transportation and 
communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in 
a State where he engages in economic activity." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S.Ct. 
2174 (quoting McGee v. lnt'I Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 
(1957)). 
a. The Burden on Defendant of Litigating in this Forum and Plaintiff's 
Interest in Convenient and Effective Relief Are Intertwined And 
Favor The Plaintiff 
This is a contract transaction wherein plaintiff admittedly obtained several loans 
to fund the transaction. It is undisputed that the defendants have prevented plaintiff 
from obtaining the promised deed to the property; they have also corruptly lured the 
plaintiff into depleting her loan funds to improve the property; and then they subsequently 
interferred with plaintiffs ability to earn an income by thereafter selling the signicantly 
improved property to a new buyer. 
it is uncontroverted that plaintiff is not regularly employable. Plaintiff has been 
adjudicated as permanently physically disabled due to serious health risks, but has been 
denied social security disability because of the agency's perception that plaintiff has the 
capacity to perform independent jobs out of the regular employment community. 
Accordingly plaintiff has no steady monthly income and must earn income off of unique 
transactions such as the case at bar. 
It is clear that Plaintiff used her borrowing power to fund a transaction that she 
could make money off the back end. The defendants have corruptly prevented plaintiff 
from doing so. Plaintiff has no more assets in which to negotiate a future income, less 
1 
this Court orders specific performance on the transaction at hand, so that plaintiff can 
complete resale of the subject real property and make a marginal profit after all obligations 
are satisfied. Presently plaintiff has no funds that would permit litigation outside the 
forum. Also all material witnesses to this case are under the personal jurisdiction and 
subpeona power of this Court, where they would not be if this Court were to dismiss this 
case to force venue in Texas. Plaintiff is representing herself in part because she lacks 
the funds to pay for an attorney. The Supreme Court has decisioned that Plaintiff may 
chose the forum which plaintiff perceives she will receive convenient and effective relief. 
Burger King, 471 U.S. At 474. Plaintiff resides at a farm house in Malad Idaho which is 
part of a family trust, albiet in serious disrepair. The expenses at the residence are funded 
by family members and plaintiff, when and if, plaintiff brings in a random income. The 
Supreme Court has decisioned that if a Plaintiff is burdened by litigating in another forum 
and that burden would be so overwhelming as to practically foreclose pursuit of the law-
suit, that a Court cannot deny plaintiff her chosen forum. Burger King supra@ 474. Under 
the circumstances presented by plaintiff, this court must grant plaintiff her chosen forum. 
The defendants on the other hand are well funded. They have hired a 
prestigious firm in Boise Idaho that has a strong practice before the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The defendants have not shown in any manner, much less a compelling manner, how 
they cannot litigate plaintiffs claims in this forum, nor have they provided any compelling 
argument why venue of plaintiffs case should not be held in Idaho where plaintiff was 
most effected by the defendant's tortious acts. 
Furthermore, the defendant's sattelite argument that the Idaho and Texas 
Governmental Immunity Acts require venue in Texas, lacks merit. First, Plaintiff has 
not sued the defendants under the Idaho or Texas Governmental Immunity Acts. 
Moreover, even if plaintiff had, the Idaho Supreme Court has decisioned that foreign 
municipalities may be sued in Idaho courts if they commit a tortious injury against an 
Idaho resident. See Athayv.Stacey, 196 P.3d 325, 146 Idaho 407 (Idaho 2008) 
(Following the rule in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) that where a foreign 
government unit commits a tortious act against a sister state resident, that government 
unit is not entitled to immunity from suit. Here, Athay sued both Idaho and Utah 
government officials under the Idaho and Utah Governmental Immunity Acts for causing 
him injury in Idaho. The Idaho Supreme Court found that Athay could proceed against 
both state municipalities in an Idaho state court and that neither municipalities were 
immuned from suit.). In the case at bar, any claim of immunity by the defendants is 
likewise non-existent just because of their status as a government unit 
Second, under the fact circumstances of the instant case, the Texas 
government unit, ie. Smith County Texas, is especially not potected by any governmental 
immunity. In State v. Lain, 162 Tex. 549, 349 S.W.2d 579, 581-82 (Tex. 1961) , the 
Texas Supreme Court specifically held: "One who takes possession of another's land 
without legal right is no less a trespasser because he is a state official or employee, and 
the owner should not be required to obtain legislative consent to institute a suit to oust him 
simply because he asserts a good faith but overzealous claim that title or right of 
possession is in the state and that he is acting for and on behalf of the state .... The 
rationale of the rule is that in such cases possession is not in fact held for the sovereign 
but is wrongfully held."). Here, plaintiff claims legal right to the property at issue and 
asserts that Smith County is now a trespasser to the land that plaintiff lawfully occupies. 
Third, this case deals with a contract dispute over the right to specifically 
enforce the sales contract of property sold to plaintiff and previously owned by Smith 
County. The Texas legislature in 2005 specfically enacted a statute that proscribed the 
granting of any immunity to a government unit entering into a contract- following in part 
the common law rule in Catalina Development, Inc. v. County of El Paso, 121 S.W.3d 
704, 705 (Tex. 2003) ("By entering into a contract, a governmental entity necessarily 
waives immunity from liability, voluntarily binding itself like any other party to the terms of 
an agreement." The government performs a private function when entering into a 
contract with another person.). See Texas H.B. 2039 codified as Local Government 
Code §§271.151.160 and providing that "by entering a contract, local governmental 
entities waive their sovereign immunity to suit for breach of that contract." Therefore, 
the Texas Governmental Immunity Act enacted to provide immunity protection for certain 
acts of government units, has absolutely no application to the "Breach of Contract 
Case" presented herein and does not provide compelling grounds to dismiss the within 
action under "non-applicable" venue statutes contained in either the Texas or Idaho 
Governmental Immunity Acts. 
Accordingly, the defendants have provided no compelling arguments that 
venue should be changed from Idaho to Texas. 
b. Forum State's Interest In Adjudicating The Dispute 
"States have an important interest in providing a forum in which their residents 
can seek redress for injuries caused by out-of-state actors." OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096. 
Here there has been clear injury within the state of Idaho and which was directed at 
plaintiff, an Idaho resident. In addition, third party beneficiaries that is also a resident of 
Idaho has likewise been injured. See Aff. Of S. Durfee. Idaho therefore has an interest in 
adjudicating the within dispute which seeks redress for injuries plaintiff suffered at the 
hands of out-of-state actors. 
c. Interstate Judicial System's Interest in Obtaining Efficient Resolution 
This factor asks "whether the forum state is the most efficient place to litigate the 
dispute." Id. "Key to this inquiry are the location of witnesses, where the wrong 
underlying the lawsuit can best be proven and whether jurisdiction is necessary to 
prevent piecemeal litigation." Plaintiff adopts her argument supra with respect to Idaho 
being the most efficient and only place for effective resolution of plaintiff's claims. In 
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), the Supreme Court held that venue should be in 
the forum where the effect and greatest injury is felt. Plaintiff contends that forum is 
Idaho. 
d. The Extent Of The Defendants Purposeful Interjection Into The 
State Of Idaho Compels Venue Of The Prosecution In Idaho 
(i) The Defendants Made More Than 9 Phone Calls, 2 Faxes And 
6 Emails Into The Forum State To Secure the Sale Of The 
Subject Property To Plaintiff 
Calling a Texas resident in Texas to solicit a loan is a purposeful contact with 
Texas. Rynone Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indus., Inc., 96 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 2002.). At least five federal appellate courts- the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and 
Tenth circuits- have held that a phone call from the defendant to the forum state can 
create specific jurisdiction when the lawsuit arises from the phone call or other electronic 
means. See Neal v. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The acts of making 
phone calls and sending facsimiles into the forum, standing alone, may be sufficient to 
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confer jurisdiction on the foreign defendant where the phone calls and faxes form the 
bases for the action."); Oriental Trading Co. v. Firetti, 236 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that phone calls and faxes into forum created jurisdiction in suit based on those 
calls and faxes); Taylor v. Phelan, 912 F.2d 429, 433 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) ("So long as it 
creates a substantial connection, even a single telephone call into the forum state can 
support jurisdiction."); FMC Corp. v. Varonos, 892 F.2d 1308, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(sending allegedly false faxes to forum state created specific jurisdiction in lawsuit based 
on those faxes); Brown v. Flowers Indus., 688 F.2d 328, 332-33 (5th Cir. 1982) (single 
telephone call initiated by the defendant was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction). 
Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10 attached to the Telford Affidavit show that more than 9 
phone calls were made by defendants or their agents to plaintiffs Idaho phone number, 
that 2 faxes were sent to plaintiff by Smith County employees, and that 6 emails were 
transmitted to plaintiff by the defendants and their agents; all in an effort to culiminate 
the sale of the subject property. It is clear that the defendants therefore purposely availed 
themselves of this forum when transacting business with plaintiff, an Idaho resident. 
(ii) Single Contracts Executed Over Internet Or Introduced 
Into the Forum By Other Means Can Result In Purposeful 
Availment Sufficient To Impose Jurisdiction 
In McGee v. Intern'! Life Insurance Co., 355 US 220, 222- 223 (1957) : The 
US Supreme Court held that entering into a single contract with a forum resident 
subjected the defendants to the plaintiffs forum even though no property belonged to the 
insurance company in California, no other policies were issued in California and the 
insurance company had no offices or agents in California.). See also Zippe Manufac-
turing Co. v. Zippo.com, 952 F.Supp 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (Where a company 
knowingly transmits files over the internet to aid in the execution of contracts, the 
company subjects itself to the foreign jurisdiction where the files were transmitted.) ; 
Toys "R" Us Inc v. Step Two SA, 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3rd Cir. 2003) (the Zippo decision has 
become seminole authority for all cases involving internet business.) Same Cadle Co. 
v. Schlitchmann, 123 Fed. App'x 675, 678 (6th Cor. 2005); Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. 
Bean Inc, 341F.3d1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2003); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 
2002); ALS Scan v. Digital Serv. Consultants Inc. 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Followed in Pro Axess Inc. v. Orlux Distribution Inc., Nos. 03-4179, 03-4189 (1 oth Cir. 
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2005) (Exercising personal jurisdiction where a contract was culminated through the 
internet with a trench defendant and plaintiff committed to obligations in the forum state in 
perfomance on the contract.). 
Citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478, 105 S.Ct. 2174, "with respect to interstate 
contractual obligations, parties who reach out beyond one state and create 
continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state are subject 
to regulation and sanctions in the other State for the consequences of their 
contractual activities." 
Here, it is clear that Smith County created a contractual relationship with an 
Idaho resident and cause plaintiff to commit to obligations in the state of Idaho in order to 
meet the terms of the contracts with the defendants. Under Supreme Court Rule in 
Burger King supra, the defendants actions constituted purposeful interjection into the 
state of Idaho, sufficient to sustain personal and venue jurisdiction in Idaho. 
Based on the foregoing, all defendants have waived any contest to this court 
exerting personal jurisdiction over the defendants, the defendants have made a general 
appearance in the action, and Idaho is the proper venue to hear plaintiff's breach of 
contract case. 
Ill. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT FAILED TO ALLEGE A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS 
A. Plaintiff Has Properly Stated A Claim For Specific Performance 
Commecing pages 13-20 of both motions to dismiss, the defendants have 
collectively argued that plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case against the 
defendants and therefore have asked this court grant rule 12(b)(6) dismissals with 
prejudice on each of plaintiffs causes of action. 
As to plaintifs first cause of action for Specific Performance on the sales 
contract, the defendants argue that because no written contract was signed, that there is 
no contract to specifically enforce. In the alternative, the defendants argue that even if 
there was a contract, the contract cannot be enforced because it was not committed to in 
writing and therefore is barred by the statute of frauds. See County defendants motion to 
dismiss@ page 14, paragraph 2. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically addressed the defendants arguments 
in Simons v. Simons, Case No. 25001 (Idaho 2000) favorably to Plaintiff. Here, the 
district court determined that Delila must deed the home and sixty acres to Newell and 
Carol pursuant to an oral agreement made between the parties. Delila argued that the 
district court could not issue such an order because the contract related to a land 
transaction which must be in writing under the state of frauds. The record showed that 
there was no dispute that an oral agreement existed to convey land to Delila's relatives 
Newell and Carol. Newell and Carol fully performed their part of the oral agreement. 
The Supreme Court affirmed that under the doctrine of part performance, when an 
agreement to convey real property fails to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, 
the agreement may nevertheless be specifically enforced when the purchaser has partly 
performed the agreement. Bear Island Water Association, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 
722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994). "What constitutes part performance must depend upon 
the particular facts of each case and the sufficiency of particular acts is matter of law." Id. 
at 722, 874 P.2d at 533; (citing Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551, 381 P.2d 802 (1963)). 
"The most important acts which constitute a sufficient part performance are actual 
possession, permanent and valuable improvements and these two combined." Roundy v. 
Waner, 98 Idaho 625, 629, 570 P.2d 862, 866 (1977). The Simons Court affirmed the 
judgment of the district court who found that Newell and Carol met the elements of part 
performance and therefore were entitled to an order of specific performance requiring 
Delila to convey the property to Newell and Carol. 
Likewise in the case at bar. There is no dispute that plaintiff won the sole and 
only bid on the subject property. See Affidavits of Vogt, Neilson, Telford and Greer. 
There is also no dispute that the County failed to perform the required appraisal of the 
property to assess it's true market value before placing the property for sale as required 
under Texas' Local Government Code. Further, there is no dispute that the County 
failed to accurately describe the property for sale as required under Texas' Local 
Government Code. There is also no dispute that plaintiff submitted a rebid for the true 
market value of the property (which no other person bid on) and that the selling agent for 
the county was committed by law to accept Holli's counterbid as the highest and only bid 
proferred. It is undisputed that the selling agent faxed Holli a letter confirming that the re-
sale bid was a conclusive and binding contract between Holli and the County and that 
Holli could take immediate possession of the property pending delivery of the deed. See 
exhibit "5" attached to Telford Affidavit for letter faxed to plaintiff. Finally, there is no 
dispute that plaintiff tendered nearly $9,700 to the county or their agents under the letter of 
credit for purchase of a "distressed" home that was transferred and affixed to the subject 
property and there is no dispute that plaintiff committed herself to another $35,000 in loan 
commitments to rehabilitate the manufactured home and develop residential 
infrastructure. 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff has met "The most important acts which 
constitute a sufficient part performance ... to wit: actual possession, permanent and 
valuable improvements and these two combined." Roundy v. Waner, 98 Idaho 625, 629, 
570 P.2d 862, 866 (1977). Accordingly, plaintiff was not required to meet the Statute of 
Frauds - when the defendants refused to convey the deed to plaintiff in writing, And, the 
Doctrine of Part Performance allows plaintiff to obtain a decree from this Court directing 
the defendants to specifically perform on the oral contract and convey the property to 
plaintiff as a matter of law. 
B. Plaintiff Has Properly Stated A Claim For Breach Of Contract 
And The Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing 
The defendants argue that because there was no written contract conveying the 
property to plaintiff, that plaintiff cannot state a claim for Breach of Contract and of the 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. For the reasons stated supra, there was an 
oral contract and plaintiff clearly performed on that contract thus avoiding the Statute of 
Frauds and making an enforceable contract. A party may sue for breach of an Oral 
contract of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in that contract. See 
Mancinelli v. International Business Machines, 87 F.3d 1320 (91h Cir, 1996) (If an oral 
contract exists, plaintiff may sue for all breaches inherent in that contract including for a 
breach of the convenant of good faith and fair dealing.) 
Since an oral contract did exist in this case, plaintif may likewise sue fo it's 
breach. 
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C. Plaintiff Has Stated A Claim Against The Defendants Under The 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
The Defendants argue that because the Idaho Consumer Protection Act does 
not specifically include government entities in it's legal definition, l.C. Section 48-603, 
that the County defendants are excluded from answering to plaintiffs claim against these 
defendants under this act. Plaintiff disagrees. The statute very clearly states "any other 
legal entity". The defendants are clearly covered under this escape clause so that the Act 
can meet it's purpose. It would be nonsensical for foreign municipalities to violate the 
rights of sister state citizens and then avoid liability for it's actions simply because it is a 
municipality. See Nevada v. Hall supra holding that foreign sovereigns are liable to 
injuries commited against citizens of sister states. 
Moreover, the defendants cite to 48-602(9) as an omissive statute that allows 
them to escape liability. This statute defines trade and commerce and does not exempt 
the defendants from liability because the defendants were in fact conducting trade and 
commerce within the meaning of it's terms with plaintiff. Specifically, the defendants did 
advertise, offer for sale, sell, collect debts arising out of the sale of goods to ... locations 
within the state of Idaho, or directly or indirectly affecting the people of this state. 
Contrary to the defendants contention, this statute does not require the goods 
sold to plaintiff be located within the state, it only requires that a good be advertised, sold, 
debts be collected arising out of the sale or that these acts . . . directly or indirectly affect 
the people of this state. The defendants claim that since the real property is in Texas 
and cannot be delivered to this state in consummation of the sale, that the defendants 
cannot be held liable under this act for any breach therefore. The defendants misstate 
the transferable item that plaintiff was sold. Plaintiff was sold the deed to the subject 
property and promised delivery of the deed in this state by the counties' legal agents 
preparing the deed. See exhibit "4" attached to Telford Affidavit which promises plaintiff a 
copy of the deed via email from Charlene Fugler and then promises to mail to plaintiff in 
Idaho, the original deed. 
D. Plaintiff Has Stated An Idaho AND Utah Racketeering Act 
Claim Against The Defendants 
As set forth in the Affidavit of Holli Telford filed on August 1, 2011, pargraph 3, 
Holli is stating an Idaho Racketeering Act claim, 18 USC Section 7801. et seq. against 
the defendants. Plaintiff has asserted the following predicate acts as LC. Sections: (1) 
18-2403 (Theft by unauthorized transfer); (2) 18-2403(d) (Theft by false promise); (3) 
18-2403 (e) (Theft by extortion) ; 18-2407 (Extortion by a public servant and resulting in 
grand theft); and 18-1905 (Falsification of corporate books). Plaintiff has also alleged 
that the defendants associated in fact to create an enterprise and conspired to comit 
racketeering acts against plaintiff, depriving plaintiff of personal and business properties. 
The defendants argue that because plaintiff is not a prosecuting attorney, she 
has no standing to prosecute the crimes alleged supra, and moreover, that the legislature 
specfically prohibits plaintiff from prosecuting said crimes because there is no private 
cause of action under the criminal statutes. 
First and foremost, the Supreme Court in Rotella v. Wood et al., 528 U.S. 549 
(2000) held that a private party becomes "a private attorney general" with authority to 
prosecute crimes on behalf of the state if they are the victims of those crimes under the 
RICO act. Hence plaintiff has standing to prosecute predicate crimes. Secondly, the 
Idaho Racketeering Act is the legislative rule that provides for a private cause of action 
when certain predicate crimes are commited under the act. Accordingly, plaintiff does 
state a RICO claim against the defendants which she is permitted to try before a jury. 
With respect to plaintiffs alleged Utah RICO crime, plaintiff dismisses this 
charge without prejudice and replaces with her charges under the Idaho RICO Act. 
E. Plaintiff Has Stated A RICO Conspiracy Claim Against All 
Defendants 
The Defendants argue that there is no cause of action for a conspiracy claim in 
the state of Idaho . Plaintiff disagrees . Idaho Code Section 18-7804. Prohibited 
activities specifically provides: ... (d) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to 
violate any of the provisions of subsections (a) through (c) of this section. Whoever 
violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a felony. 
Plaintiff alleged that the defendants associated in fact and conspired to commit 
the predicate crimes set forth supra, especially Tad Beall and his lawfirm. On June 2, 
2011, Plaintiff specifically informed this defendant that he was committing violations 
under Idaho's racketeering act and that if he didnt withdraw from the conspiracy and direct 
immediate turn over of the deed to plaintiff, that plaintiff would sue him and his lawfirm 
as part of an ongoing RICO conspiracy continuing into the future. Plaintiff is entitled to 
send this claim to a jury under Idaho law. 
F. Plaintiffs Has Stated A Fraud Claim 
The Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot meet all of the elements of a fraud 
claim. Addressing each element: 
(1) A statement or representation of fact: 
Plaintiff and those working with plaintiff were all told that: (i) plaintiff had 
won the bid with Smith County, (ii) plaintiff's bid offer was conclusive and binding, (iii) 
Smith County had sold the subject property to plaintiff, (iv) plaintiff could possess the 
property and improve it, and (v) the Law offices of Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and 
Sampson were preparing the deed to turn over to the plaintiff. These facts are 
undisputed. (See exs. 3-6 attached to Telford affidavit and the whole of the affidavits 
presented by Telford, Nielsen, Vogt, Greer and Durfee.) 
(2) it's falsity: 
(i) The defendants did not hold plaintiff's bid conclusive and binding; (ii) 
the defendants denied that they sold the subject property to plaintiff; (iii) the lawyer 
agents did not deliver to plaintiff the deed to the property, and (iv) the defendants denied 
that they knew plaintiff had significantly improved the property at the time the defendants 
turn over the property to the prior owners on June, 1, 2011. 
(3) its materiality: 
All of the misrepresentations made to plaintiff and others - directly caused 
the damages to which plaintiff and others have averred in their affidavits. 
(5) the speakers knowledge of its falsity: 
On June 1, 2011 and June 2, 2011, County agent Lois Mosley and attorney 
Tad Beall both informed plaintiff that they were withdrawing the sales contract with plaintiff 
and that plaintiff therefore had no remedy for the tens of thousands of dollars of improve-
ments plaintiff made to the property. Tad Beall is an attorney and as a matter of law 
would have to have known that plaintiff did have a remedy, to wit: a lawsuit against the 
defrendants. 
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(6) the speaker's intent that there be reliance: 
The County defendants intended that plaintiff rely on their promises that 
plaintiff had been sold the property owned by the Couny - as the County defendants knew 
of plaintiffs plans to improve the property immediately with the manufactured home that 
plaintiff had simultaneously purchased from the County, the county knew plaintiff had 
obligated herself to liens to rehabilitate the home and the property, and the County 
waited until after plaintiff performed these substantial improvements before telling plaintiff 
that they had decided not the sell the property to plantiff. 
(7) The hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statements: 
The record establishes that plaintiff obtained 2 loans, one in the amount of 
$18, 000 to support the letter of credit and the other in the amount of $35,000 to subsidize 
the rehabiliation of the property and home and to cover costs for transfer and installation 
of the home. The record shows that $9700 was already paid out to the county for the 
distressed home and transport. Plaintiff has testified that she was ignorant of the 
defendants fraud until June 1, 2011 when Smith County employee Lois advised plaintiff 
they were not going to tender plaintiff a deed to the property and that plaintiff had no 
remedies against the county to force turn over of the deed. Tad Beall, one of the county's 
attorneys butressed these statements. 
(8) Reliance by the hearer: 
Plaintiff incorporates hereunder her response in subsection (7) supra and 
reasserts that she made improvements and obligated herself on loans because she relied 
on the counties promises to deliver plaintiff the deed. 
(9) Resultant Injury. 
Credit Injury because plaintiff has not been able to make the payments 
under the loans; actual loss injury in applied liens in the amount of $53,000 to date; any 
injury plaintiff has suffered from damage to the home and property while Elham Nielson 
has not been able to purchase and occupy the property nor been able to secure insurance 
on the property because of the county's refusal to deliver laintiff the deed; emotional and 
mental distress damages; and punitive damages for outrageous conduct on the part of 
the defendants. 
There is no question that the records on file show that plaintiff can prove up a 
claim for fraud against all defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff contends that the defendants have 
waived any allege defect in service of process or any other defense of lack of personal 
jurisdiction - by making a general appearance before this court both in their venue motion 
and because they simultaneously asked this court to grant affirmative relief under their 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss with prejudice all of plaintiffs pleaded claims for relief 
upon plaintiffs alleged failure to state any claim upon which relief may be granted. 
Plaintiff also asserts that venue in this jurisdiction is proper, and furthermore, 
that the defendants waived their defense of improper venue when they sought affirmative 
relief under Rule 12(b)(6) - to essentially kills plaintiffs claims and walk away with a 
windfall. 
Finally, plaintiff requests that she be granted in cross, a summary judgment on 
all of her claims for relief if the court considers affidavits outside the four corners of the 
complaint. 
Dated: August 31, 2011 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the following 
parties on August 31, 2011. 
Brian Julian, Stephen Adams 
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise Idaho 83707 
Fax no. 208-344-5510 
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To the clerk of the court: 
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law offices of Linebarger Goggan Blair Sampson, LLP of Tyler, Texas in March of 2011 in the amount of 
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If you have any further questions please feel free to call. 
.~~1~ lrisa~acock 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DIS~,~========i 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA COPELAND, et aL 
Defendants 
Case No. CV 2011 - 00066 
NOTICE TO THIS COURT THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT SERVED 
WITH THE DEFENDANT'S REPLIES 
FILED IN ro THE COURT RECORD 
ON AUGUST i 8, 201 i UNTIL THE CLERK 
TENDERED COPIES OF THESE 
REPLIES TO PLAINTIFF ON SEPTEMBER 
2,2011 
PLAINTIFF FILED AN OPPOSITION 
TO THE DEFENDANTS MOTIONS 
TO DISMISS ON AUGUST 31, 2011 
AND AN AMENDED OPPOSITION 
ON SEPTEMBER 1, 2011 
THIS COURT SHOULD DIRECT THE 
DEFENDANTS TO FILE REPLIES 
TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED OPPOSITION 
-·· -- -----· ·--- J' --J _, --- -· ·-
HEARING SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 
7, 2011 
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR OSC 
RE CONTEMPT AGAINST OPPOSING 
PARTIES AND THEIR ATIORNEYS OF 
RECORD 
COMES NOW Plaintiff and Notices this court that she was never served with 
copies of any defendants Replies filed into the court record on August 18, 2011. As this court 
is well aware, plaintiffs home was search and seized on August 9, 2011 and for days 
afterword, on a general search warrant All of plaintiff's case files, electronic records, paper 
records, evidence, computers, electronic devices, etc. were taken. Plaintiff filed a 
mandamus writ for the return of hers and other third person's properties lawfully in plaintiff's 
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possession and illegally seized In violation of the fourth amendment. That Writ was attached 
to plalntiff's August 23, 2011 response to this Court's August 18, 2011 OSC to plaintiff. On or 
about August 25, 2011, the criminal judge over plaintiffs obstruction case, dismissed 
plaintiffs Mandamus petition for an alleged rule violation but then reinstated the petition after 
learning of the error in his ruling and set a hearing for September 9, 2011. 
Neverthless, plaintiff has not received her files or computer equipment back from 
the Sheriff's office. Irrespective, on August 31, 2011, plaintiff completed the construction of 
another Opposition To The Defendant's Motions To Dismiss given her inability to obtain her 
draft of this Opposition contained in her computer that the Sheriff seized on August 9, 2011 
and after obtaining new copies of the defendant's motions to dismiss from the court's file. 
Plaintiff amended her Opposition on September 1, 2011. Opposing counsel was fax filed 
plaintiffs Original opposition on August 31, 2011 and plaintiffs Amended Opposition on 
September 1, 2011. See attached electronic phone log showing the fax filing to opposing 
counsel's office on August 31, 2011 attached hereto as exhibit "1 ". 
On September 2, 2011 plaintiff was advised that opposing counsel had filed Replies 
to their motion to dismiss on August 18, 2011, in spite of this court's OSC to plaintiff to 
explain why she had not filed her Opposition by August 11, 2011 (during the time plaintiff was 
in jail on the obstruction charge for resisting the illegal search of her home.). As aforestated, 
plaintiff was not served with these replies unless the sheriff seized plaintiff's mail while plaintiff 
was in jail and these replies were in the seized mail. 
Nevertless, this court should order the defendants to file responses to plaintiff's 
Amended Opposition fax served on opposing counsel's office on September 1, 2011 to 
permit the defendants to file new replies. Otherv..rise, plaintiff seeks an OSC re contempt 
against the defendants for making certain false statements in their replies to avoid this court's 
jurisdiction. Specifically: 
Defendant Tab Beall denies he called plaintiffs Idaho phone number on June 2, 
2011. Exhibit "1 O" attached to plaintiffs affidavit filed on August 1, 2011 is the phone log 
reflecting Tab Beall's incoming phone call from 903-525-3100. Given plaintiffs phone device 
was seized by the sheriffs office and therefore plaintiff is unable to bring this device to the 
court on September 7, 2011, plaintiff requests that this Court issue an OSC against 
defendant Tab Beall to produce a copy of his phone bill designated with the phone number 
903-525-3100 for the date of June 2, 2011 to prove what phone number this defendant called. 
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Plaintiff's Idaho phone number 208-473-5800 will most definitely be on this defendant's phone 
bill. 
As to the County defendants Reply, their attorney has made two credibility attacks 
against plaintiff, to wit: ( 1) the plaintiff is not the true party in interest given an unexecuted 
contract with Elham Nielsen - irrespective that plaintiff has presented substantial damages to 
this court that attach directly to plaintiff, and ; (2) the plaintiff is practicing law without a 
license because plaintiff bought a tax deed property which she sought to "flip" and sell to Ms. 
Neilsen in order to earn an income. Both of these arguments are rediculous and frivolous and 
this court should issue an OSC to counsel to answer why the court should not sanction 
counsel for filing such a fivolous argument. 
Dated: September 3, 2011 
Holli Telford 
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the following parties on 
September 3, 2011 with the foregoing document by fax .. 
Brian Julian, Stephen Adams 
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise Idaho 83707 
Fax no. 208-344-5510 
Judge Stephen Dunn 
208-236-7012 
Clerk of the Oneida County Court 
208-766-2990 
- 2.~1-
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA COPELAND, et al. 
Defendant 
Case No. CV 2011 - 66 
AMENDED RETURN OF "PERSONAL 
SERVICE" ON DEFENDANT SMITH 
COUNTY ASSESSOR GARY BARBER 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Holli Telford and submits this Amended Return of 
"personal service" on defendant Smith County Assessor Gary Barber. While plaintiff 
does not agree that she is required to personally serve the defendants with the summons 
and complaint in the instant action, the appearing defendants have successfully obtained 
an order to quash service of the process which was initially served upon them by certified 
mail as required under the service statute via Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff 
intends to perform "personal service" on the appearing defendants only. On appeal 
plaintiff will challenge the court's ruling that service by certified mail on the non-appearing 
defendants was improper under the specific seNice statute set forth under the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act 
Plaintiff has now effected personal service of the summons and complaint 
upon the defendant Smith County Assessor Gary Barber pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 4(d)(2): Service upon individuals ... by delivering a copy of the summons 
and of the complaint to the individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the 
individual's ... usual place of abode with some person over the age of eighteen (18) 
years residing therein. 
Attached hereto as exhibit '"1" is the notarized Affidavit of Service on Smith 
FROM : FRX NO. : Sep. 16 2011 10:09RM p 
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County Tax Assessor Gary Barber showing that this defendant received personal service 
of the Summons and Verified complaint on September 13, 2011 by a licensed process 
server in in Smith County Texas. 
This Amended Return of Service should nowmoot the defendant's pending 
motion to quash service of process via certified mail. 
Dated: September 16, 2011 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the 
following parties on September 16, 2011. 
Attorneys Brian Julian and Stephen Adams 
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise Idaho 83707 
Fax no. 208-344-5510 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA COPELAND, et al. 
Defendant 
Case No. CV 20i 1 - 66 
AMENDED RETURN OF "PERSONAL 
SERVICE" ON DEFENDANT TAB 
BEALL 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Holli Telford and submits this Amended Return of 
"personal service" on defendant Tab Beall. While plaintiff does not agree that she is 
required to personally serve the defendants with the summons and complaint in the 
instant action, the appearing defendants have successfully obtained an order to quash 
service of the process which was initially served upon them by certified mail as required 
under the service statute via Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff intends to perform 
"personal service" on the appearing defendants only. On appeal plaintiff will challenge 
the court's ruling that service by certified mail on the non-appearing defendants was 
improper under the specific service statute set forth under the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act 
Plaintiff has now effected personal service of the summons and complaint 
upon the defendant Tab Beall pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(d)(2): 
Service upon individuals ... by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to 
the individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's ... usual place of 
abode with some person over the age of eighteen (18) years residing therein. 
Attached hereto as exhibit "1" is the notarized Affidavit of Service on Tab Beall 
showing that this defendant was personally served by leaving copies at his usual place of 
ROM rnx NO. Sep. 16 2011 10:11RM P 
abode during business hours and with a person over the age of 18 residing therein for 
business purposes (and designated as the officer manager of the business). The service 
of the Summons and Verified complaint was effected on September 13, 2011 by a 
licensed process server in in Smith County Texas. 
This Amended Return of Service should nowmoot the defendant's pending 
motion to quash service of process via certified mail. 
Dated: September 16, 2011 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the 
following parties on September 16, 2011. 
Attorneys Brian Julian and Stephen Adams 
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise Idaho 83707 
Fax no. 208-344-5510 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA COPELAND, et al. 
Defendant 
Case No. CV 2011 - 66 
AMENDEDRETURNOF "PERSONAL 
SERVICE" ON DEFENDANT THE LAW 
OFFICES OF PURDUE, BRANDON, 
FELDER, COLLINS @ MOTT LLP 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Holli Telford and submits this Amended Return of 
"personal service" on defendant the Law Offices of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins @ 
Mott llp. While plaintiff does not agree that she is required to personally serve the 
defendants with the summons and complaint in the instant action, the appearing 
defendants have successfully obtained an order to quash service of the process which 
was initially served upon them by certified mail as required under the service statute via 
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff intends to perform "personal service" on the 
appearing defendants only. On appeal plaintiff will challenge the court's ruling that 
service by certified mail on the non-appearing defendants was improper under the specific 
service statute set forth under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
Plaintiff has now effected personal service of the summons and complaint 
upon the defendant Tab Beall pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(d)(4). 
Service upon domestic or foreign corporations. (A) ... by delivering a copy of the 
summons and complaint to an officer, managing or general agent of the Law Offices of 
Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins @ Mott. 
Attached hereto as exhibit "1" is the notarized Affidavit of Service on the Law 
Offices of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins @ Mott, showing that this defendant business 
I, 
- ZCl.Lf-
ROM FRX NO. Sep. 16 2011 10:13AM P 
partnership was personally served by leaving copies of the summons and complaint wlth 
the Officer Manager Stephan Golden The service of the Summons and Verified 
complaint was effected on September 13, 2011 @ 1 :30 p.m. by a [icensed process server 
in Smith County Texas. 
This Amended Return of Service should now moot the defendant's pending 
motion to quash service of process via certified maiL 
Dated: September 16, 2011 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the 
following parties on September 16, 2011. 
Attorneys Brian Julian and Stephen Adams 
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700 
PO Box7426 
Boise Idaho 83707 
Fax no. 208-344-5510 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA COPELAND, et a!. 
Defendant 
Case No. CV 2011 - 66 
AMENDED RETURN OF "PERSONAL 
SERVICE" ON DEFENDANT SMITH 
COUNTY AKA SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE, 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Holli Telford and submits this Amended Return of 
"personal service" on defendant Smith County aka Smith County Trustee. While 
plaintiff does not agree that she is required to personally serve the defendants with the 
summons and complaint in the instant action, the appearing defendants have 
successfully obtained an order to quash service of the process which was initially served 
upon them by certified mail as required under the service statute via Idaho's Consumer 
Protection Act. Plaintiff will perform "personal service" on the appearing defendants 
only. On appeal plaintiff will challenge the court's ruling that service by certified mail on 
the non-appearing defendants was improper under the specific service statute set forth 
under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
Plaintiff has now effected personal service of the summons and complaint 
upon the defendant Smith County aka Smith County Trustee pursuant to Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure Rule 4(d)(4). Service upon domestic or foreign entities. (A) ... by 
delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to to an agent authorized by 
appointment or by statute to receive service of process. In the state of 
Texas, the agent of service fo:c smith cm.mty is county judge Joel Baker 
pursuant to Tex. Civil Prac. & Rem. Section 17.024(a). 
FROM : FRX NO. Sep. 16 2011 01:28PM P2 
Attached hereto as exhibit "1" is the notarized Affidavit of personal Service on 
County Judge Joel Baker as the agent of service for Smith County aka Smith County 
Trustee. As attested therein, County Judge Joel Baker was personally delivered the 
summons and complaints on Smith County and Smith County Trustee . The service of 
the Summonses and Verified complaints were effected on September 15, 2011 @ 11 :15 
a.m. by a licensed process server in Smith County Texas. 
This Amended Return of Service should now moot these defendant's pending 
motion to quash service of process via certified mail. 
Dated: September 16, 2011 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the 
following parties on September 16, 2011. 
Attorneys Brian Julian and Stephen Adams 
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise Idaho 83707 
Fax no. 208-344-5510 
~I 
Holli Telford 
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) 
HOLLI TELFORD ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
~~ ) 
) 
SANDRA COPELAND; ADMITRA MILLS ) 
JEM1ETTE HARMON; CODY KELLY; ) 
PAUL KELLEY JR.; THE ESTATE OF PAUL ) 
KELLEY SR.; SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE; ) 
TAX ASSESSOR GARY BARBER; SMITH ) 
COUNTY; ARTIE ROSS; ATTOR."t\J'EY TAB ) 
BEALL; LAW OFFICES OF PERDUE ) 
BRANDON, FIELDER, COLLINS & MOTT; LISA ) 
NEILSON, A.J\TD DOES 1 - 10, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ON DEFEN'DANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Re: SMITH COUNTY TEXAS; 
SMITH COlJNTY TAX ASSESSOR 
G.t\R.YBA.RBER;ATTOR.~EYTAB 
BEALL; LAW OFFICES OF 
PERDlJE BRMTDON, FIELDER, 
COLLINS & MOTT 
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, motion to quash and motion for 
summary judgment (Motion) filed by the Defendants Smith County Texas, Smith County Tax 
Assessor Gary Barber, Tab Beall, and the law offices of Perdue Brandon Fielder Collins & Mott 
(Defendants). A hearing on the Motion was held September 7, 2011. The Defendants were 
represented telephonically by their counsel Stephen L. Adams. Ms. Telford (Plaintiff) appeared pro 
se. After careful consideration of the record, briefs, affidavits, and arguments of the parties the 
Court issues its decision and GRA.~TS Defendants' Motion. 
ST Ai.""IDARD OF REVIEW 
A Motion to Dismiss is governed by LR. C .P .12(b ), which provides, in part: "Every defense, 
in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, ... , shall be asserted in the responsive pleading 
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thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses shall be made by motion: ... (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, ... "1 Further, 
I.R.C.P. 12(c) provides that: "After the pleadings are closed but ·within such time as not to delay the 
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings."2 
A motion to dismiss may be granted where "the plaintiff can prove no set of facts upon 
which the court could grant relief," and in such a case, "the complaint should be dismissed."3 In 
addition, "the nonmoving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in its 
favor."4 If additional "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment."5 All parties are given a reasonable 
opportunity to present material that would be pertinent to a motion for summary judgment. The 
dispositive question is whether the nonmovant has alleged sufficient facts in support of her claim 
which, if true, would entitle her to relief.6 
Vv'hen reviewing a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction, the Idaho 
Supreme Court applies the same standard it uses when it reviews appeals from orders of summary 
judgment. The facts and evidence presented are construed in favor of the party opposing the order 
and accord that party the benefit of all inferences which might be reasonably drmvn.7 
"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
1 l.R.C.P. 12 (b)(6). 
2 Id 
3 Johnson v. Boundary School Dist. No. JOI, 138 Idaho 331, 334, 63 PJd 457, 460 (2003) (citing Gardner v. Hollifield, 
96 Idaho 609, 611, 533 P.2d 730, 732 (1975)). See also Ernstv. Hemenway and Moser Co., Inc., 120 Idaho 941, 946, 
821P.2d996, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991) ("For a complaint to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the 
complaint fails to state a claim, it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim which would entitle him to relief"). 
4 Johnson, 138 Idaho at 334, 63 P.3d at 460; Ernst, 120 Idaho at 946, 821 P.2d at 100 l. 
5 LR.C.P. 12(c). 
6 Serv. Emp. Intern. v. Idaho Dept. of H. & W, 106 Idaho 756, 758, 683 P.2d 404, 406 (1984). 
7 Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 74-75, 803 P.2d 978, 980-81 (I 990) (citing lntermountain Bus. 
Forms, Inc. v. Shepard Bus. Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538, 540, 531P.2d1183, 1185 (1975)). 
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together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. "'8 \Vhen considering a motion for 
summary judgment, a court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the nonmoving party.9 Normally, summary judgment must be denied where reasonable 
persons could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence 
presented. 10 
The moving party has the burden of showing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. 11 
To meet this burden, the moving party must challenge, in its motion, and establish through evidence 
that no issue of material facts exists on an element of the nonmoving party's case. 12 The 
nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but 
the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
shO\ving that there is a genuine issue for trial."13 Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of 
the moving party, when the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential 
to that party's case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. 14 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 15 This 
standard is set out in Cellotex Corp. v. Catrett,16 and adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Badell 
v. Beeks: 
8 I.R.C.P. 56(c); Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 460, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008); Northwest Bec-
Corp v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 838, 41P.3d263, 267 (2002); see also Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 
494, 50 P.3d 987, 989 (2002). 
9 Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991). 
IO Id 
II Northwest Bee-Corp, 136 Idaho at 838, 41 P.3d at 267. 
12 Id 
13 Id (quoting l.R.C.P. 56 (e)). 
14 Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 719, 918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996). 
15 Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994). 
16 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 
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The plain language of Rule 56( c) mandates the entry of Summary Judgment, after adequate 
time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient 
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party 
will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to 
any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is 
entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law .... 17 
Thus, a responding party cannot raise meritless defenses or claims to defeat Summary Judgment. 
Rather, a party must introduce facts into the record that support each element of each defense or 
claim asserted. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff saw an internet advertisement for the sale of real property by the Smith County 
Tax Assessor's Office. 18 The Smith County Tax Assessor's Office is a government entity 
located in Smith County, Texas. The properties that were to be sold were also located in Smith 
County, Texas. 19 Plaintiff traveled to Smith County on February 8, 2011, to complete the 
necessary formalities allowing her to bid for a..11d, if the winning bidder, purchase one of the 
properties.20 Plaintiff verified the parcel number and address with the tax assessor's office prior 
to bidding.21 Plaintiff submitted a bid for a parcel being sold by the Smith County Tax 
Assessor's Office and located in Smith County, Texas.22 Plaintiffs bid won the auction.23 
Smith County telephoned the Plaintiff at home in Idaho to inform her she won the auction.24 
Smith County employees also sent a confirmation email to the Plaintiff.25 
17 115 Ida.11.o 101, 102 (1998). 
18 Affidavit of Holli Telford, p. 1, , 4, July 18, 2011 
19 Complaint, Jun. 3, 2011, Exhibit 1. 
20 Affidavit of L.A. Greer, p. I,, 3, July 22, 2011; Affidavit ofElham Neilsen, p. 2,, 6, July 25, 2011; see Affidavit 
of Holli Telford, p. 2, , 6, July 18, 2011. 
21 Affidavit of Holli Telford, p. 2,, 5. 
22 Id p. 1,, 4 
23 Id p. 4, ~9. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. p. 4,, 10. 
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On April 30, 2011, Plaintiff again traveled to Texas to inspect the purchased property.26 
Upon entering the property Plaintiff thought she had purchased she was informed that she was on 
the \Vrong property.27 Plaintiff discovered that there was an error in the address on the property 
list posted on the website.28 After Plaintiff advised Smith County of the error she was directed to 
the property that Smith County actually owned and that she had purchased.29 The parcel Plaintiff 
purchased was significantly different than anticipated. 30 Because of this error the Smith County 
Tax Assessor's Office allowed her to adjust her bid to reflect the value of the correct property. 31 
Plaintiff changed her bid to reflect the value of the property and began to improve the property to 
suit her intended purposes.32 After Plaintiff had incurred substantial costs improving the land, 
Plaintiff was notified that the former owner had redeemed the property and that the Smith 
County Tax Assessor's Office was revoking the sale.33 
Plaintiff threatened to sue Smith County if the trustee's deed was not delivered to her 
immediately.34 Tab Beall, an attorney with Perdue Brandon Fielder Collins & Mott, called 
Plaintiff's Idaho residence to discuss the basis of her threatened lawsuit or any potential claims 
she might bring against Smith County.35 Plaintiff threatened to include Mr. Beall and his law 
firm in her lawsuit unless they '\vithdrew from the County's conspiracy to commit various 
racketeering violations. "36 
Plaintiff did sue Defendants in Oneida County Idaho claiming breach of contract, and 
26 Id p. 4-5, ~ 12. 
21 Id. 
2s Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at p. 5, ~ 13-14. 
31 Id. at p. 5, ~ 14. 
32 Id. p. 6, ~ 15-16. 
33 Id. p. 7, ~ 20. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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violations of both the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and the Idaho Racketeering Act. 37 
Plaintiff requests all compensatory, special and punitive damages allowed, treble damages if 
allowable, specific performance, pre and post judgment interest, attorney's fees and court costs, 
d . . 138 an a Jury tna. 
Defendants seek to have all of the Plaintiff's claims dismissed, asserting that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction. Defendants assert that they have done nothing to subject themselves to the 
jurisdiction of Idaho courts because their appearances have been special appearances to contest 
jurisdiction or made motions incidental to contesting jurisdiction. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Does Idaho's Long-Arm Statute allow Idaho courts to exercise jurisdiction over 
non-resident def end ants when the controversy arises out of the sale of real 
property located in Texas to an Idaho resident when the negotiations and 
contract formation39 occurred in Texas? 
Prior to exercising jurisdiction over nomesident defendants Idaho courts must satisfy two 
criteria.4° First, the court must determine that the nomesident defendant's actions fall within the 
scope of Idaho's Long-Arm Statute.41 Second, the court must determine that exercising 
jurisdiction over the nomesident defendant complies with the constitutional standards of due 
process.42 
A. May this Court exercise its jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendants under 
Idaho's Long-Arm Statute? 
Idaho's Long-Arm Statute extends jurisdiction over persons involved in the transaction of 
37 Complaint, Jun. 3, 2011. 
38 Id p. 9. 
39 Defendants dispute that a valid contract was ever formed. However, for the purposes of this motion onlv, the 
Court will infer a valid contract existed between the parties. 
"
0 McAnally v. Bonjac, Inc., 137 Idaho 488, 491, 50 P.3d 983, 986 (2002); St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med Ctr. v. State of 
Washington, 123 Idaho 739, 742, 852 P.2d 491, 494 (I 993). 
41 McAnally, 137 Idaho at 491, 50 P.3d 983. 
42 Id 
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"any business within this state .... "43 The term transact is defined as "carry[ing] on or 
conduct[ing] negotiations or business. "44 The phrase "within this state" requires that at least 
some part of the negotiations or business be performed in Idaho. Therefore, to be within the 
scope of the long-arm statute at least some negotiations or business must be performed in Idaho. 
The broad wording of the statute is intended to provide a forum for Idaho residents to resolve 
their complaints and should be liberally construed.45 However, even this broad wording has its 
limits. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that a contract alone will not be sufficient to 
subject a nonresident to the jurisdiction of Idaho courts.46 Instead, the actions of the parties prior 
to and after formation of the contract must be examined to determine if the parties' actions rise to 
the level of transacting "business within th[e] state .... "47 
The cases of Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc. and 
Akichika v. Kelleher are helpful in determining what constitutes transacting business in the state. 
In Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc. did not have any offices or 
employees in Idaho. Instead Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply Inc. sent advertising circulars directly to 
Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel resulting in periodic sales over a ten year period. 48 The court found 
that the active solicitation to targeted buyers in Idaho for a substantial period of time constituted 
the transaction of business within the state bringing Cal-Cut within the scope of Idaho's Long-
Arm Statute and providing a basis for Idaho courts to exercise jurisdiction over Cal-Cut.49 
Like printed advertisements in the past, the internet has become a convenient method to 
advertise and attract potential buyers. In cases where the internet advertisement is analogous to 
43 LC.§ 5-514(a). 
44 Black's Law Dictionary, Online (2009). 
45 Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of America, 93 Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 (1969). 
46 W. States Equip. Co. v. Am. Amex, Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 158, 868 P.2d 483, 486 (1994). 
47 Id 
48 Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., 98 Idaho 495, 567 P.2d 1246 (1977). 
49 Id at 498, 567 P.2d at 1249. 
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an advertisement in a national magazine, courts usually hold there is no basis for jurisdiction. 
However, if the advertisement provides the method to consummate a transaction courts have 
found a sufficient basis for the state where the website was accessed and the transaction 
consummated to exercise jurisdiction over the advertising company. "[T]he dealings between 
the parties both prior to, and following, the execution of the contract must be examined" to 
determine if Idaho's Long-Ann Statute will empower the court with jurisdiction over the 
nomesident. 50 
Here, unlike in Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, the Defendants did not directly solicit 
business from the Plaintiff in Idaho. The online advertisement did not allow viewers to 
consummate a transaction online. The Smith County Tax Assessor's Office placed a passive 
advertisement on the internet inviting interested parties to contact them to initiate a business 
transaction. Because the internet can be accessed and information viewed globally it is obvious 
that Smith County intended to attract as many potential buyers as possible. However, there is no 
evidence that Smith County intended to travel to the jurisdiction of each interested buyer and 
there consummate a sale of real property located in Texas. Instead, the Smith County Tax 
Assessor's Office required interested parties to contact it, and travel to Texas, to purchase the 
property. Under this system neither the Tax Assessor's Office nor its officers traveled to any 
foreign jurisdiction or sent goods into any foreign jurisdiction. They simply invited interested 
buyers to come to them to transact business. In this manner Smith County limited its exposure to 
foreign jurisdictions. The Plaintiff responded to the passive internet advertisement that was not 
targeted at Idaho or any of its residents. She traveled to Smith County, Texas to initiate and 
transact her business. 
In Akichika, an Idaho resident found a Portland based newspaper in the Boise airport 
50 W. States Equip. Co. v. Am. Amex, Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 158, 868 P.2d 483, 486 (1994). 
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advertising a truck for sale in the Portland area. 51 The Idaho resident travelled to Oregon to 
purchase the truck. The negotiations, sale, and delivery of the truck all occurred in Oregon. 
While traveling back to Idaho the truck broke down. While the truck was being repaired 
Akichika discovered that the truck was not as represented in the advertisement. The 
advertisement claimed the truck was a 1971 model. In reality the truck was rebuilt from various 
model years. Akichika stopped making payments. Kelleher made phone calls to Akichika and 
even came to Idaho to attempt to repossess the truck. Akichika eventually sued Kelleher in an 
Idaho state court. Akichika argued that the phone calls and the attempted repossession showed 
that Kelleher transacted business in Idaho allowing Idaho courts to exercise jurisdiction over 
him. The Idaho Supreme Court held that Kelleher's action did not amount to transacting 
business in Idaho, therefore, Idaho courts could not exercise jurisdiction over Kelleher under the 
long-arm statute. 52 The Court further instructed that Kelleher' s attempts to receive payment or 
recover the truck were incidental to the business transaction that occurred in Oregon and could 
not be the basis for jurisdiction in Idaho. 53 Akichika is instructive because unless at least some 
part of the business is transacted in Idaho, the fact that one party to the transaction is an Idaho 
resident is insufficient to provide Idaho courts with jurisdiction. Additionally, incidental contact 
with Idaho by the nonresident in relation to the transaction cannot be the basis for jurisdiction. 
Here the facts are similar to Akichika. The Plaintiff saw a general internet advertisement, 
posted by a Texas governmental agency, to sell property in Texas. She initiated the transaction 
by traveling to Texas to complete the necessary formalities to bid on the real property located in 
Texas. Her bid was sent to Texas and received by Smith County. The negotiations and 
formation of the sales contract occurred in Texas. The only contacts that Defendants had with 
51 Akichika v. Kelleher, 96 Idaho 930, 932, 539 P.2d 283, 285 (1975). 
s2 Id 
53 Id. 
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the Plaintiff were phone calls and emails informing the Plaintiff that she won the auction, 
updating her about the transfer of the deed, ru'ld inquiring into the basis of her claims against the 
Defendants. These contacts, like the contacts of Kelleher in Akichika, were incidental to the 
business transacted in Texas. Just like in Akichika they cannot be the basis for jurisdiction in 
Idaho. 
Examining the actions of both parties prior to and after the formation of the sales contract 
there is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendants did not transact business in Idaho 
subjecting them to the jurisdiction ofidaho courts under Idaho's Long-Arm Statute. 
B. May this Court exercise its jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendants in 
compliance with the United States Constitution's Due Process requirements? 
Even if the long-arm statute was applicable allowing Idaho courts to exercise jurisdiction 
over the Defendants, their contacts with Idaho would be insufficient under the Due Process 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution to permit jurisdiction. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution permits a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when 
that defendant has certain minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."54 The court focuses on 
"the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."55 If the "defendant's 
conduct and connection with the forum state" is such that the defendant "should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there" then jurisdiction in that state will not violate the notion of 
fair play and justice. 56 This reasonable anticipation of being haled into court provides the 
nonresident a fair warning that they may be sued in that foreign jurisdiction. 
This reasonable anticipation is presumed to exist when a nonresident purposefully targets 
54 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L Ed. 95, 101-02 (1945). 
55 Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2579 (1977). 
56 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct 559 (1980). 
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Idaho or Idaho's residents with their actions and these actions result in alleged injuries that "arise 
out of or relate to" those actions. 57 A targeted approach where the actions are aimed at a target 
state will lead to a strong relationship between the parties and the forum state. This strong 
relationship allows the forum state to exercise jurisdiction over the parties without offending the 
notions of fair play and justice. However, not all targeted contacts will be sufficient to provide 
jurisdiction. In Saint Alphonsus Regional A1edical Center v. Washington, the Idaho Supreme 
Court found that sending communications and payments to medical providers in Idaho was not 
sufficient to establish minimum contacts and any exercise of jurisdiction under these or similar 
circumstances violated due process.58 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a three part test to address whether 
jurisdiction can be exercised over nomesidents.59 Only compliance with all three parts will 
allow a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nomesident. First, the nomesident defendant must 
"purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident 
thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of 
conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."60 
Second, the claim must be one which "arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related 
activities."61 Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction must "comport with fair play and substantial 
. . . . b bl "62 JUSt1ce, i.e., it must e reasona e. 
Under either the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis in Saint Alphonsus or the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals' test this Court finds that the Plaintiff has not established purposeful availment 
on the part of the Defendants. The initial untargeted actions of the Defendants are insufficient to 
57 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, I 04 S. Ct. 1473 (1984). 
58 Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Medical Ctr. v. Wash., 123 Idaho 739, 744-45 (1993). 
59 Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (2008). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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allow an Idaho court to exercise its jurisdiction. The actions of the Defendants only targeted the 
Plaintiff and Idaho after she had initiated the transaction in Texas. The minimal contacts 
between the Plaintiff and Defendants arose incidentally from the transaction to sell property in 
Texas. The Plaintiff traveled to Texas, negotiated for the sale of the property in Texas, and 
consummated the contract in Texas. The phone calls and emails from the Defendants to the 
Plaintiff are incidental to the transaction and are insufficient to forewarn the Defendants that they 
could be haled into an Idaho court. 
Even though Idaho has an inclusive long-arm statute intended to protect its residents by 
exercising jurisdiction over nonresident parties it is not without limits. The Defendants' actions 
must fall within the scope of the long-arm statute and the exercise of jurisdiction must not violate 
due process. Because the Defendants' actions do not fall 'Within the scope of Idaho's long-arm 
statute it would violate due process for an Idaho court to exercise jurisdiction over them. 
Because this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case it must be dismissed unless the 
Defendants have waived their ability to challenge, and have submitted to jurisdiction in Idaho by 
making a general appearance. 
II. Did Defendants make a general appearance subjecting them to Idaho courts' 
jurisdiction by including additional defenses seeking affirmative relief from the 
Court when they contested jurisdiction? 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have consented to Idaho courts' jurisdiction by filing 
additional defenses and seeking affirmative relief in the form of challenging the venue and 
dismissing the lawsuit for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."63 
Plaintiff's assertion is unfounded and inaccurate for the following reasons. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g) requires a party to assert the affirmative defense of 
lack of personal jurisdiction by motion "prior to filing a responsive pleading and prior to filing 
63 Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, p. 3, Sept. l, 2011; I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
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any other motion" or the defense is waived. 64 This defense is not waived if it is 'joined with one 
or more other motions or by filing a special appearance under Rule 4(i)(2)."65 Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4(i)(2) allows any party making a special appearance to join other defenses in a 
motion under Rules 12(b)(2), (4) or (5). 66 The joining of these additional defenses will not 
"constitute a voluntary appearance by the party under this rule. "67 Therefore, additional defenses 
included in a motion to challenge jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process, or 
insufficiency of service of process will not constitute a general appearance. 
Defendants filed special appearances on June 30 and July 5, 2011.68 The special 
appearance was the Defendants' first filing with the court in the matter. In these special 
appearances Defendants declared they intended to contest jurisdiction and filed a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 69 The motions filed do in 
fact contest jurisdiction and challenge the service of the summons and complaint. Motions of 
this nature are expressly classified as special appearances.70 Additionally, the motion challenges 
that venue is proper in Oneida County and assert that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for 
which relief can be granted.71 Because Defendants made a special appearance to contest 
jurisdiction, a 12(b )(2) motion, the inclusion of the additional defenses in that motion does not 
morph their special appearance into a general appearance. 
Because the issue of jurisdiction is dispositive this Court need not address any other 
issues raised by either party. 
64 LR.C.P. 12(g). 
65 Id. 
66 I.R.C.P. 4(i)(2). 
67 Id. 
68 Notice of Special Appearance, June 30, 2011; Notice of Special Appearance, July 5, 2011. 
69 Id. 
70 I.R.C.P. 4(i)(2). 
71 See Memoranda in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Quash and Motion for Summary Judgment, July 13, 
2011. 
Case No. CV-2011-0000066 Page 13 
MEMORANvlJM DECISION ON DEFE:t\TDANTS' MOTION FOR SillvfMARY JUDGME1'11 
- 312.. -
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the undisputed facts showing Defendants' actions prior to and after 
the formation of the contract results in the conclusion that the Defendants have not transacted 
business in the state of Idaho. The Plaintiff transacted business in Texas. The Defendants' 
incidental contacts with Idaho, arising from the business transacted in Texas, are an insufficient 
basis to establish jurisdiction under Idaho's Long-Arm Statute. Furthermore, even if the long-
arm statute were applicable the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution would 
prohibit jurisdiction in Idaho because the Defendants have not purposefully availed themselves 
to the jurisdiction of Idaho or had sufficient contact with Idaho to reasonably anticipate being 
haled into an Idaho court. Because the Defendants have not submitted to jurisdiction in Idaho 
through any other means this Court lacks jurisdiction. Therefore, the Plaintiffs claims against 
the Defendants who have specially appeared are DISMISSED. A final judgment cannot yet be 
entered as there remain Defendants who have not yet been properly served. No disposition can 
yet be entered as to those Defendants. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2011. 
Case No. CV-20 11-0000066 
A;LA..... 
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District Judge 
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HOLLI TELFORD 
AKA HOLLI LUNDAHL 
10621 S. Old Hwy 191 
Malad, Idaho 83252 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA COPELAND, et al 
Defendants 
Case No. CV 2011 -- 00066 
l.R.C.P RULE 11 (a)(2)(B) MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE 
COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF GARY 
BARBER, TAB BEAL, LAW OFFICES 
OF PURDUE, BRANDON, FELDER, 
COLLINS & MOTT, AND SMITH COUNTY 
REQUEST FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
AFTER RECONSIDERATION OF THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ABOVE STATED 
REQUEST FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
OF THE RULE 68 SETTLEMENT JUDGMENT 
BETWEEN LISA NIELSEN AND HOLLI 
TELFORD 
REQUEST TO CERTIFY AS A FINAL 
JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 54(b) THE 
COURT'S ORDER DENYING DEFAULTS 
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AGAINST 
THE REMAINDER DEFENDANT'S 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF SERVED THESE 
THESE DEFENDANTS BY CERTIFIED 
MAIL VERSUS PERSONAL SERVICE 
UNDER IDAHO'S CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT'S SERVICE STATUTE 
AS PERMITTED FOR TORTFEASORS 
RESIDING OUT OF STATE 
MOTION TO STAY THE TRIAL 
PROCEEDINGS AS TO THE REMAINDER 
DEFENDANTS UNTIL THE SUPREME 
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HAS INTERPRETED IDAHO'S CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT'S SERVICE STATUTE 
COMES NOW PLAINTIFF and moves this court to: (1) reconsider it's 
October 3, 2011 summary judgment order entered in favor of Gary Barber, Tab Beall, The 
Law Offices of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins & Mott and Smith County, (2) enter Rule 
54(b) certifications of (a) the (reconsidered) summary judgment in favor of Barber, Beall, 
Purdue and Smith; (b) the rule 68 settlement judgment in favor of defendant Lisa 
Nielsen, and; (c) the Court's Order denying entry of defaults and default judgments in 
favor of plaintiff as to the remaining defendants, and (3) stay the trial action as to the 
remainder defaulted defendants until the Supreme Court has as a matter of first 
impression interpreted the specific service statute provided under Idaho's Consumer 
Proection Act with respect to constitutional service on out of state defendant tortfeasors. 
I. The Court Is Authorized To Reconsider It's Summary Judgment 
Ruling And Take In New Evidence Under IRCP Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) 
In Noreen v. Price Development Co. Limited Partnership, 135 Idaho 816, 
25P.3d 129 (Idaho App. 2001), the Idaho Supreme Court re-affirmed that l.R.C.P. 11 (a) 
(2)(B) was the proper rule to move for reconsideration of a summary judgment ruling and 
to move for the submission of additional evidence. The Noreen Court cited to First Nat'I 
Bank v. David Steed & Assoc., Inc., 121 Idaho 356, 825 P.2d 79 (1992) where the Idaho 
Supreme Court opined: Until a final judgment had been entered under rule 58(a) or a 
certificate granted by the trial court pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(b), the order dismissing DSA's 
counterclaim was not final and appealable. Therefore, it was incorrect for the trial court to 
strike the banking expert's additional affidavit which attached the Bank's loan manual in 
further dipsute of the claim. Thus the Noreen Court re-affirmed in accordance with 
Steed supra that until entry of a final judgment under rule 58(a) or a certificate under Rule 
54(b), an order for summary judgment must be considered interlocutory and subject to 
reconsideration under l.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B). 1 
II. The Court Has Failed To Liberally Construe And Reasonably 
Infer All Facts Presented During The Proceedings In Favor 
Of Plaintiff As Required By Law 
At page 2 of plaintiffs Amended Opposition to Smith County's motion to 
dismiss (see caption page attached hereto as exhibit "1 "), plaintiff argued that when a 
court considers a motion to dismiss in a case that would be tried to a jury (in this case 
plaintiff demanded a jury trial), all facts are to be liberally construed and all reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms, 119 
Idaho at 517, 808 P.2d at 854; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 
876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Plaintiff contends that: (1) this court did not construe all facts in plaintiffs favor, 
(2) this court inserted facts into it's Summary Judgment Decision which were neither in 
the record nor supported by any of the evidence founded upon the record, and (3) this 
court failed to conduct a contacts analysis under plaintiffs tort causes of action sounding 
in civil and criminal fraud. 2 See Hudson v. Cobbs, 797 P.2d 1322; 118 Idaho 474 (ID 
1990) (This case was reversed as a wholesale compilation of judicial error. Here, the 
district court decided how the case would be tried, ignored the theories presented by the 
1. Furthermore, the Noreen Court denied Attorney Fees under l.C. § 12-
121 and l.R.C.P. rule 54(e)(1) on direct trial of the case and on appeal on the grounds 
that when a party presents a question of first impression for decision to a court, such 
proceeding cannot be construed as frivolous. Here, Noreen presented a first impression 
question as to the ramifications of a violation of the Assumed Business Names Act. 
2. The Court errored when it limited anaylsis of plaintiffs case to a contract 
case and ommitted material facts to fashion a decision which denied plaintiff jurisdiction 
in the state of Idaho. See Yahoo Inc v. La Ligue Contre Lw Raciseme Et L'Antisenitiseme, 
433 F.3d 1199 (91h Cir. 2006) (We treat "purposeful availment" somewhat differently 
when addressing tort and contract claims.. In tort claims, we inquire whether a 
defendant "purposefully direct[s] his activities" at the forum state, applying an "effects 
test" that focuses on the forum in which the defendant's actions were felt, whether or not 
the actions themselves occurred within the forum. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803 
(citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984)). By contrast, in contract claims, 
we inquire whether a defendant "consummate[s] [a] transaction" in the forum, focusing 
on activities such as delivering goods to or executing a contract in the forum state. Both 
anaylsis' must be conducted to determine if one or the other will sustain jurisdiction. 
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parties, and refused to grant a motion for reconsideration in spite of acknowledged 
judicial error.). 
Moreover, the record shows that the court's factual conclusions that plaintiff 
executed , consummated and signed the contracts to purchase the subject real property 
and the manufactured home placed thereon - in Texas, are wholly incorrect, and 
accordingly, taint this Court's "purposeful availment analysis" under plaintiff's contract 
claims presented in her complaint. 
Based on all of the foregoing, plaintiff asserts that the Court wrongfully 
deprived her of the proper, most convenient and a fair forum to try her claims. 
(1) Many Of The Court's Facts And Legal Conclusions Supporting 
The Court's Purposeful Availment Analysis Under Plaintiffs 
Contract Claims Are In Error As All Transactions Were 
Consummated In The State Of Idaho - Not Texas 
Plaintiff contends that the Court's factual conclusions in analyzing the 
defendant's "purposeful availment" contacts under plaintiff's contracts claims are either 
disputed by the record, or completely lack foundation from the evidence submitted into 
the record, or are contrary to the judicial admissions made on paper or in open court. In 
addition with the new evidence submitted by plaintiff, there is no doubt that the court's 
factual conclusions are wrong. Before addressing each factual error, plaintiff presents 
the following conclusions of law applicable to a "contract contacts" analysis: 
(1) Under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, a contract is considered 
consummated, formed and executed where the contract is signed. 
See Gates v. Collier, 378 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1967) (This circuit adopts 
the rule of lex loci contractus set forth in Restatement of the law of 
the Conflicts of Law § 332 and which makes the law of the place where 
the contract is signed determine the validity, meaning and effect of an 
agreement.). Followed in Yahoo Inc v. La Ligue Cantre Lw Raciseme 
Et L'Antisenitiseme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) ( ... in contract cases, 
we typically inquire into whether a defendant ... "consummate[s] [a] 
transaction" in the forum, focusing on activities such as delivering goods 
to or executing a contract in the forum state. See Schwarzenegger, 
374 F.3d at 802.); Pro Axess Inc. v. Orlux Distribution Inc., Nos. 03-4179, 
03-4189 (10th Cir. 2005) ( Exercising personal jurisdiction where a 
contract that was presented through the internet by a French defendant 
was signed in Utah and committed Plaintiff to obligations in Utah in 
perfomance on the contract.). 
(2) A contract is consummated where it is reduced to writing and signed. 
Rayv. Frasure, 200P.3d1174, 146 Idaho 625 (ID 2009) (a contract 
is consummated when it is reduced to writing and signed.); See Toivo 
Pottala Logging v. Boise Cascade 733 P .2d 71 O; 112 Idaho 489 (Idaho 
1987) (if plaintiff wished to consummate the contract to purchase, he 
usually must sign the standard form prepared by the manufacturer and 
tender consideration.); Black's Law Dictionary's two definitions for 
"executed contract", are: a written and signed contract, or a contract 
that has been fully performed. (9th ed. 2009). 
(3) Contract formation occurs when consideration is tendered to form the 
contract. Mitchell v. Siqueros, 582 P.2d 1074; 99 Idaho 396 (Idaho 
1978) (Contract formation occurs when consideration is given to form the 
contract.); l.C. § 28-2-204, dealing with formation in general provides 
that "[a] contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner ... 
including conduct by a party which recognizes the existence of such 
a contract."); Hudson v. Cobbs, 797 P.2d 1322; 118 Idaho 474 (ID 
1990) (The contracts were formed when Hudson signed them, relying 
on the representations of Cobbs and Kennevick that the leases were 
valid contracts under which they intended to be obligated. ). 
(4) Unilateral contracts are consumatted where the offeree accepts the terms 
of the unilateral offer and performs thereunder to secure the promises 
in the offer. See Evanston Insurance Company v. Westchester Surplus 
Lines Insurance Company; Case No. 10-36133 (9th Cir. 10/03/2011) , 
the gth circuit re - affirmed the factual circumstances under which a 
unilateral contract will be formed, executed and subject to enforcement. 
The Ninth circuit cited to Black's Law Dictionary's two definitions for 
"executed contract", to wit: a written and signed contract, or a contract 
that has been fully performed. (9th ed. 2009). Accordingly, "A unilateral 
contract exists when one party offers to do a certain thing in exchange for 
the other's performance, and performance by the other party constitutes 
acceptance and execution of the contract." Here, the fax from Bellevue 
Master to Northwest on February 22, 2001 was an offer: Northwest would 
be able to continue working as a subcontractor at the construction project 
provided it complied with Bellevue Master's insurance requirements. When 
Northwest contacted its insurance broker and requested that the broker 
issue the insurance certificate to Bellevue Master, Northwest accepted the 
unilateral contract, and a contract was thereby formed, executed and 
subject to enforcement." Idaho also concurs that a unilateral contract will 
be formed and executed when the offeree performs upon the terms of the 
offer in Shore v. Peterson, 204 P.3d 1114, 146 Idaho 903 (Idaho 2009) 
("where the offeror makes a promise that is conditional on the offeree"s 
acceptance, an offeree accepts by rendition of the requested performance.") 
citing CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 21 at 52 (1963) (An offer for a 
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unilateral contract calls for acceptance by rendition of the requested 
performance.) J. CALAMARI and J.PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 1-10 (1977). Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 
Idaho 286, 291, 688P.2d1191, 1196 (Ct.App.1984). 
(5) Loan obligations created in the forum state to fund contracts creates 
contacts in the forum state where the payments on the loans are expected 
to generate. Rynone Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indus., Inc., 96 S.W.3d@ 640, 
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002.) ("Calling a Texas resident in Texas to solicit a 
loan is a purposeful contact with Texas under a contracts anaylsis.) See 
also Pro Axess Inc. v. Orlux Distribution Inc., Nos. 03-4179, 03-4189 
(10th Cir. 2005) (Exercising personal jurisdiction where a contract that 
was presented through the internet by a French defendant was signed 
in Utah and committed Plaintiff to monetary obligations in Utah in 
perfomance on the contract.); Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B.V., 
218 P .3d 1150, 148 Idaho 89 (Idaho 2009) (loans obtained locally for 
business purposes result in contact with forum.) same Hsu v. Liu, Case no. 
07-1046 (Texas Supreme Court 2007) 
(6) Phone calls, faxes, letters, and emails sent in the forum state to firm up 
contract negotiations or correct contract errors, are contacts with the forum. 
Neal v. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The acts of making 
phone calls and sending facsimiles into the forum, standing alone, may be 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the foreign defendant where the phone 
calls and faxes resulted in a consummated contract where consideration 
generated from the forum state.); Oriental Trading Co. v. Firetti, 236 F.3d 
938, 943 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that phone calls and faxes into the forum 
created jurisdiction in suit based on those calls and faxes); Taylor v. Phelan, 
912 F.2d 429, 433 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) ("So long as it creates a substantial 
connection, even a single telephone call into the forum state can support 
jurisdiction."); FMC Corp. v.Varonos, 892 F.2d 1308, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(sending allegedly false faxes to forum state created specific jurisdiction in 
lawsuit based on those faxes); Brown v. Flowers Indus., 688 F.2d 328, 332-
333 (5th Cir. 1982) (single telephone call initiated by the defendant was 
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction). 
(7) A website is not passive where it provides a means to purchase goods or 
products or services. See Holland America Line Inc. v. Wartsila North 
America, Inc., 485 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 2007) ( Defining passive website as 
one that does not provide any means for purchasing items or requesting 
services.) CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(posting information over the internet for purpose of selling products is not 
a passive website and meets the express aiming requirement to impose 
jurisdiction where the sales have an impact.); Telco, 977 F. Supp.at 406 
("because [defendants] conducted their advertising and soliciting over the 
Internet, they subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the buyers courts). 
Blacks law definition: passive is "receiving or subjected to an action without 
responding or initiating an action in return. A judicial consensus has 
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generally emerged that personal jurisdiction exists when Internet activities 
involve the conduct of business over the Internet, including substantial 
commercial interactivity that result in obligations incurred by the buyer in 
buyer's jurisdiction. See id. At *5 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. At 
1125-26; Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 
1996); Gary Scott lnt'I, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 716 -17 (D. 
Mass. 1997); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp. 481, 486-87 (W.D. 
N.C. 1997); Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 743-44 
(W.D. Tex. 1998); Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 
(6th Cir. 1996)). 
With these contract laws in m'1nd, plaintiff now points to the numerous 
erroneous factual conclsuions in the court's October 3, 2011 Decision which seeks to 
deny plaintiff of an Idaho forum in which to hear her claims. Plaintiff also includes new 
evidence to buttress her attack on these erroneous factual conclusions. 
Summary Judgment@ pg. 4 states all of the following conclusionary facts : 
Court's stated fact: "Plaintiff saw an internet advertisement for the sale of real 
Property by the Smith County Tax Assessor's Office." 
Plaintiffs response: This fact is true but OMITS other material facts pertinent 
to this stated fact. Specifically, Plaintiff saw the internet advertisment on Smith County's 
Website on or about March 1, 2011 when the advertisement was posted for the first time 
by Smith County, and further, required all bids to be placed by noon of the last work day 
of each month (thereby implying monthly postings.). See exhibit "1" attached to Telford's 
affidavit in support of this reconsideration motion, for Bid instruction sheet posted on 
Smith County's Website at 9:00 a.m. on March 1, 2011 @ paragraph 12 which instructs 
as to the monthly deadline for submission of bids on struck off property. This document 
also instructs "buyers at large" to draw down "the request for written statement under 
Texas Tax Code section 34.015 regarding delinquent taxes and to mail the executed 
document in with the sealed bid and supporting consideration (including a letter of credit), 
before expiration of the deadline. Attached as exhibit "2" to Telford's affidavit in support 
of this motion is a copy of Smith County Tax Assessor's Website as it existed on March 
1, 2011. As can be seen thereby, Smith County instructs "national buyers" to draw 
down "the request for written statement under Texas Tax Code section 34.015 regarding 
delinquent taxes directly from Smith County's website, to draw down the Bid Sheet form 
that Smith County requires Bids to be submitted on, and to mail or personally deliver 
the executed Tax Delinquency Statement, the sealed bid and supporting consideration 
(including a letter of credit) to the Smith County County Tax Office. 
The date this advertisement was posted is relevant to when and where the 
subject bid and supporting consideration were formed, executed and consumated. 
Court's Stated Facts: 'The Smith County Tax Asessor's Office is a government 
entity located in Smith County Texas. The properties that were sold were also located in 
Smith County, Texas." 
Plaintiffs response: Plaintiff alleged in her Amended Opposition that Smith 
County's status as a governmental entity located in Smith County Texas and the location 
of the properties plaintiff purchased at the time of the sale, were irrelevant to whether 
these defendants were subject to the jurisdiction of the Idaho courts where plaintiff 
suffered the effects of the injuries inflicted upon her by these defendants. Specifically 
plaintiff presented Texas law which showed the Smith County was performing a "private 
function" having no governmental immunity when they transacted business and inflicted 
injuries upon plaintiff in the state of Idaho. Reciting these laws: The Texas legislature in 
2005 specfically enacted a statute, H.B. 2039 codified as Local Government Code 
§§271.151.160, that proscribed the granting of any immunity to a government unit 
entering into a private function such as a contract - following in part the common law rule 
in Catalina Development, Inc. v. County of El Paso , 121 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex. 2003) 
( "By entering into a contract, a governmental entity necessarily waives immunity from 
liability, voluntarily binding itself like any other private party to the terms of an agreement. 
The government performs a private function when entering into a contract with another 
person."). Plaintiff also cited to Athay v.Stacey, 196 P .3d 325, 146 Idaho 407 (Idaho 
2008) (Following the rule in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979): where a foreign 
government unit commits a tortious act against a sister state resident, that government 
unit is not entitled to immunity from suit when charged with a tort as a private tortfeasor). 
Holli also argued to the court that Smith County has sent Holli the deed to the 
manufactured home to her Idaho address but had refused to deliver the deed to the real 
property Holli had purchased to Holli's Idaho address. Holli stressed that the properites 
she expected to be delivered WERE THE DEEDS as it was the deeds that served as 
securities for the now defaulted loans Holli obtained in the state of ldhao. 
Court's Stated Fact: " Plaintiff traveled to Smith County Texas on February 8, 
2011 to complete the necessary formalities allowing her to bid for and, if the winning 
bidder, purchase one of the properties." 
Plaintiffs response : Plaintiff did not travel to Smith County Texas on 
February 8, 2011 for the purpose of completing the necessary formalities to allow her to 
bid on the properrty at hand. First, plaintiff was in texas on another matter and while 
there learned of Texas' property tax sales unique from other states. Plaintiff obtained 
the necessary Statement while she was in Texas on another matter. The Tax 
Delinquency Statement was good for 90 days from the date of purchase. See statement 
as exhibit "1 "attached to Holli's affidavit filed on July 18, 2011 for expiration date of this 
document. At the time Holli purchased the Tax Delinquency Statement, the subject real 
property which Holli had bid on had not yet been posted on Smith County's website as a 
struck off property. Accordingly Holli had not yet executed any contract concerning 
purchase of the "specific property" at issue. 
Court's Stated Fact : " Plaintiff verified the parcel number and address with 
the tax assessor's office prior to bidding." 
Plaintiffs response : This verification process took place in the coarse of 
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negotiations conducted over numerous phone calls between plaintiff and Lois Mosley 
while Holli was in Idaho at her Idaho residence. Holli was clearly back in the state of 
Idaho by February 14, 2011 as she personally filed an Ex-par1e Motion To Apply 
Telford's Motion For Summary Judgment On Ralston's First Amended Complaint To 
Ralston's Substituted Counterclaim Filed By Ralston On February 2, 2011, on February 
14, 2011 in Oneida County Idaho case no. 2010-185. In addition, in her affidavit filed 
with this court on July 18, 2011, Paragraph 5, p. 2, Holli attested that she was told by 
Lois Mosley of the Smith County Tax office on or about March 8, 2011 that the property 
Holli was interested in was the acreage land hosting a barn and owned by Jospeh and 
Tammi Conflitti. Exhibit "3" attached to Holli's affidavit supporting this motion for 
reconsideration and filed separately with the clerk Diane Skidmore under separate cover 
on 10/17 /2011- is an electronic exhibit of the magic jack phone call from Lois Mosley to 
Holli at her Idaho residence on March 8, 2011 while Holli and Lois were playing phone tag 
to discuss further matters concerning the subject real property. 
Court's Stated Fact : "Plaintiff submitted a bid for a parcel being sold by the 
Smith County Tax Assessor's office and located in Smith County Texas." 
Plaintiffs response : "Plaintiffs "written acceptance bid" was formed, 
executed, signed by an Idaho notary (as required in exhibit "1" to Holli's supporting 
affidavit) , and consummated in the state of Idaho. Holli also included with her written 
bid acceptance contract, a letter of credit bearing her Idaho address as the obligatory 
address for the loan supporting the letter of credit. A letter of credit supporting at least 
the full amount of the bid was a requirement of Smith County when submitting the "Bid 
Acceptance contract". (Again refer back to exhibit "1" attached to Holli's affidavit 
supporting this motion - for the instruction letter by Smith County @ paragraph 8 citing 
the requirement that the letter of credit be in the minimum amount of the full bid.). After 
Holli formed, signed, executed and consummated her written bid acceptance contract in 
Idaho, she mailed these documents to Smith County Texas as instructed on Smith 
County's Instruction letter posted on Smith County's website. 
Court's Stated Facts : "Smith County telephoned Plaintiffi at her Idaho home 
to inform Plaintiff she won the auction. Smith County employees also sent a confirmation 
email to the Plaintiff." 
Plaintiffs response : In addition, to calling plaintiff several times to confirm 
plaintiff had won the bid, Smith County employee Lois Mosley also faxed Plaintiff a letter 
to initate the process of collecting the purchase fees under Plaintiffs letter of credit 
bearing Plaintiffs Idaho address as the obligatory address. This letter was attached as 
exhibit "5" to Telford's Affidavit filed on July 18, 2011 and referred to by Holli @ 
Paragraph 11, p. 4 of Holli's Affidavit. The faxed letter constituted judicial admissions 
that : (1) Holli's bid was conclusive and binding; (2) Smith County was preparing the 
deed to convey the property to Holli; (3) no redemption right existed on the property 
resold to Holli; and (4) Holli was permitted to occupy the property and improve it. 
Furthermore, in compliance with Lois Mosley's faxed letter, on April 5, 2011, Smith 
County's lawfirm Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and Sampson sent Holli an email notifying 
Holli that they were preparing the deed and had sent Holli a letter confirming Holli was the 
new owner of the subject real property so that Holli could obtain property insurance. This 
-3Z3-
email was attached as exhibit "4" to Holli's July 18, 2011 affidavit and referred to in 
Paragraph 2, p.1 and Paragraph 11, p. 4 of that Affidavit. 
Summary Judgment@ pg. 5 states all of the following conclusionary facts : 
Court's Stated Facts: "On April 30, 2011, Holli traveled to Texas to inspect 
the purchased property. Upon entering the property ... she was informed that she was 
on the wrong property. Plaintiff discovered there was an error in the address on the 
property list posted on the website. After Plaintiff advised Smith County of the error she 
was directed to the property that Smith County actually owned and that she had 
purchased via the internet. The parcel Plaintiff had purchased was significantly different 
than anticipated. Because of this error, the Smith County Tax Assessor's Office allowed 
Holli to adjust her bid to reflect the value of the correct property. Plaintiff changed her bid 
to reflect the value of the property and began to improve the property to suit her intended 
purposes." 
Plaintiff's response : All of the foregoing facts are correct, except the 
"adjustment of the bid" should be considered a modification of the original "bid 
acceptance contract" plaintiff tendered in perfomance of Smith County's unilateral 
offer to sell the subject struck off property advertised on their website. 
Court's Stated Facts : "After Plaintiff incurred substantial costs improving the 
land, Plaintiff was notified that the former owner had redeemed the property and that 
Smith County Tax Assessor's office was revoking the sale." 
Plaintiff's response : Plaintiff had not only spent $5450 excavating the subject 
real property of trees and shubbery as asserted @ Paragraph 21, p. 8, of Telford's July 
18, 2011 Affidavit and as shown in exhibit "11" attached to that affidavit, but Holli had 
also moved a manufacutured home on the property and incurred another loan obligation 
of $35,000 against title of the home to pay for the infrastructure that supported utilities, 
water and waste faciilities to the manufactured home. The lender on the home was an 
Idaho lender and again the obligatory address for the second loan in the amount of 
$35,000 was plaintiff's Idaho address. (See affidavit of S. Durfee on file with the court.). 
In addition, Holli's became obligated on the $18,000 letter of credit which attached to a 
personal loan Holli obtained to purchase the struck off property. These obligations also 
attached to Holli's Idaho address. 3 Accordingly the actual "invested damages" total 
some $65,000 to date and Plaintiff felt the injuries from these defrauded investments in 
the state of Idaho where she became obligated thereto. Smith County had no 
3. These monetary obligations are now being funded by Ferron Stokes, given 
Oneida County officials obstructed Holli's ability to earn any income by an illegal search 
and seizure they performed on Holli's property on August 10, 2011 For example, Ferron 
Stokes paid off the delinquent property taxes due in Oneida County case no. 2011-CV-44 
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authority at law to redeem the property to the former owner given statutes 
presribing such acts as void. (See Texas Property Tax Code Sec.3423(b): the 
owner of .property sold for taxes to a taxing unit may not redeem the property from the 
taxing unit after the property has been resold.). Plaintiff alleges that Smith County in fact 
retained the property in their coffers so that they could resell the property to another at a 
significantly higher value (since the prior owners could not redeem the property as a 
matter of law because Smith County had resold the property to Plaintiff.). Plaintiff has 
alleged that Smith County exerted unconsented control over plaintiffs properties by 
fraud and deception and thereby committed the following civil and criminal violations: 
Fraud under Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, Theft by unauthorized transfer under 
l.C. 18-2403; Theft by false promise under l.C. 18-2403(d); Theft by extortion under 
l.C. 18-2403( e); and common law and constructive fraud under Idaho law. 
Court's Stated Facts : " Plaintiff threatened to sue Smith County if the trustee's 
deed was not delivered to her immediately. Tab Beall, an attorney with Perdue, 
Brandon, Felder, Collins & Mott, called Plaintiffs Idaho residence to discuss the basis of 
her threatened lawsuit or any potential claims she might bring against Smith County. 
Plaintiff threatened to include Mr Beall and his lawfirm in her lawsuit unless "they withdrew 
from the county's conspiracy to commit various racketeering violations." 
Plaintiffs response : These facts are correct and plaintiff has charged the 
attorney and his lawfirm with conspiracy to violate the following criminal codes constituting 
predicate acts under Idaho's racketeering act : Theft by unauthorized transfer under l.C. 
18-2403; Theft by false promise under l.C. 18-2403(d); and Theft by extortion under 
LC. 18-2403(e). 
Court's Stated Facts : • Defendants seek to have all of plaintiffs claims 
dismissed, asserting that this Court lacks jurisdiction. Defendants assert that they have 
done nothing to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of Idaho courts because their 
appearances have been special appearances to contest jurisdiction or made motions 
incidental to contest jurisdiction." 
Plaintiffs response : Plaintiff contends that the defendants did not make 
to the County Treasurer Diane Pett to save the Malad property from foreclosure; Ferron 
Stokes purchased the $35,000 note held by S. Durfee on the Manufactured home placed 
on the Texas property which was due to foreclose on October 15, 2011 (see affidavit of 
S. Durfee filed into this court's record) and is holding Holli's payments due on this note 
under a reverse mortgage theory taking in payments as Holli can afford ; and Ferron 
Stokes is paying Holli's $18,000 loan obligations to American First Bank which supported 
Holli's letter of credit for the purchase of the subject struck off property now affixing 
permanently thereto, the manufactured home bearing the $35,000 Idaho lien. Ferron 
Stokes will be owed substantial premiums for his reverse mortgage and note liens as soon 
as Idaho properly invokes jurisdiction over the torts at hand and allows a jury to award 
plaintiff damages. Ferron Stokes is an Idaho business man. (See Idaho Well Drillers 
license for Ferron Stokes as exhibit "4" attached to Holli's affidavit supporting this motion 
for reconsideration.). 
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special appearances. In their motion to dismiss, the defendants moved for dismissal 
under Rule 12(b )(2), but they also joined summary judgment petitions asking the court 
to summary adjudicate all of plaintiffs claims "on their merits" in the defendant's favor on 
the alleged assertion that plaintiff failed to state any prima facie claim on it's face that 
would allow relief. The defendants argued that they were permitted to argue both 
jurisdictional and merits dismissals in the same motion under rule 4(i) which allowed the 
joinder of defenses in one motion without making a general appearance. Plaintiff 
contended that rule 4(i) also included provisions that if a defendant argued defenses 
outside of Rule 12(b)(2), (4) and (5), before a court had ruled on the 12(b)(2), (4) and (5) 
defenses and denied them, that the defendants would be making a voluntary 
appearance. This conflict in rule 4(i) has never been addressed by an Idaho Appellate 
Court and certainly has not been clearly addressed by this court's October 3, 2011 
decision which continues to lend confusion to this issue. Therefore, plaintiffs reasserts 
that by taking the defendants position, the Court has rendered the other provisions in rule 
( 4 )(i) superiluous. 
Court's Stated Fact : " Plaintiff sued the Defendants in Oneida County Idaho 
claiming breach of contract, and violations of both the Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
and the Idaho Racketeering Act." 
Plaintiffs response : Plaintiff also sued for equitable claims of Specific 
Performance, Constructive Trust, and Breach of Implied Covenant Of Good Faith and 
Fair dealing. 
(2) The Court's Misapplied The Law Based On The Court's 
Erroneous Factual Conclusions 
To begin it's legal anaylis, the Court incorrectly asserts that the 
negotiations and contract formations took place in Texas. In fact nothing in the 
record supports either factual conclusions. The negotations and contract formations, 
executions and consummations took place in Idaho as the evidence clearly shows. The 
Court then identifies that plaintiff must meet two prongs to assert jurisdiction over her 
case in Idaho, to wit: the defendant's actions must fall within Idaho's Long Arm Statute 
and jurisdiction over the defendants must be reasonable under the Due Process Clause. 
Notably missing from the Court's jurisdictional analysis is any assessment under Idaho 
Long Arm Statute's - Tortious Injury Prong . Here, it is undisputed that the defendants 
caused more than $65,000 in actual obligatory damages in the state of Idaho as a direct 
result of the defendant's civil and criminal fraud purposefully interjected into Idaho and 
against an Idaho resident. 
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(a) The Court Has Improperly Limited Analysis of Plaintiff's 
Claims Under the Idaho Long Arm Statute To The "Doing 
Business" Prong And Has Completely Avoided Any 
Analysis Under The Tortious Act Prong 4 
( i) Under Western States Equipment Co. v. Am Amex Inc., 
Jurisdiction Is Properly Placed In Idaho 
In assessing the "Doing Business" prong, the court has correctly stated that 
Idaho may obtain jurisdiction over a business transaction if "at least some negotiations or 
business were performed in Idaho." The Court then cites to Western States Equipment 
Co. v. Am Amex Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 158, 868 P.2d 483, 486 (1994) for the proposition 
that a contract alone cannot support jurisdiction. However in analyzing Western States 
supra as applied to the facts of this case, there are clear similarities such that the Idaho 
Supreme Court would hold that jurisdiction over this case under both the Business Prong 
of the Idaho Long Arm Statute and the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution. 
Specifically in Western States Equipment Co. v. Am Amex Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 
158, 868 P.2d 483, 486 (1994), several telephone negotiations took place between 
American's secretary in Georgia and Western's credit manager in the State of Idaho 
concerning the leasing of equipment. At least one (1) of these conversations was 
initiated by American's secretary by calling the office in Idaho. (See Aff. Of Telford 
supporting this motion for reconsideration, exhibit "3" filed under separate cover as an 
electronic record with the clerk of the court, plaintiff presented a recorded incoming 
phone call from Smith County Tax official Lois Mosley on March 8, 2011 to plaintiff in 
Idaho for purposes of further discussing and negotating the sales offer by Smith County 
concerning the subject struck off property.) in Western, the Supreme Court found that 
the single phone contact, combined with the credit application which was faxed to 
Western's general office in Idaho, indicated the transaction of business in Idaho for 
4. Idaho's Long Arm Statute, l.C. § 5-514 has two prongs applicable to the 
case at bar : (a) The transaction of any business within this state which is hereby 
defined as the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or 
accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business purpose or 
objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, association or corporation; 
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this state; 
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purposes of pecuniary benefits as defined in l.C. § 5-514(a). The Court further 
concluded that Western had established that American had purposely availed itself of the 
privilege of conducting business in Idaho under the Due Process Clause because 
American negotiated with Western to obtain credit from Western and Western did extend 
credit to American in Idaho based on the faxed credit application. 
In comparing the similarities in Western supra with plaintiffs case, on July 18, 
2011, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit wherein she attached exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10, all which 
showed more than 9 phone calls were made by defendants or their agents to plaintiffs 
Idaho phone number, 2 faxes were sent to plaintiff by the defendants, and that at least 6 
emails were transmitted to plaintiff by the defendants and their agents; all in an effort to 
secure pecuniary benefit from the transactions. However, exhibit "5" attached to 
Telford's July 18, 2011 affidavit would be the most compelling in applying the standards 
in Western supra to plaintiff's case. Exhibit "5" shows that Smith County employee Lois 
Mosley faxed Plaintiff a letter to plaintiff's Idaho home confirming the finality of the 
purchase and seeking to commence the process of drawing funds on Plaintiffs Letter of 
Credit which loan obligations attached to plaintiffs Idaho residence. Plaintiff asserts that 
Mosley's faxed letter seeking a substantial draw on plaintiffs Letter of Credit is likened to 
the faxed credit application to Western from American , and further, that both faxes were 
sent into the state of Idaho in order to realize pecuniary benefits. Therefore, like the 
Supreme Court ruled in Western States Equipment, supra, Smith County purposely 
availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Idaho under the Due Process 
Clause because Smith County negotiated with Plaintiff to obtain funds off of plaintiffs 
letter of credit , and did in fact receive a substantial amount of money for the purchase of 
the manufactured home permanently affixed to the subject struck off property. Therefore 
under Western States supra, jurisdiction in Idaho is established. 
( ii ) Under Southern Idaho Pipe v. Cal-Cut, Jurisdiction 
Is Properly Laid In Idaho 
This Court then cited to Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel v. Cal-Cut, 567 P.2d 1246; 
98 Idaho 495 (ID 1977) and distinguished plaintiffs case by holding that Smith County 
did not directly solicit business from the Plaintiff in Idaho as was done in Southern Idaho. 
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Plaintiff disagrees. In Southern Idaho, Cal-Cut argued that it did not maintain sales 
offices or agents in the state, however it did advertise for the sale of goods by mail or 
telephone and that such advertisements reached Idaho citizens. It was admitted that 
Deliveries were made in California as were the contracts of sale and that upon executing 
an acceptance contract to Cal-cuts solicited unilateral offers, the buyer was responsible 
for transporting the purchased steel pipe. On June 23, 1973, Southern Idaho received in 
the mail a publication advising that Cal-Cut wished to negotiate the sale of used steel 
pipe. Several phone conversations ensued between the parties to negotiate terms. The 
offer was accepted by mail by Southern Idaho. Southern Idaho enclosed a $20, 000 
check along with its acceptance bid for 30,000 feet of steel. (This transaction, like 
plaintiffs herein, was a unilateral contract.). Southern Idaho took delivery of 12,937 
feet of pipe in California between September 8, 1973 and October 5, 1973 with just over 
17,000 feet still owing. Sometime in October, Cal-Cut refused to make any more pipe 
available. 
The Idaho Supreme Court opined that Cal-Cut's activities in the State of Idaho 
constituted the "transaction of business" within the meaning of l.C. § 5-514(a). Although 
it was true that Cal-Cut did not operate a sales office and did not maintain sales agents in 
Idaho, this fact did not prevent jurisdiction in Idaho under l.C. § 5-514(a) citing Inter-
mountain Business Forms, Inc. v. Shepard Business Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538, 531 P.2d 
1183 (1975). This Court has said in the past that by enacting the statute in question the 
legislature intended to exercise all the jurisdiction available to the State of Idaho under the 
due process clause of the United States Constitution. Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of 
America, supra, 93 Idaho at 30, 454 P.2d 63. In modern times that jurisdiction has been 
expanded to cover contacts with a state that fall far short of a physical presence citing 
Fullmer v. Sloan's Sporting Goods, Co., 277 F.Supp. 995 (1967), where a Defendant 
advertised its products in a magazine of national circulation and sold its products to out-of-
state customers by mail order, the Idaho federal court held that the defendant was 
subject to the jurisdiction of Idaho because " the defendant was doing an act for the 
purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit in the State of Idaho'~ 
Here, Cal-Cut sent advertising circulars to potential buyers notifying them of 
the availability of steel pipe and announcing the terms of which they would sell. Follow-
up communications were then made by telephone and mail to secure the transactions. 
The fact that Southern Idaho received the steel pipe in California and opened their offers 
in California were not dispositive. 
Plaintiffs case is similar to Southern Idaho in that both cases involve unilateral 
contracts. (See pg 5 supra, provision 4 for rules on unilateral contracts. Also see 
Evanston Insurance Company v. Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company; 
Case No. 10-36133 (9th Cir. 10/03/2011). 5 In Plaintiffs case as in Southern 
Idaho Pipe, the sellers imputed unilateral offers into Idaho by advertising means 
that would have a tendency to reach forum residents. The buyers executed written 
acceptance bids supported by monetary consideration in performance of the Seller's 
unilateral offers. The Sellers then realized substantial pecuniary benefits from the 
buyer's performances. 
To avoid Southern Idaho's similarity to plaintiffs case, the Court inaccurately 
asserted that Smith County did not actively solicit business in Idaho because Smith 
County's online advertisement did not allow viewers to consummate a transaction online. 
The Court therefore summated that Smith County operated a passive website and their 
online advertisements cannot hold Smith County liable to the jurisdictions of sister state 
courts. Finally, this Court asserted without any any evidentiary support that Smith 
5. The 9th Circuit and Idaho both hold unilateral contracts subject to 
enforcement. In Evanston Insurance Company, supra.the 9th circuit held that "A 
unilateral contract exists when one party offers to do a certain thing in exchange for the 
other's performance, and performance by the other party constitutes acceptance and 
execution of the contract." Here, the fax from Bellevue Master to Northwest on 
February 22, 2001 was an offer: Northwest would be able to continue working as a 
subcontractor at the construction project provided it complied with Bellevue Master's 
insurance requirements. When Northwest contacted its insurance broker and 
requested that the broker issue the insurance certificate to Bellevue Master, Northwest 
accepted the unilateral contract, and a contract was thereby formed, executed and 
subject to enforcement." Idaho also concurs that a unilateral contract will be formed and 
executed when the offeree performs upon the terms of an offer in Shore v. Peterson, 
204 P.3d 1114, 146 Idaho 903 (Idaho 2009) ("where the offeror makes a promise that 
is conditional on the offeree"s acceptance, an offeree accepts by rendition of the 
requested performance.") citing CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 21 at 52 (1963) 
( An offer for a unilateral contract calls for acceptance by rendition of the 
requested performance.) J. CALAMARI and J.PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 
1-10 (1977). Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 Idaho 286, 
291, 688 P2d 1191, 1196 (Ct. App. 1984). 
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County required interested parties to travel to Texas to purchase property. (This later 
factual conclusion is directly controverted by the bid instructions electronically available on 
Smith County's website.). To address this Courts legal conclusion, it is necessary to 
determine the legal parameters of a passive website. (See pgs 6-7 supra, provision no. 
7 and footnote 6 infra for authorities addressing the definition of a passive vs interactive 
website.) 6 In nearly every authority plaintiff examined, a person DOES NOT 
CONDUCT A PASSIVE WEBSITE WHERE THEY PROVIDE A MEANS TO 
PURCHASE ITEMS OR SERVICES OVER THEIR WEBSITE. 
Resorting back to exhibits "1" and "2" attached to Telford's affidavit in support 
of this motion for reconsideration, these evidentiary documents establish that Smith 
County did not operate a passive website sufficient to avoid jurisdiction in a sister state 
court for any contractual or tort liability arising thereunder. First as stated on page 8 
supra, paragraph 2 under plaintifs response: Smith County was engaging in private 
functions when selling properties in Smith County. Second in reviewing exhibit "2" 
attached to Telford's Affidavit, ' the struck off property website for Smith County Tax 
Office' , this page directly represents that Smith County desires to sell struck off 
properties to the public at large by stating verbatim: "The law further prohibits the sheriff 
or constable from delivering a tax deed to any purchaser who fails to present to the 
6. A website is not passive where it provides a means to purchase goods 
or products or services. See Holland America Line Inc. v. Wartsila North America, 
Inc., 485 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 2007) ( Defining passive website as one that does not 
provide any means for purchasing items or requesting services.) CompuServe, Inc. v. 
Patterson, 89 F .3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (posting information over the internet for 
purpose of selling products is not a passive website and meets the express aiming 
requirement to impose jurisdiction where the sales have an impact.); Telco, 977 F. 
Supp.at 406 ("because [defendants] conducted their advertising and soliciting over the 
Internet, they subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the buyers courts). Blacks law 
definition: passive is "receiving or subjected to an action without responding or 
initiating an action in return. A judicial consensus has generally emerged that 
personal jurisdiction exists when Internet activities involve the conduct of business 
over the Internet, including substantial commercial interactivity that result in 
obligations incurred by the buyer in buyer's jurisdiction. See id. At *5 (citing Zippo 
Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1125-26; Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 
1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Gary Scott lnt'I, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 
716-17 (D. Mass. 1997); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp. 481, 486-87 (W.D. 
N.C. 1997); Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 743-44 (W.D. Tex. 
1998); Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
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officer ... " Any purchaser is not limited to the state of Texas. A further reading of this 
page shows that Smith County provided links for the potential purchaser which permitted 
that purchaser to draw down the required Delinquent Tax Statement, the Bid instructions 
(attached as exhibit "1" to Telford's affidavit), the Bid Sheet which is actually the Bid 
contract, and the county clerks records to verify liens against the property. A review of 
the bid instructions found at exhibit "1" attached to Holli's affidavit, directs the potential 
purchaser to (1) complete a Request for written statement regarding delinquent taxes, (2) 
Notarize the statement, (3) submit a copy of the statement with each sealed bid, (4) 
attach your money order or letter of credit for the full amount of the bid, (5) sign the bid, 
and (6) submit the bids either by mail or in person to Smith County Tax Office. 
NOWHERE IN THESE DOCUMENTS DOES IT REQUIRE THE 
PURCHASER TO TRAVEL TO TEXAS TO PURCHASE PROPERTY as this 
court erroneously factually concluded on page 8 paragraph 2 of it's decision. 
Based on the foregoing it is clear that Smith County was actively selling 
properties on their website to any purchaser and likewise that Smith County provided 
the means on their website to receive written acceptances to their bid offers, via mail to 
their offices. Furthermore as plaintiff has re-established in her supporting affidavit, 
plaintiff DID NOT TRAVEL TO SMITH COUNTY TEXAS TO INITIATE, TRANSACT OR 
CONSUMMATE HER PURCHASE. Lawsuit records in Oneida County, show that plaintiff 
was in the state of Idaho during the time the property initially went up for sale on Smith 
County's website, during the whole of the bid period and nearly 1 Yi months after Plaintiff 
was advised that she was the new owner of the struck off property. 
(iii) Akichika Is No Longer Good Law Under Blimka v. My 
Web Wholesaler LLC, (Idaho 2008) In Light Of The "Effects 
Tesr Promulgated By The US Supreme Court In Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. And Calder v. Jones 
This Court spends a considerable amount in it's decision asserting that Akichika 
v. Kellerher, 96 Idaho 930, 539 P .2d 283 (1975) controls plaintiff's case. Plaintiff 
disagrees that there are any similarities between Akichika and her case as the contract 
at issue in Akichika was signed, consummated, paid for and negotiated in the state of 
Oregon, the seller's domicile, where here, the contracts at issue were signed, executed, 
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paid for, negotiated, consummated and performed upon from the state of Idaho, 
plaintiffs domicile. Nevertheless, the Idaho Supreme Court in Blimka v. My Web 
Wholesaler LLC, 152 P.3d 594, 143 Idaho 723 (Idaho 2008), held that Akichika v. 
Kellerher, 96 Idaho 930, 539 P .2d 283 (1975) was no longer good law because the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued two decisions wherein it placed substantial emphasis on providing 
a forum in a state where the victim suffers injury from tortious action directed toward a 
resident of that state. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) and 
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984 ). In Akickika, this Court held that the non-
resident defendant was not transacting business in Idaho when he sold a used truck to an 
Idaho resident. More specifically, the Idaho resident drove to Oregon, executed a 
contract of purchase in Oregon, paid a deposit for the truck in Oregon and then drove the 
truck from Oregon back to his home in Idaho whereupon the truck broke down. The 
Seller then appeared in Idaho to collect more money from the buyer or repossesss the 
truck. As applied to Akichika, the Idaho Supreme Court then held that because the 
contract was executed, performed and consummated in Oregon, there was no actual 
"contract contacts" which were directed into Idaho. 
Blimka supra, presented two contacts analysis with Idaho, a doing business 
analysis and a tort analysis. The Idaho Supreme Court held that since the damages 
under Blimka's tort claim of fraud - would be identical to the damages under Blimka's 
contract claim, the only contacts analysis needed to invoke jurisdiction in Idaho was 
Blimka's tortious injury claim. The court therefore disregarded Blimka's "contract 
contacts" argument of doing business in Idaho and sustained jurisdiction over Blimka's 
case because the internet Seller committed fraud against Blimka, an Idaho resident. 
Blimka supra has efectively mooted the application of Akichika v. Kellerher; 
therefore this court errored in applying this case to prejudice plaintiffs access to an Idaho 
Court. Moreover, this Court failed altogether to address the tortious injury prong in 
creating jurisdiction over plaintiffs civil and criminal fraud claims in the state of Idaho 
where plaintiff suffered insurmountable damages. 
Ill. This Court Has Wholly Avoided Any Purposeful Availment 
Or Contacts Analysis Under Plaintiff's Tort Claims Sounding 
In Civil And Criminal Fraud 
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Plaintiffs Complaint and supplemental charges alleged various torts against the 
defendants which injuries and damages were felt in the state of Idaho. As an offer of 
proof that plaintiff suffered injuries in the forum state of Idaho, plaintiff supplied this court 
with numerous affidavits which pointed to various loan obligations plaintiff incurred as an 
Idaho citizen in performance on two related unilateral contracts offered by Smith County 
to sell a distressed land lot and a manufactured home to plaintiff - if plaintiff would 
agree to pay the assessed market value of the land lot and a certain sum of money 
for the manufactured home. Plaintiff accepted these unilateral contract offers by Smith 
County when she performed upon these offers by substantially obligating herself on 
loans to the tune of $65,000 as an Idaho resident. (The lenders were also Idaho 
residents or doing lending business in Idaho.). 
The record shows that the defendants informed plaintiff by phone on April 4, 
2011 that plaintiff was the new owner of the struck off property. On April 8, 2011, the 
defendants faxed plaintiff a letter informing plaintiff that she could now occupy and 
improve the struck off property (in part by placing the manufactured home plaintiff had 
simultaneously purchased from Smith County - onto the struck off property. ). (See 
exhibit "5" attached to Telford's July 18, 2011 affidavit for the April 8, 2011 faxed letter.). 
Under this same faxed letter, the defendants admitted that they were expediting a draw 
on plaintiffs letter of credit to pay for the struck off property. (Smith County had already 
taken a draw under the letter of credit in March of 2011 to pay the deposit purchase on 
the manufactured home. See exhibit "1" attached to plaintiffs Amended Opposition to 
the defendant's motion to dismiss filed with the Court on September 1, 2011 for this "wired 
fund transfer" in the amount of $4,214.77 to Smith County Attorney's offices - as partial 
funding for the transactions at hand.) By May 5, 2011 when plaintiff placed the 
manufactured home on the struck off property, the defendants had deceptively procured 
plaintiff to obligate herself to the tune of $65,000 to improve the subject property - all the 
while deliberately withholding their fraudulent intent to never turn over title to the struck 
off property to plaintiff. (The defendants did turn over title to the manufactured home as 
"a carrot" to plaintiff that plaintiff could rely on Smith County's representations regarding 
title to the struck off property.). The defendants had actual personal knowledge that 
plaintiff was substantially improving the property because the record shows that on May 
6, 2011, plaintiff emailed to Smith County tax official Lois Mosley, at least 6 email 
communications attaching digital pictures of her ongoing improvements to the struck off 
property. (See exhibit "6" attached to Telford's July 18, 2011 Affidavit for these email 
commnications.). Almost three weeks after Plaintiff had substantially improved the 
property, Lois Mosley corruptly informed plaintiff that Smith County was revoking the 
sale (on the fraudulent grounds that the prior owner had redeemed the property.). 
Under Texas law, a taxing unit cannot accept redemption funds once the 
property has been resold to a bonafide purchaser (see Texas Property Tax code Sec. 
34.23(b): the owner of ... property sold for taxes to a taxing unit may not redeem the 
property from the taxing unit after the property has been resold), and any prior owner 
attempting to redeem defaulted property must contact the purchaser and obtain an 
accounting of the monies it would cost to redeem property within the redemption period. 
(see Texas Propty Tax Code Sec. 34.21 (I): The owner of property who is entitled to 
redeem the property under this section must request that the purchaser of the property, 
provide that owner a written itemization of all amounts spent by the purchaser . . in costs 
on the property ... within 180 days of losing the property to default. Sec. 34.23(b)). Here, 
the struck off property had already been resold to plaintiff as acknowledged in Mosley's 
April 8, 2011 faxed letter. Accordingly, the taxing unit had no right to redeem the 
property to the original owners. Secondly, in the affidavits of Telford, Greer and Vogt, 
filed into the court record on or about July 18, 2011, all of these persons attested that 
while plaintiff was improving the property, the original owners repeatedly came onto the 
property to inquire into plaintifs activites and were informed by plaintiff that plaintiff 
owned the property through a resale of the property to plaintiff by Smith County. At this 
point in time, the original owners had direct contact with plaintiff and never once asserted 
a redemption right nor submitted a written request to plaintiff to obtain an accounting of 
the monies it would cost to redeem the property. Finally, the original owners redemption 
rights, if any were said to exist, expired on May 4, 2011 according to Mosley's letter. As 
attested, plaintiff never received any redemption petition from the original owners up 
through the end of the day of May 4, 2011; irrespective that the owners had direct access 
to plaintiff while plaintiff was on the property excavating same. 
Based on the foregoing, Smith County's basis for fraudulently depriving 
plaintiff of the fruits of her bargains on the fraudulent and corrupt assertion that the 
original owners had redeemed the struck off property, is an illegal and invalid defense 
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under Idaho, Texas and Federal laws. As such, the Smith County defendants and 
their lawfirm have intentionally and purposely inflicted tortious injury upon plaintiff, an 
Idaho resident, within the state of Idaho and must be held to answer in an Idaho court of 
law. 
Moreover, when the contracting defendants defrauded plaintiff of the fruits 
of her bargains and thus caused plaintiff to suffer substantial losses in the state of idaho 
by and through depleting an Idaho resident's assets and causing an Idaho resident to 
obligated to loans of upwards of $65,000, these defendants subjected themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the state of Idaho where plaintiffs injuries were felt from the defendant's 
fraud; irrespective that the misrepresentations were made from the state of Texas. 7 
During the whole of their contracting with plaintiff, the defendants knew that the brunt of 
plaintiffs injuries would be felt in Idaho. 8 
Because the record herein shows that plaintiff suffered substantial injuries in this 
state as a result of the defendants civil and criminal fraud, this court errored by mot 
addressing the tortious injury prong in it's October 3, 2011 Decision for invoking 
jurisdiction in the state of Idaho over plaintiffs primarily fraud based causes of actions. 
7. See Gates v. Collier, 378 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1967) (With respect to that 
portion of Collier's claim which is based on fraud, § 377 of the Restatement recites that 
" When a person sustains loss by fraud, the place of wrong is where the loss is 
sustained, not where fraudulent representations are made."); United States v. Pascucci, 
943 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (Jurisdiction lies where the plaintiffs assets are 
depleted through the wrongs commited by the defendant); Sinatra v. Nat'I Enquirer, 
Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988 ) (exercising personal jurisdiction over a Swiss 
Clinic that misappropriated Frank Sinatra's name through a series of advertisements 
claiming recommendation by high profile California resident.); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 
v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1990) (fraudulent letter sent to plaintiff in forum 
state was express aiming). 
8. See Yahoo Inc v. La Ligue Contra Lw Raciseme Et L'Antisenitiseme, 433 
F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (We hold jurisdiction proper in California from a letter sent to 
Yahoo threatening financial penalties against Yahoo if Yahoo did not comply with a french 
order to cease and desist certain internet activities engaged in France. Because the 
impact of any financial penalties would be felt by Yahoo at her resident heaquarters in 
Santa Clara, California, we hold we have jurisdiction in Caifornia by applying the 
"effects test" under Calder which focuses on the forum in which the defendant's actions 
are felt, whether or not the actions themselves occurred within the forum. See 
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984)). 
We take this opportunity to clarify our law and to state that the "brunt" of the harm need 
Ill. The Court's Analysis Of Rule 4(i) Renders Superfluous Various 
Parts Of That Rule 
See State v. Yzaguirre, 163 P.3d 1183, 144 Idaho 471 (Idaho 05/25/2007) (In 
determining its ordinary meaning "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if 
possible, so that no word will be rendered void, superfluous, or redundant." State v. 
Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006) (quoting In re Winton Lumber 
Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d 664, 666 (1936)). 
At pages 4-6 of plaintiffs amended opposition, plaintiff made the following 
argument citing Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 193 P.3d 866, 146 Idaho 319 (Idaho 
09/24/2008 ) : "If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court, he 
not be suffered in the forum state. If a jurisdictionally sufficient amount of harm is 
suffered in the forum state, it does not matter that even more harm might have been 
suffered in another state. Calder stands for the proposition that purposeful availment is 
satisfied even by a defendant "whose only 'contact' with the forum state is the 'purposeful 
direction' of a foreign act having effect in the forum state." Also see Blimka v. My Web 
Wholesaler LLC, 152 P.3d 594, 143 Idaho 723 (Idaho 2008) (Blimka argues that the 
district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the defendants with respect to 
the fraud claim pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-514(b), and with respect to the contract claims 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-514(a). Since we conclude that jurisdiction existed on the 
fraud claim, both with respect to My Web and DePa/ma, and because the fraud claim 
supports all relief granted in the judgment, we need not address the issue of jurisdiction 
over the contract claims. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) 
and Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). In this case, the allegedly fraudulent 
representations were directed at an Idaho resident and the injury occurred in this state 
when Blimka departed with funds as a result of the fraud. Plaintiff paid large sums of 
money for defective goods that were mispresented to Blimka. Thus, we hold that 
Blimka's allegation of fraud was sufficient to invoke the tortious acts language of Idaho 
Code § 5-514(b) with respect to both defendants. Morover, because the defendants 
purposefully directed their allegedly false representations into Idaho and the plaintif 
suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of these false representations, the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction is presumed not to offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Brainerd v. Governors of the 
Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1989). Idaho has an ever-increasing 
interest in protecting its residents from fraud committed on them from afar by electronic 
means.). Citing Calder et al v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) ("the fact 
that the actions causing the effects in California were performed outside the State did not 
prevent the State from asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those 
effects ... the brunt of the harm was suffered or is being suffered in the forum state,. .. 
thereby invoking jurisdiction in the forum where the "effects" of the out of state conduct 
is felt." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-298 (1980); 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 37 (1971 ). 
must keep out for all purposes except to make that objection." Pingree Cattle Loan Co. v. 
Charles J. Webb & Co 36 Idaho 442, 446, 211 P. 556, 557 (1922) (quoting from Lowe v. 
Stringham, 14 Wis. 222, 225 (1861)). Rule 4 (i) provides in part that "If, after a motion 
under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied, the party pleads further and defends the action, 
such further appearance and defense of the action will not constitute a voluntary 
appearance under this rule. Here, the defendants would not be pleading further in the 
action because they merged their rule 12(b)(6) petitions with their rule 12(b)(2),(4) and (5) 
petitions and argued all petitions on their merits in thr first instance. 
The defendants assert that another provision of rule 4(i) permits them to merge 
all defenses in one motion and thereby not make a general appearance. This issue 
presented is whether this merger of motions is a grant to argue all of the defenses on 
their merits at once in the jurisdictional motion, or merely a grant to preserve the other 
defenses. Plaintiff contends that it is meremy a grant to preserve other defenses 
otherwise the defendants would render superfluous the other provision under rule 4(i) -
"If, after a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied, the party pleads further and 
defends the action, such further appearance and defense of the action will not constitute a 
voluntary appearance under this rule. 
The Court has not addressed this conflict in the rule in his October 3, 2011 
Decision presumably so that this question can be raised on appeal as a first impression 
question and set stare decisis law for trial courts in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff asserts that her contracts and tort 
claims are jurisdictional in the state of Idaho under the Doing Business prong and the 
tortious injury prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute. Furthermore, the record before this 
court shows that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of intentionally 
committing the tortious conduct of fraud in the state of Idaho and against an Idaho 
resident thereby subjecting them to jurisdiction in Idaho under the Due Process Clause 
where plaintiff suffered the whole of her injuries and da 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA COPELAND, et al. 
Defendants 
Case No. CV 2011 - 00066 
Am~tJDe r> 
PLAINTIFPS OPPOSITION TO THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
SUPPORTED BY: 
(1) The Affidavit of Hom Telford 
(2) The Affidavit of LA Greer 
(3) The Affidavit of Sham Neilsen 
(4) The Affidavit of Kim Vogt 
(5) The Affidavit of S. Durfee 
(6) Verified Response To Court Order 
Dated August 18, 2011 
CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Holli Telford and timely files her OPPOSITION to the defendanfs 
motions to dismiss within 7 days before the scheduled hearing date of September 7, 
2011. , 
1. The Defendants contend that Rule 56 applies to lhe motions to dismiss. 
Plaintiff disagrees. Rule 56 does not apply until after the Court has exercised his 
discretion and decided that he is going to consider matters outside of the pleadings. See 
In the adoption of John Doe v. Idaho Dept. of Health And Welfare, Docket no. 37936 
(Idaho Supreme Court, 2011) (The Civil Rules provide that it matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court. a motion under 1.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) shall be treated as one for summary judgment l.R.C.P. 12(b). Glaze v. 
Deffenbaugh, 144 Idaho 829, 831, 172 P.3d 1104, 1106 (2007}. Here, the Supreme 
Court affirmed that it was within the courts disa"etion to consider or exdude affidavits, 
and that if the affdavits were considered, then the judgment would be converted to a Rule 
56 judgment Here, since the Defendanfs motions to dismiss were couched under Rule 
12 of the Idaho Rules of CfvH Procedure and the court doesnt exercise his discretion to 
convert the motions until the time of the hearing, then the time schedule set out in Rule 
7(b)(3).(B) or (E) controls. These provisions read as follows: 
HOLLI TELFORD 
AKA HOLLI LUNDAHL 
10621 S. Old Hwy 191 
Malad, Idaho 83252 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA COPELAND, et al. 
Defendants 
Case No. CV 2011 -- 00066 
AFFIDAVIT OF HOLLI TELFORD 
supporting : 
l.R.C.P RULE 11 (a)(2)(B) MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE 
COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF GARY 
BARBER, TAB BEAL, LAW OFFICES 
OF PURDUE, BRANDON, FELDER, 
COLLINS & MOTT, AND SMITH COUNTY 
REQUEST FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
AFTER RECONSIDERATION OF THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ABOVE STATED 
REQUEST FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
OF THE RULE 68 SETTLEMENT JUDGMENT 
BETWEEN LISA NIELSEN AND HOLLI TELFORD 
REQUEST TO CERTIFY AS A FINAL 
JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 54(b) THE 
COURT'S ORDER DENYING DEFAULTS 
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AGAINST 
THE REMAINDER DEFENDANT'S 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF SERVED THESE 
THESE DEFENDANTS BY CERTIFIED 
MAIL VERSUS PERSONAL SERVICE 
UNDER IDAHO'S CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT'S SERVICE STATUTE 
AS PERMITTED FOR TORTFEASORS 
RESIDING OUT OF STATE 
MOTION TO STAY THE TRIAL 
PROCEEDINGS AS TO THE REMAINDER 
DEFENDANTS UNTIL THE SUPREME 
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State of Utah 
:ss 
County of Box Elder 
HAS INTERPRETED IDAHO'S CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT'S SERVICE STATUTE 
COMES 
I, Holli Telford, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein and do competently 
attest thereto. 
2. The Court failed to liberally construe all facts and reasonable inferences 
in my favor as required when considering a motion to dismiss, this court inserted facts 
into it's Summary Judgment Decision which were neither in the record nor supported by 
any of the evidence founded upon the record, and this court failed to conduct a contacts 
analysis under my tort causes of action sounding in civil and criminal fraud. 
3. The Court's factual conclusions I executed , consummated and signed 
the contracts to purchase the subject struck off property and the manufactured home 
placed thereon - in Texas, are wholly incorrect, and I contend that these inaccurate 
factual assertions tainted this Court's "purposeful availment analysis" as applied to my 
contract claims under the "Doing business" prong under Idaho's Long Arm Statute and the 
Due Process Clause. 
4. I saw the internet advertisment for the sale of the struck of property at 
issue in these proceedings on Smith County's Website on March 1, 2011 when the 
advertisement was posted for the first time by Smith County over their website. Attached 
hereto as exhibit "1" is the Bid instruction sheet posted on Smith County's Website at 
9:00 a.m. on March 1, 2011. In paragraph 12 it states the monthly deadline for 
submission of bids on struck off properties is by noon of the last work day of each month. 
I contend that this statement implies that Smith County posts a new struck off property list 
at the beginning of each month on their website. Moreover I attest that I was monitoring 
Smith County's struck off property list during the months of February, March and April of 
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2011, and a new list was posted at the beginning of each month. I further attest that the 
property I bid on was not posted on their website until March 1, 2011. 
5. Attached as exhibit "2" hereto, is a true copy of Smith County Tax 
Assessor's Website as it existed on March 1, 2011. As can be seen in this exhibit, 
Smith County instructs "national buyers" accessing their website to draw down "the 
request for written statement under Texas Tax Code section 34.015 regarding 
delinquent taxes, to draw down the Bid Sheet form that Smith County requires Bids to be 
submitted on, and to mail or personally deliver the executed Tax Delinquency Statement, 
the sealed bid and supporting consideration (including a letter of credit) to the Smith 
County County Tax Office. 
6. A further review of exhibit "1" attached which was the bid instructions 
sheet Smith County directed me to draw down fom their website before executing my bid 
in March of 2011, this document required that I pull down the Request for Written 
Statement regarding Tax Delinquencies, that I have this document notarized and submit 
this document to Smith County, along with my sealed bid, and my letter of credit. The 
document further shows that bidding papers may be submitted by mail. 
7. In accordance with these instructions: (1) I did sign, execute and form 
my written bid acceptance contracts for the at issue struck off property from my residence 
in Malad, Idaho; (2) I did obtain a letter of credit from my bank and incur an $18,000 
personal loan to support that letter of credit which constituted my consideration for my 
written bid acceptance contract, (3) I did obligate myself to a personal loan specifically 
for the transactions at hand and these loan obligations attach to collateral which attaches 
to my residence in Malad Idaho, and (4) I did mail my bidding documents to the Smith 
County Tax Office before the deadline date of the last business day of the month as 
instructed in exhibit "1" attached. 
8. During the whole of the time that I was engaging in commercial activity 
with Smith County I was aware that they were acting as private parties and that no 
immunities were accorded these defendants for their commercial activities. See H.B. 
2039 codified as Local Government Code §§271.151.160 no immunities for government 
units engaging in contracts and other commercial functions. 
9. I did not travel to Smith County Texas on February 8, 2011 for the 
purpose of bidding on the struck off property subject of this action. I was in Texas on 
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another matter and while there I learned of Texas' property tax sales unique from other 
states. I obtained this Statement which on its face shows that it is good for 90 days from 
the date of purchase. See this Statement as exhibit "1 "attached to my affidavit filed on 
July 18, 2011 to verify this expiration date . I was back in Idaho by February 14, 2011 
as I personally filed an Ex-parte Motion To Apply Telford's Motion For Summary 
Judgment On Ralston's First Amended Complaint To Ralston's Substituted Counter-
claim Filed By Ralston On February 2, 2011, on February 14, 2011 in Oneida County 
Idaho case no. 2010-185. 
10. My negotiations concerning the subject struck off property did not 
commence until after March 1, 2011, when the property was first posted on Smith 
County's website. On March 8, 2011, I verified during a phone call with Lois Mosley from 
my home in Idaho the particulars concerning the property. Filed under separate cover 
as electronic exhibit "3" - is a phone recording from Lois Mosley to my Idaho address for 
the purpose of negotiating matters concerning the subject struck off property. The call 
was recorded because I was unavailable to answer my phone. 
11. In addition to calling me several times on April 4, 2011 to confirm 
that I had won the bid, Smith County employee Lois Mosley also faxed me a letter 
to initate the process of collecting the purchase fees under my letter of credit bearing my 
Idaho address as the obligatory address securing collateral for my personal loan. This 
letter was attached as exhibit "5" to my Affidavit filed on July 18, 2011 and I made 
references to the letter in my July 18, 2011 Affdaivit @ Paragraph 11, p. 4 . In addition, 
Lois Mosley confirmed in this faxed letter that : (1) my bid was conclusive and binding; 
(2) Smith County was preparing the deed to convey the property to me; (3) no 
redemption right existed on the property resold to me; and (4) I was permitted to occupy 
the property and improve it. 
12. To substantiate Mosley's faxed letter, Smith County's lawfirm Linebarger, 
Goggan, Blair and Sampson, on April 5, 2011 sent me an email notifying me that they 
were preparing the deed and had sent me a letter confirming I was the new owner of the 
subject real property so that I could obtain property insurance. This email was attached 
as exhibit "4" to my July 18, 2011 affidavit and referred to in Paragraph 2, p.1 and 
Paragraph 11, p. 4 of that Affidavit . 
13. On April 30, 2011, I traveled back to Texas to inspect the purchased 
property. Upon entering the property ... I was informed that the property address listed 
on Smith County's website for the property I purchased was wrong. I advised Smith 
County of the error and was subsequently directed to the property that Smith County had 
sold to me. The Smith County Tax Assessor's Office modified the purchase price of the 
property to the market value of the property, due to their self imposed error. I was told 
that I could now improve the "correct property." 
14. I spent $5450 in excavating the struck off property of shubbery and trees 
that infested the property. See exhibit "11" attached to my July 18, 2011 affidavit for proof 
of these expenditures. I also moved a manufacutured home on the property and incurred 
another loan obligation of $35,000 against title of the home to pay for the infrastructure 
that supported utilities, water and waste faciilities to the manufactured home. The lender 
on the home was an Idaho lender and again the obligatory address for the second loan in 
the amount of $35,000 was my Idaho address. Moreover any suit against me for default 
on the $35,000 lien would be required to be heard in Idaho under a forum clause that 
attaches to that $35,000 mortgage. Finally, I became obligated on the $18,000 letter of 
credit which attached to the above stated personal loan. All of these loans were 
committed to fund the transactions at hand and to improve the subject struck off property. 
These loans and expenditures total some $65,000 to date and represent actual injuries 
inflicted upon me in the state of Idaho as a result of the fraud of the defendants. 
15. I was unable to fund these loan obligations because of an illegal search 
and seizure conducted on my home on August 10, 2011 and which tainted what income I 
earned as a tax representative for a small group of low income people. Consequently 
my monetary obligations are now being funded by Ferron Stokes. For example, Ferron 
Stokes paid off the delinquent property taxes due in Oneida County case no. 2011-CV-44 
to the County Treasurer Diane Pett to save the Malad property from foreclosure; Ferron 
Stokes purchased the $35,000 note held by S. Durfee on the Manufactured home placed 
on the Texas property which was due to foreclose on October 15, 2011 (see affidavit of 
S. Durfee filed into this court's record) and is holding Holli's payments due on this note 
under a reverse mortgage theory - taking in payments as Holli can afford ; and Ferron 
Stokes is paying Holli's $18,000 loan obligations to American First Bank which supported 
Holli's letter of credit for the purchase of the subject struck off property now affixing 
permanently thereto, the manufactured home bearing the $35,000 Idaho lien. Ferron 
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Stokes will be owed substantial premiums for his reverse mortgage and reverse note 
liens, as soon as Idaho properly invokes jurisdiction over the torts at hand and allows a 
jury to award me damages. Ferron Stokes is an Idaho business man. (See Idaho Well 
Drillers license for Ferron Stokes as exhibit "4" attached hereto. 
16. On June 1, 2011, Smith County informed me that they were revoking the 
sale and that they had redeemed the property to the original owners. Smith County 
lacked any authority at law to redeem the property to the former owner given statutes 
presribing such acts as void. (See Texas Property Tax Code Sec.34.23(b): the 
owner of ... property sold for taxes to a taxing unit may not redeem the property from the 
taxing unit after the property has been resold.). I contend that Smith County in fact 
retained the property in their coffers so that they could resell the property to another 
potential buyer at a significantly higher value given my substantial improvements to the 
property. I am accusing Smith County of exerting unconsented control over my 
properties by civil and criminal fraud and deception as proscribed under Idaho's 
Consumer Protection Act, Idaho's Racketering act vis-a-vis Theft by unauthorized 
transfer under l.C. 18-2403; Theft by false promise under l.C. 18-2403(d); Theft by 
extortion under l.C. 18-2403(e); and common law and constructive fraud under Idaho law. 
17. In applying the law to the facts, this Court has mistated the facts 
contained in the record in order to misapply various laws against me. In addition, this 
court has based its decision to deny me jurisdiction in Idaho based on a case that was 
effectively overruled by the Idaho Supreme Court in Blimka v. MyWeb Wholesale. 
Because of the court's distortion of the facts, the court has wrongfully denied jurisdiction 
over my case under the "Doing Business Prong" of Idaho's Long Arm Statute. 
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18. In addition, there is absolutely no analysis conducted by the court under 
the "tortious injury" prong of Idaho's Long Arm Statute. I attest that I suffered and 
continue to suffer substantial damages in the state of Idaho from the defendants civil and 
criminal fraud directed at me as an Idaho citizen and having serious effects in the state of 
Idaho. 
Further this affiant saith na 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this '18th day of October, 201 '1 
?, 
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Certificate of Service 
The undersigns that she served the foregoing Affidavit of Telford supporting 
Rule 11 motiion for reconsideration on the following parties by fax and by email on 
October 18, 2011 
Brian K. Julian 
Stephen LAdams 
250 S. Fifth St. Ste 700 
Boise Idaho 83707 
fax no. 208-344-5510 
1 
q 
SMITH COUNTY TAX OFFICE 
SEALED BID INSTRUCTIONS 
-YOU MUST SUBMIT A COMPLETED BID OR IT MAY BE DISQUALIFIED"** 
1. DO NOT disturb any occupants. 
2. DO NOT enter vacant structures. 
3. Read carefully the General Conditions for Bids. 
4. Complete the form titled Request For Written Statement Under Texas Tax Code §34.015 Regarding 
Delinquent Taxes. On this form you are to list all properties owned by you in SMITH COUNTY or ANY CITY 
or ANY SCHOOL DISTRICT that is located at least in part in Smith County. 
5. Have completed form notarized. Wait to sign this form before the notary so she/he may witness your 
signature. 
6. Submit notarized form with $10.00 to the Smith County Tax Office to request a written statement stating 
whether there are any delinquent taxes owed by you to SMITH COUNTY or to ANY SCHOOL DISTRICT or 
MUNICIPALITY having territory in Smith County. 
7. Submit a copy of this statement from the Smith County Tax Office with each sealed bid. 
8. Attach your cashier's check, money order or letter of credit for the full amount of your bid. 
9. Sign the bid. AU bids must be signed by hand. 
1 G. Submit your bid for each property in separate sealed envelopes with the following typed on the exterior of 
EACH envelope: 
11. Submit your bid for each property to: 
By Mail 
Smith County Tax Offii:;e 
P.O. Box 2011 
Tyler, Texas 75710 
"SEALED BID ENCLOSED" 
NAME 
ADDRESS 
TELEPHONE NUMBER 
PROPERTY ACCOUNT NUMBER 
CAUSE NUMBER 
In Person 
Smith County Tax Office 
Cotton Belt Building 
1517 West Front 
Tyler, Texas 75702 
12. All bids must be received no later than 12:00 p.m. (noon) on the last work day of each month. 
13. You need not be present at the bid opening. 
ll 111 
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Property Struck Off List 
Tax Assessor 
Property Taxes 
Property Tax 
FAQs 
Property Tax 
Rates 
Delinquent Tax 
Sales 
Struck Off Tax 
Sales 
Ve hide 
Registration 
Vehicle 
Registration 
FAQs 
Related Links 
Taxes Online 
Struck Off Tax Sales 
Beginning with Texas tax sales conducted on or after October 7, 2003, purchasers at 
a tax foreclosure sale must present to the sheriff or constable conducting the sale a 
written statement issued to the purchaser by the Smith County Tax Assessor-
Collector stating that the purchaser owes no delinquent property taxes to the county 
and that there are no known or reported delinquent taxes owed by the purchaser to 
any school district or city with territory in Smith County. The law furtl\er prohibits the 
sheriff or constable from delivering a tax deed to any purchaser who fails to present 
to the officer this required written statement Issued by the county tax assessor-
collector. To obtain this needed statement, complete the following form and return to 
the Smith County Tax Office. Remember to enclose the appropriate $10.00 fee or 
your request will not be processed. 
\lirk h"te for the R"quest for Written Stat"ment Und"r Texas Tax Code § 34 01 5 
Regarding Deljnquent wxes 
Click here for the Sealed Bid !nstr11rtlgo< and Bid Sheet. 
(Note: Properties are subject to any and all Oty of Tyler and Smith County liens 
recorded in the County Ci"r!s Records Troup properties are subject to Troup ISD 
taxes.) 
Inventory of Smith County Property Struck off Tax Sale 
3 /1 I 2611 
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State of Idaho 
Department of Water Resources 
DRILLING COMPANY CERTIFICATE 
This is to recognize that STOKES DRILLING, Dri16ng Company License 
Number 660, has the following Licensed Driller in the ~s employ 
authorized to supervise the driling and completion of eaeh well constructed by 
the company named on this certificate: 
FERRON STOKES, PRINCIPAL DRILLER 
This certificate and the ~ng authorization card are for the licensing 
period commencing Apri 1, 2010, and expiring on March 31, 2012. 
"LJ ' ,, 
This certifk:ate has been issued on 
October 4, 2010 
~~~~ 
Charles D. Galloway, P.E. 
Chief, Resource Protection Bureau 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN Ai"l\1D FOR THE COUNTY OF Ol'ot1EIDA 
Register #CV-2011-66 
HOLLI TELFORD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SANDRA COPELAND, ET AL 
Defendants, 
* * * * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER 
8 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 6(e)(2), the Court advises the parties that the hearing scheduled on 
November 21, 2012 will be argued without the submission of any evidence not previously 
submitted in \\lriting. No live testimony will be permitted. This hearing is for argument only on 
the matters raised by the VvTitten submissions of the parties, in compliance with the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 8th day ofNovember, 2011. 
STEPHENS. DlJNN 
District Judge 
ORDER 
Holli Telford vs. Sandra Copeland, et al, CV-2011-66 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of November, 2011, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing MINUTE ENTRY ANTI ORDER to the following person(s) in the 
manner indicated below: 
Holli Telford 
10621 S. Old Hwy. 191 
Malad, ID 83252 
Stephen L. Adams 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
ORDER 
[x] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[] Facsimile 
[x] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
Deputy 'crerk / J 
Holli Telford vs. Sandra Copeland, et al, CV-2011-66 
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Brian K. Julian, ISB No. 2360 
Stephen L. Adams, ISB No. 7534 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
E-Mail: bjulian@ajhlaw.com 
sadams @ajhlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Tab Beall, 
Law Offices of Perdue, Brandon, Fielder, 
Collins and Mott, LLP, Smith County and 
Tax Assessor, Gary Barber 
nr10 f\lfl !~ I 1. 1 i '~ t--\ 
'-"''"*-. 
AT .a~20 O'clock _,Q.M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONIEDA 
HOLLI TELFORD assignee to M.D. Diet Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDRA COPELAND; ADMITRA. MILLS; 
JEANETTE HARMON; CODY KELLEY; 
PAUL KELLEY JR; THE ESTATE OF PAUL 
KELLEY SR; SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE; 
TAX ASSESSOR GARY BARBER; SMITH 
COUNTY; ARTIE ROSS; ATTORN'EY TAB 
BEAELL; LAW OFFICES OF PURDUE 
BRADON, FELDER, COLLINS & MOTT; 
LISA NEILSON, AND DOES 1 - 10, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 2011-000066 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
AND REQUEST FOR 54(b) 
CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18, 
2011 
COME NO\V Defendants Tab Beall, Law Offices of Perdue, Brandon, Fielder, Collins & 
Mott, Smith County, and Gary Barber (herein referred to as "Defendants"), and hereby submit 
this objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and 54(b) Certificate, filed October 18, 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR 
54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18, 2011 - 1 
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2011. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 3, 2011, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision granting various aspects 
of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Quash, and Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Memorandum Decision (Oct. 3, 2011), p. 1. In its ruling, the Court determined that the 
Defendants did not act in any manner which subjected them to jurisdiction under the Idaho long 
arm statute, and further found that even if the long arm statute was applicable, constitutional 
considerations prevented the Idaho Courts from exercising jurisdiction over the Defendants. Id., 
pp. 10- 12. 1 
On October 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed a motion on several issues (hereinafter referred to as 
Plaintiff's "Motion for Reconsideration"), including requesting reconsideration of the Court's 
October 3, 2011 Memorandum Decision, and requesting a 54(b) certificate related to 
Defendants' dismissal. With regard to these issues, Defendants contend that because Plaintiff has 
not presented any new evidence or recently decided caselaw to the Court, the Court has had a 
chance to fully review the facts and applicable law and there is no basis for the Court to 
reconsider its previous decision. With regard to the request for the 54(b) certificate, Defendants 
contend that such certificate is not allowable under the circumstances. These issues will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
With regard to the remainder of the issues addressed in Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration, such issues are either not addressed in her briefing, or are not related to 
The Court did not rule on Defendants' other requested grounds for dismissal. However, the Court did rule 
that Defendants' joinder of other defenses, such as lack of venue, did not constitute a general appearance as the 
defenses were consolidated into one motion, as allowed by l.R.C.P. 4(i) and 12(g). Memorandum Decision (Oct. 3, 
2011), pp. 12 - 13. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR 
54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18, 2011 - 2 
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Defendants. Specifically, the caption of Plaintiff's brief indicates that she is seeking 54(b) 
certification related to the "rule 68 settlement judgment between Lisa Nielsen and Holli Telford." 
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1. Defendants are aware that Lisa Nielsen was named as a party 
in this lawsuit, but are have never been informed that Ms. Nielsen appeared, nor are they aware 
that Ms. Nielsen ever made a Rule 68 offer of judgment related to this lawsuit. Further, 
Defendants could not find any portion of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration addressing this 
issue. In any case, as Defendants' counsel does not represent Ms. Nielsen, this issue will not be 
addressed below. 
Similarly, in the caption Plaintiff requested a 54(b) certificate relating to the July 18, 
2011 Memorandum Decision denying default judgments against the non-appearing parties. As 
stated above, Defendants' counsel does not represent these individuals, and there is no discussion 
in Plaintiff's brief showing a compelling reason why such certification is needed. Plaintiff has 
six months to properly serve the Complaints and Summonses from the date it was filed. l.R. C.P. 
4(a). Such deadline runs on or around December 3, 2011 (six months from the date of the 
Complaint filing on June 3, 2011), and so if Plaintiff fails to properly serve prior to that time, she 
will have the opportunity to appeal the dismissal of her case after that. Therefore Defendants will 
not address this issue below. 
Finally, Plaintiff asks the Court to stay trial proceedings until the Supreme Court has 
ruled on this issue. Once again, there is no discussion of reasons or citation of authority 
supporting the request to stay the proceedings. In any case, there is no trial setting, service has 
not yet been properly affected, and the Supreme Court has not taken up this issue on appeal. 
Therefore, there is no reason for the Court to stay anything in t11is matter. This issue will not be 
discussed in more detail below. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST FOR 
54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18, 2011 3 
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II. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. NO 54(b) CERTIFICATE SHOTJLD BE ISSUED IN THIS CASE BECAUSE NO 
CLAIMS HA VE BEEN DISMISSED IN FlJLL, Ai~1) BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS 
FAILED TO SHOW ANY COMPELLING NEED FOR A PARTIAL APPEAL. 
With regard to Plaintiff's request for a 54(b) certificate regarding the Court's October 3, 
2011 Memorandum Decision, Defendants contend that issuance of such certificate under the 
circumstances would be inappropriate. Such certificates are not routinely issued, "and 
certification should be granted only upon a showing of hardship, injustice or other compelling 
reasons." Bowen v. Heth, 120 Idaho 452, 454 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991). 
We have cautioned that I.R.C.P. 54(b) certification should not be granted 
routinely, or as a matter of course; it should be reserved only for "the infrequent 
harsh case." The party requesting certification must show that it will suffer some 
hardship or injustice, or provide some other compelling reason why the 
certification should be granted. Further, mere delay is not a hardship in and of 
itself, because I.R.C.P. 54(b) contemplates that t..liere will normally be a delay in 
cases involving multiple parties and motions. 
Kolin v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 328 (1997) (internal citations omitted). The 
logic behind a rule 54(b) certificate is to "avoid an injustice which might result if an appeal were 
delayed until final disposition of the entire case. Except where an injustice would result from 
denial of an immediate appeal, Rule 54(b) was not intended to abrogate the general rule against 
piecemeal appeals." Pichon v. L.J. Broekemeier, Inc., 99 Idaho 598, 602 (1978). 
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to identify any compelling reason why a 54(b) certificate 
should be issued by the Court. Plaintiff's affidavit (dated October 18, 2011), does not address 
why a 54(b) certificate should be issued. The affidavit only addresses Plaintiff's concerns about 
the Court's October 3, 2011 Memorandum Decision, and does not identify whether any injustice 
would occur if the appeal were delayed until a fi.1.'1al judgment was issued in this matter. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AA'D REQUEST FOR 
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Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden showing that a 54(b) certificate should be 
issued. 
In addition to this, Defendants contend that a 54(b) certificate is not allowed under the 
plain language of the rule. The rule states: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . . or when 
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment 
upon one or more but less than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction 
for the entry of the judgment. 
l.R.C.P. 54(b). The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "Idaho's version of Rule 54(b) was 
different from the corresponding federal Rule 54(b). Idaho's rule permitted certification only 
when there was more than one claim for relief and one or more but less than all of those claims 
were disposed of against all parties against whom those claims were made." Pichon v. L.J. 
Broekemeier, Inc., 99 Idaho 598, 601 (1978). \\There the ruling of the trial court left some aspects 
of the claims outstanding against other parties, certification was not proper on those claims 
against the dismissed parties. Id. In other words, the certification is only allowed when one claim 
is dismissed against all parties, not when one party (or in this case, four of the defendants), have 
all claims dismissed against them. 
Plaintiff's Complaint has four causes of action, which are alleged generally, and therefore 
it must be assumed that they are alleged against all of the named defendants. Because none of 
those claims have been dismissed in their entirety, and because there is no compelling reason, 
I.R. C.P. does not allow for a 54(b) certificate. Therefore, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's 
request for a 54(b) certificate should be denied. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHOTJLD BE DENIED 
BECAUSE THERE IS NO BASIS IN LAW OR FACT FOR THE COURT TO 
RECONSIDER ITS PRE"VIOUS OPINION. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REQlTEST FOR 
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\\Then a party files a motion for reconsideration, there is no requirement that the party 
provide the Court with either newly decided case law or new evidence. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 
Idaho 468, 472 73 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006). However, a motion for reconsideration usually 
includes new or additional facts. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 
823 (1990). The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to allow the Court to "obtain a full 
and complete presentation of all available facts, so that the truth may be ascertained, and justice 
done, as nearly as may be." Id. Even though no new facts are required when filing a motion for 
reconsideration, the burden is on the Plaintiff to bring to the Court's attention any new facts or 
reasons why the Court's previous decision should be reconsidered. See Coeur d'A.lene Mining 
Co. , 118 Idaho at 823 ("The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to 
the new facts. We will not require the trial court to search the record to determine if there is any 
new information that might change the specification of facts deemed to be established."); 
Johnson, 143 Idaho at 472 - 73 (absent new facts, the Court had no basis on which to grant a 
motion for reconsideration) (citing Devil Creek Ranch. Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal 
Co., 126 Idaho 202 (1994) and Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586 (2001)). 
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to provide any new facts to the Court which it could 
utilize to reconsider its prior ruling. As discussed above, Plaintiff's October 18, 2011 affidavit 
contains no new facts which were not previously available to the Court in Plaintiff's prior 
affidavits.2 In fact, a majority of Plaintiff's affidavit is an extension of her Brief, in that it sets 
forth her analysis of why the Court incorrectly determined there was no jurisdiction over the 
Plaintiff does append new documents to her affidavit, but none of these documents are relevant to the 
issues for reconsideration. Exhibit 1 is instructions for how to complete the sealed bid documents. Exhibit 2 is 
allegedly a printout of Smith County's website. Exhibit 3 is allegedly a recorded telephone conversation with Lois 
Moseley, who is not a party to this suit, and Exhibit 4 is a certificate for Ferron Stokes, who is also not a party to this 
suit. None of these documents provide new or relevant evidence to whether there is jurisdiction over Defendants in 
Idaho. 
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Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to show that any new facts would 
support a reconsideration of the Court's prior ruling. 
The only reason, then, for the Court to reconsider this matter would be if the Court 
misapplied the law to the facts as presented. Johnson, 143 Idaho at 473 (errors of law may be 
basis for reconsideration). Defendants contend that the Court properly determined that no 
jurisdiction exists over Defendants, and that Plaintiff has failed to show that the Court made an 
error of law. Even utilizing Plaintiff theory of law regarding formation of contracts and such, see 
Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 4 - 12, Plaintiff puts forth no evidence or legal reason to support 
her claim that any contract was formed in Idaho. Therefore, the Court did not improperly 
determine that the long arm statute did not create jurisdiction over the Defendants in Idaho. 
Further, Plaintiff relies on both W States Equip. Co. v. Am. Amex, 125 Idaho 155 (1994) 
and Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Suvplv, 98 Idaho 495 (1977) to support 
her conclusion that jurisdiction is appropriate. However, Plaintiff ignores the fact that in both of 
those cases, the out-of-state entities initiated the relevantcontact with the in-state entities, seeking 
to form a business relationship. W States Equip. Co., 125 Idaho at 156; Southern Idaho Pipe & 
Steel Co., 98 Idaho at 496. In this case, the opposite occurred. Plaintiff sought out Defendants in 
Texas, and then initiated contact with them. Thus, the rulings in those cases do not provide any 
support for Plaintiff's request for reconsideration. 
Plaintiff also attempts to allege that the Idaho Supreme Court has overturned Akichika v. 
Kelleher, 96 Idaho 930 (1975) in Blimka v. My Web Vlholesaler. LLC., 143 Idaho 723, 727 
(2007). Motion for Reconsideration, p. 19. This is incorrect. In Blimka, the Idaho Supreme Court 
distinguished Akichika, but did not overturn it. Blimka, 143 Idaho at 727. Therefore, the Akichika 
analysis and holding is still valid law in Idaho, and there was no error in the Court relying on it 
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as valid caselaw. 
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the Court should reconsider its ruling as to whether 
Defendants properly made a special appearance. Plaintiff relies on Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 
146 Idaho 319, 320 (2008) for support of this proposition. However, Rhino Metals. Inc. was cited 
by the parties at the hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiff does not 
satisfactorily show that the Court misconstrued its language. VVhile Rhino Metals, Inc. does state 
that "If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court, he must keep out for all 
purposes except to make that objection," it also contains the following language: 
Rule 4(i) further provides that the voluntary appearance or service of any pleading 
by a party constitutes voluntary submission to the personal jurisdiction of the 
court "except as provided herein." It then lists three exceptions. First, filing a 
motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) does not constitute a voluntary 
appearance. Second, filing a motion asserting any other defense does not 
constitute a voluntary appearance if it is joined with a motion under Rule 
12(b)(2), (4), or (5). Finally, filing a pleading and defending the lawsuit does not 
constitute a voluntary appearance if it is done after the trial court has denied the 
party's motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5). 
Rhino Metals, Inc., 146 Idaho at 322 (quoting Engleman v. Milanez, 137 Idaho 83, 85 (2002)). 
Defendants' actions in this case fall precisely within the second exception: all of Defendants' 
other affirmative defenses were joined with Defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion. Therefore, 
Plaintiff can only arrive at her conclusion that a general appearance occurred by ignoring the 
plain language of I.R.C.P. 4(i) and 12(g) and the remainder of the language of the Rhino Metals. 
Inc. case on which she relies. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not satisfactorily met her 
burden to show that there is a basis for the Court to reconsider its prior decision. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
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Based on the foregoing, Defendants request that the Court deny Plaintiff's petition for 
reconsideration, and further deny Plaintiff's petition to issue a 54(b) certificate. 
DATED this day of November, 2011. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
~ . 
B /~JV", Cr- / y ______ ./___;;'Yi, ___ "-_, ·~___ _ 
Brian K. Julian, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants Tab Beall, Law 
Offices of Perdue, Brandon, Fielder, Collins 
and Mott, LLP, Smith County Texas, and 
Gary Barber 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _l I_ day of November, 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION Al\TD REQUEST FOR 54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED OCTOBER 18, 
2011 by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Holli Telford 
Assignee to M.D. Diet Trust 
106212 S. Old Hwy 191 
Malad City, Idaho 83252 
Pro Se Plaintiff 
[ x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ x] E-mail 
. I 
Brian K. Julian 
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ROM : 
HOLLI TELFORD 
10621 S. Old HVl'Y 191 
Malad, Idaho 83252 
FRX ND. Nov. 19 2011 10:27PM P1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA COPELAND, et al 
Defendants 
STATE OF UTAH 
: SS 
County of 
Case No. CV 2011 -- 00066 
AFFIDAVIT OF LISA NIELSEN 
CONFIRMING RULE 68 SETTLEMENT 
JUDGMENT 
I, Lisa Nielsen, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts of herein and do competently attest 
thereto. 
2. I entered into a Rule 68 settlement contract regarding Texas properties 
that I defaulted on. Holli Telford was the substitute trustee for the lender that 
mortgaged one of the properties. She agreed to forego foredosure proceedings 
associated.with the defaulted Texas property if l sent Texas recording official Ann 
Carraway Bruce a conveyance instrument which transferred title in the property to Jim 
Keddington. My voluntary conveyance avoided costly foreclosure fees which I would 
have been otherwise Hable for_ 
3. I contacted Jim Keddington to notify him that Texas recording official Ann 
Bruce was supposed to be sending him a letter confirming that the property had been 
transferred to him after recording my voluntary conveyance deed. Mr. Keddington gave 
me attached exhibit "1 ", an email communication from Ms. Bruce verifying that she had 
sent a letter to Jim_ Jim later called me to complain that he had received no such letter 
from Ms. Bruce. 
fc 
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4. I subsequently called Ms. Bruce to inquire into the conveyance matters that 
were supposed to be confirmed by her in an offidal letter. Ms. Bruce informed me that 
she had sent my quitclaim deed to the County clerk for recording and that the Clerk 
refused to record my document unless I made a personal visit to the recording office. 
could not as I was in Utah at the time addressing serious financial difficulties with my 
office supply business. 
5. Holli expedited the foreclosure process by executing a foreclosure deed on 
December 28, 2010 to Jim Keddington. Again, the clerk refused to record Holli's · 
foreclosure deed because I had not personally appeared before the clerk to file a quitclaim 
deed. As a result Holli and Jim have suffered subtantial losses as well as myself. 
6. Holli and I agreed that Hom would sue me in the present proceedings and 
only seek statutory damages of $1 ,000 for the failed conveyance m?tters - if I would 
assign all of my causes of actions arising out of the Texas land transactions to Jim 
Keddington. I did so assign my rights over to Jim Keddington. 
7. As promised, Holli and I entered into a Rule 68 settlement judgment where I 
agreed to pay Holli $1,000 plus $88 in filing and service fees and I further agreed that I no 
longer had any rights, titles or interests in the Texas land transactions. 
8. This settlement agreement has already been performed upon by me and is a 
judicially closed matter. Accordingly, I seek a final judgment from this court dismissing 
all of plaintiffs claims against me with prejudice as settled. 
r your affiant saith naught, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO B~FORE ME THIS _i1_ DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2011 
CQs.Ll~"i TL)o,\G.fY 
501~·;s 
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Clrn11ii. PW: ~c<m frn1ti a >:erox WorkCcntre Pro https://rnail.google.rnni/mail/?ui=2&ik:~e3'1680e58b&view-=pt&sea ... 
conveyed in fee simple Thank-you. 
fQuoled text hidden] 
Bruce, Margaret <margaret.bruce@daHascityhall.com> 
To: james keddington <jimkeddington@gmail.com> 
We sent a letter to the address specified , 
Ann Carraway Bruce 
Sr. Real Estate Specialist 
320 E. Jefferson, Room 203 
Dallas, TX 75203 
214-948-4103 
214-948-4083 (fax) 
marnaret. bruce@dallascitvhall .com 
wtfW. pat. da llascitv ha II. corn 
from: james keddington [mailto:iimkeddington@amail.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2010 2:49 PM 
To: Bruce, Margaret 
subject: Re: FW: Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre Pro 
[Quoted text hidden] 
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